Thoughts from a Dustoff Pilot
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26 January 2012
I am a Dustoff pilot (Instructor pilot) with over 1000 hours of combat time, and over 300+ combat medevac missions under my belt. In 2004 (Iraq) we flew single ship, responding to thousands of medevac 9-line calls. Not one helo shot down, but we sure got shot at a lot. On a few occasions, we had to ask armed helos, who were out on missions, to divert and escort us into some hot areas. On a few other occasions, we had the Air Force Pedros request to go along with us on missions. We responded quickly and efficiently. When we got the call, we went.
When there were multiple casualties, we as crews made the call to launch more than one medevac bird to accommodate the number of patients. No bureaucracy on launch authority or escorts.
Now, all medevac calls must go through channels, must be approved by commanders at battalion level or higher, must be escorted etc etc. This is what slows us down.
Some facts as I see it:
1. With only 1 medic on the helo, we will NEVER take more than 2 critical patients. More than that will overload the medic’s ability to treat the patients. So arming medevac will NOT lower the ability of the Blackhawk helicopter to carry patients due to weight. (Hawks in medevac configurations, typically launch at about 16K lbs, but have a max of 22k, so are they saying that guns and ammo weigh 5000+ pounds? Ridiculous.
2. Medevac can launch within 3-5 minutes of a call. Pedros always took at least 10 to get spooled up. [Note from Michael Yon: Pedro can go in about 6 mins.] Apaches and Kiowas must sight in their systems and take at least 15 minutes to get up, assuming they are fully armed, fueled and ready to go. So escorts always keep us waiting.
However, the biggest problem we face in combat today is not waiting for escort (though they are slow), it is not the Dustoff crews, it is the current command. Commanders and their representatives (usually battle Captains on duty) are so worried about their careers being effected by enemy action, they will take any Dustoff call and send it so high up the chain of command (cover your ass) that it takes 30-45 minutes to just get launch approval. This usually has little to do with our escorts. We sometimes are all (medevac and escorts) ready to fly, but sit for 20 minutes for launch approval, because someone has to wake the general, brief him or her and then get approval for the mission.
So taking off the red cross, arming the medevac bird is a great thing, but will only solve half the problem. We need commanders willing to allow the Dustoff crews to do their job, without multiple layers of approval for every mission. We need to solve the problem of every commander having to fear for his career (or worse) over making decisions on the battlefield. We need to empower the lower levels of command again instead of waiting for the generals to micromanage the entire war.
====END====
Separately, this comment was found under a dispatch:
RE: MEDEVAC Issue — Dustoffer
I'm a Dustoff pilot that returned from Afghanistan in April 2011. There is a launch criteria that we have to be off the ground within 15 minutes of the 9-line call. The problem is, we have to be approved by our battalion commander or the battle captain on duty to launch. There were several times we were sitting on the ground at REDCON 1 (100%) waiting to be told that we could launch. I actually launched my bird early once and proceeded to get an ass chewing once we returned via telephone. I honestly believe if I were closer to the flag pole, they would have relieved me of my position. I was about 6 hours away by air. Oh, and I launched at 15 minutes and some change.
To add injury to insult, approx. 70% of the missions I flew were MEDEVAC on MEDEVAC coverage. Meaning we had no gunship escort to the pickup site (one MEDEVAC aircraft covering another MEDEVAC aircraft).
There was more than one occasion that if we would have had mounted M249's or M240's we could have laid suppressive fire and/or engaged the threat. That is my personal and professional opinion. Unfortunately, my opinion doesn't matter.
This comment was found here.
And I strongly disagree with “my opinion doesn’t matter.” The opinions of Dustoff and Pedro people are extremely important. Dustoff and Pedro opinions carry the overwhelming weight of this fight. The force behind all this is the Dustoff and Pedro communities. Every morning they crack the whip. I am only the public face. My website is your website. This is your microphone.
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Comments
This is exactly what I have been concerned about. The rear echelon - REMF's - in old military lingo are hampering the efforts of the MedeVac Operation in the theatre of operations today.
I was convinced that at the Unit Level that the MedeVac Crews held to the same high standards that I flew under stateside in a MAST unit flying in extremely dangerous weather and terrain. The above statements confirm that. As the Pilot In Command I had full discresion to accept and attempt the mission and we could be airborne in 5 minutes. We saved untold lives of those we were tasked to serve.
Thank you for your service and for confirming my belief and conviction that those crews flying MedeVac today hold the same high standards begun all the way back to Vietnam and Korea.
The contrast between Iraq and Afghanistan tells us that the longer our wars go on, the bigger and more cumbersome the bureaucracy becomes. But the scariest thing is that an officer can sit back in a headquarters and place his career ahead of a soldier bleeding on the battlefield. I cannot fathom how a soldier can let another soldier down like that.
The Command appears to be satisfied to meet the Golden Hour criterion *on average.* That is fallacious thinking. The question is not did I meet the average; rather, it is did I do the best that I could do? That is clearly the attitude of the Army and AF aircrews. It appears, however, the staff criteria is, "Did I meet the required average."
Decisions must be kept at the lowest level possible because those are the people closest to the situation on the ground. They know the enemy situation, the weather, and the patient's criticality. These facts don't change as the decision is pushed higher, but the perspective does.
This thread makes it sound like we are like some 3rd world country who is afraid to let our Sergents, Lieutenants, Captains and Majors make decisions and get a job thats needs to be done right now from being accomplished.
If we have to wake a general to make these kinds of decisions, then there is something seriously gone wrong with our command structure.
I couldn't agree with you more and was once placed in a position to explain to the Commanding General, as a Warrant Officer 1, why I had flown the mission I did. I informed him that his thoughts on requiring the "Offficer of the Day" to give a go ahead for a mission were useless.
The OAD had no experience and therefore ability to make that call. I also told him that with all due respect, he didn't either!
We have been at war for ten years! Is it not finally time to retire these pathetic slugs and replace them with warriors?
Please start with the current SMA (Sergeant-Major of the Army). He visits units and asks soldiers, "who is wearing their dog tags?" Anyone who is not wearing them is excoriated as an example of a "bad soldier," "lacking discipline." Rather than consider the combat experience of such men, he focuses on petty "indicators" that are, in the end analysis, meaningless.
This sort of conduct was a hallmark of some of the shittiest Command Sergeants Major to ever befoul an Army uniform. Most of them scurried for hiding holes when the wars began, or they retired. They were peacetime soldiers, not warriors. They were good at directing soldiers to paint rocks and mow grass, and they were exemplary at holding stupid, time-wasting inspections. They were not good at training soldiers for war. When the time came to go to war, they vanished.
Now that the cycle is turning again, and a period of peacetime looms, they are reappearing.
This is precisely the sort of jackass that needs to be evicted from the services. We are going to downsize. We must downsize. We need to downsize. Do not, for God's sake, leave idiots in positions of high trust. Kick them out.
Promote warriors!
Secondly, these types of "life and death" legitimately frame the issue of whether or not these middle layers of bureaucrats really add sufficient value? If you eliminate these multiple layers of command, you effectively eliminate a vast number of opportunities for promotions and/or billets thus threatening "career growth".
What has happened to retaining decision-making and the lowest level possible - a historic advantage of the American military? In Vietnam pilots said sergeants were making launch decisions...or if they heard a MEDEVAC request they just flew it. Statistics compiled by the Royal Army Medical Corps shows that the mean time for a MEDEVAC has lengthened by more than a third since Vietnam - things have gotten slower over the past 40 years.
Still arguably not as useful as an armed escort. A second medevac-configured helicopter, armed or not, would have some other advantages; if one aircraft had to discontinue the mission, a single ship could finish the mission -- an apache would have a hard time continuing a mission to pick up a casualty if the medevac they were escorting went down.
Plus, if you are flying 2 medevacs, you might be willing to pick up some marginal lower category patients at the same time, vs. only picking up CAT A and leaving the rest to CASEVAC or ground evacuation. Having a larger total number of medevac helicopters also gives you more capacity in the case of mass casualties, patient transfers between medical treatment facilities, etc.
There are some decent arguments for dual ship medevac vs. medevac + armed escort missions independent of the overall armed vs. unarmed medevac argument. I am for armed medevacs flying single or dual ship missions, with occassional and opportunistic Apache escorts for particularly hot pickups, with the goal of never delaying a medevac mission unless it absolutely cannot be helped.
But the fact that this pilot waited on launch approval while Redcon-1 for CAT-A's on the tarmac is a reflection on HIS unit's commanders and lack of trust in lower level staff. That wasn't mine or my unit's problem, so don't "copy/paste" this claim to all units.
I'm fully on board with some of the suggestions of Michael Yon and some other readers, but remember: when listening to an opinion, that's coming from one single, bias point of view... mine included. Don't frame everything as what happens in all instances, all units; you'll blur the real picture.
I agree with your point of view that the incident referred to by Mike Yon was indeed ONE incident and refers to one decision (or not) to launch.
The response by the Army (not just that unit) has been to use bluff and deception, citing Geneva Convention etc as their "excuse". The Army has made it an Army issue. Every argument that they have given has been dismissed as invalid or inaccurate.
I agree that, in this situation however, it reflects the lack of trust from above. My own personal biased opinion is that lack of trust and "CYOA" (cover your own a**) is a huge problem and responsibility should be handed to those closer to event.
Mike himself has clearly stated that other units and forces do not use the Red Cross and are armed. Why not the Army.
They cannot give a clear and valid response. This is criminal and why Mike has highlighted and pushed for a) publicity of the issue, b) resolving the issue in order to, c) save the lives of these brave young men.
My utmost respect goes to you for serving your country in war and having to make the bold decisions to save lives.
Maybe if there were more like you serving in the Army now and making the necessary decisions, we wouldn't be reading these reports from Mike.
To you, to all serving members of all armed forces and to Mike, Stay safe (through wisdom and awareness, not through beurocracy)
First thank you for the kind words. I'm more countering the Dustoff pilot's claims that Yon posted here. I'm fully behind Yon's mission of removing the crosses and adding the M240's, which is the cause to the effect (being the reasoning for the delay for rescuing Chazray).
This Dustoff pilot is essentially claiming that the bigger problem is the Aviation commanders and their staff is killing soldiers more so than these other problems (as he closes with). I don't know how much better or worst it has gotten since I was there, but the bureaucracy slowing responses goes away with:
1. Commanders that can put their ego away long enough to grab lunch without managing 100% of the battle
2. Competent staff (particularly CPT's and SGT's) that can be trusted to make these tough decisions in the absence of orders (it's right in the damned NCO creed).
Early on in my deployments, both factors were weren't in equilibrium, but as the Aviation unit settles, tactics are run by CPT's/SGT's more so.
This Dustoff pilot refers to this as an endemic problem, which it is not as far as my experiences pertain.
I'm with you, and have total respect. As (I think I'm right in saying and which goes with your original post) You, I, Mike, and the majority of readers here, will have a modicum of sense and reality, and will be able to take every opinion "with a pinch of salt".
I cannot claim to have any knowledge of exactly why (or not) these decisions are made. I am not and soldier and never have been. I can only read opinions and make my own mind up.
I'm not saying that bureaucracy is endemic and claiming lives, but it appears that (from what I have read) it was the problem that allowed Chazray's recovery to be delayed for an unacceptable period.
When this was raised by Mike, the Army has backed itself into a corner like a wounded hyena and is snapping back with a misguided and often inaccurate fury.
That would indicate to me that the policy of marking and not arming DUSTOFFs has contributed to (not necessarily been the cause of) Chazray's death. They are embarrassed. But will not concede easily.
Ego has no place on a battlefield. Neither do lack of trust, bureaucracy and half a**ed policies that were dropped as irrelevent over 50 years ago by some forces.
I will end with agreeing with your original comment and re-iterate that the original comments are ONE opinion, (as are mine and yours) but counter with the argument that (in the context of the bigger picture that is unfolding here) it would appear to me as though it's not an isolated incident. Not necessarily endemic, but for one frustrated pilot and his crew it could well appear to be that way.
As I said in earlier post, Respect to you, and to all past, present and future warriors.
Stay Safe
Wish I had known about this before I sent the letters to my congressional representatives .
Thanks for explaining the issues you are having. It helps us to understand what you are going through.
Anyway the current situation is outrageous, but I bet matters would soon change if the powers that be were in the firing line. The trouble is of course they make sure they keep out of the way, too busy making up rules to do anything useful. Pathetic.
We must train, use, and respect them. By the same token, if anyone passes a decision up the chain for no good reason; they should be penalized.
Too many officers on division and brigade staffs have little to do and try to insert themselves into decision-making where they are not needed.
So we have two problems: improper aircraft markings and configuration and a growing number of officers afraid to take on the responsibilitie s normally associated with their positions.
"The more things change, the more they stay the same."
Lt. Col. USAF-ret (Vietnam veteran)
1. With only 1 medic on the helo, we will NEVER take more than 2 critical patients. More than that will overload the medic’s ability to treat the patients. So arming medevac will NOT lower the ability of the Blackhawk helicopter to carry patients due to weight. (Hawks in medevac configurations, typically launch at about 16K lbs, but have a max of 22k, so are they saying that guns and ammo weigh 5000+ pounds? Ridiculous.
I also like the comment stated by the Dustoffer :
There was more than one occasion that if we would have had mounted M249's or M240's we could have laid suppressive fire and/or engaged the threat. That is my personal and professional opinion. Unfortunately, my opinion doesn't matter.
If you want the truth and the facts, take from the men and women who actually do the job, not some pompus ass that has brass instead of stripes.
Even if the base and the casualty are both are reasonable altitudes, it is common to have to traverse very high saddles in the mountains enroute. The highest altitude largely governs the weight allowed for the mission.
This wasn't an issue in Iraq -- it was hot, sure, but everything was pretty low altitude, with no pesky mountains between every valley.
But really? Put over a barrel and not lifting off until some 12 star general finally says so.
Dear Dust off pilots, Please get together, and make the choice to go. If the army grounds you, and the next guys lifts off the same way, they can't ground you all.
At the end of the day, orders may be orders, but following bad orders - in this case leaving men on the ground dying because of stupid politics requires bad orders to be defied. I doubt I personally would sit on the pad waiting. I'd take the ass chewing, grounding, court marshal first before accepting this. I think I'd rather be bust down to nothing and be thrown out than simply accept that.
They can do far worse than ground them all. I understand the sentiment but "getting together" to disregard your chain of command is called Mutiny. You can be shot for that, remember?
Art. 94. (§ 894.) 2004 Mutiny or Sedition.
(a) Any person subject to this code (chapter) who—
(1) with intent to usurp or override lawful military authority, refuses, in concert with any other person, to obey orders or otherwise do his duty or creates any violence or disturbance is guilty of mutiny;
(2) with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of lawful civil authority, creates, in concert with any other person, revolt, violence, or other disturbance against that authority is guilty of sedition;
(3) fails to do his utmost to prevent and suppress a mutiny or sedition being committed in his presence, or fails to take all reasonable means to inform his superior commissioned officer or commanding officer of a mutiny or sedition which he knows or has reason to believe is taking place, is guilty of a failure to suppress or report a mutiny or sedition.
(b) A person who is found guilty of attempted mutiny, mutiny, sedition, or failure to suppress or report a mutiny or sedition shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.
(a) News Media
(b) Politicians
(c) Military Brass
(d) All of the above
Well these people have given the LINE officers a taste of the good life on the side of raping the system for personal gain. Most of the Stars and Birds never spent a minute in combat ( even though #400 in line busting up a house was Mac Daddy Chrystal, yup Mr teflon acting like one of the boys) They are looking for the easy life and these taxis give it to them. Its going to be REALLY hard to Pull it away from them.
http://www.armytimes.com/community/opinion/army_opinion_letters_080204/
There's something to be said about putting it under either command though. Putting it under the GSAB means that emphisis on what to task the MED birds to can be more efficient. At the GSAB level, you can say no to a "Priority" level mission that can legitimately wait for 4 hours or so knowing there's a very high danger mission going on that you can safely assume will yield an "Urgent" patient any moment. The GSAB staff guy will hold that Priority mission for a bit in order to be postured for potential Urgent any day of the week.
So as you see, there's advantages and disadvantages to placing their tasking under any command.
On the flip side, you can have inefficient commanders/staffs at the GSAB level that can delay Urgent launches.
It will always come down to commander's trust in their low level staff and that low level's staff efficiency.... something that definitely varies from unit-to-unit AND within each unit from time-to-time. No different than the business world, just higher stakes.
Doc
http://psysim.www7.50megs.com/skyraider%20resc.html
first, the pilot or receiving medical facility should report the falsified 9-line as it could have cost another soldier his life. The aviation unit CO or the medical unit CO should inform the batttlespace owner, usually a brigade CDR, that he needs to perform a headspace adjustment on one of his subordinates.
Decisions to release aviation assets should not have to rise above that battlespace owner. There is no reason on earth why MEDEVAC coppers can't mount M240's as a minimum. There is no longer a reason for there to be a shortage of rotary-wing assets in Afghanistan.
There is another way to examine this policy. What if all Army MEDEVAC helicopters were Pedros instead of slick Blackhawks? Well, first we wouldn't have to wait for an armed escort and we would still probably fly two ship formations. BUT, no Apache or Kiowa helicopters would have to be diverted from direct CAS missions. So, two ship evacs instead of three or four ship flights. We would be saving airframes and blade time (maintenance) at low cost. Most importantly no delays and no staff officers switching thumbs and calling higher. It has been my experience that pilots in this business are not risk averse. Finally, take major aviation unit staffs and commanders out of the decision making chain. The assets would be assigned (chopped) to the battlespace commander until rotated back to the aviation unit.
Result - shorter response times and lives saved - period.
It is important to understand that in this incident, the fucking battalion commander is standing erect on the LZ and he has determined that the LZ is cold. I am not interested in what any staff officer at BDE thinks or at DIV if there is one. If the BDE commander questions the judgement of this BN commander, he should get on the horn and ask him. But, time is a wasting and this is bullshit. It is arrogant for any staff officer to impose his judgement on a superior who is a commander. If an S-3 (and I was one) thinks that a subordinate commander's judgement is flawed, he had better get the Brigade commander involved because if I was the BN CDR; when I got back I would do more than kick his ass.
The grim reality is that no one is likely to be able to ascertain whether the Taliban have set up a sophisticated ambush – even with overhead IR surveillance. That surveillance was present (but off-center) where the SEALs in that Chinook were shot down. So, going higher in the chain is unlikely to better develop the situation. But, I’m forced to contrast this with RVN where it was degrees of warmth and usually the pilots came in knowing how bad it was going to be and came anyway. That’s why we switched to armored seats. I wish that we could slap some armor on today’s helicopter skins like the old Jolly Greens. What can I say, things have changed.
DUSTOFF does not have MISSION Authority, nor does PEDRO. That comes from the Patient Evacuation Coordination Center (PECC). Mission Authority is where we need to be looking.
Air Force does not have "Medics". The Air Force Pararescuemen (PJs) are highly trained in personnel recovery. They are in theatre for Combat Search and Rescue, not MEDEVAC. While the PJs training is far superior to that of the Army Flight Medic, they are trained for two very different missions. I encourage further education on the difference between the two and their mission before making blanket statements comparing the Air Force Pararescuemen and the Army Flight Medic.
If you really want to see how MEDEVAC/CASEVAC should be done, look into how the British program works. Their flight crews and medical assets are far superior to that of PEDRO and DUSTOFF. No need to re-invent the wheel, just learn from other successful programs.
This course teaches how to manage trauma patients prior to evacuation and provide emergency medical treatment. Phase I is 4 weeks of emergency medical technician basic (EMT-B) training. Phase II lasts 20 weeks and provides instruction in minor field surgery, pharmacology, combat trauma management, advanced airway management and military evacuation procedures. The airmen are then sent to Tucson, Arizona for hands-on medical training. Trainees work along side paramedics with the Tucson Fire Department as well as local hospitals. Graduates of the course are awarded National Registry of Emergency Medical Technicians-Paramedic (NREMT-P) certification.
Army Flight Medic training is a 4 week course for existing Army medics. It is similar to portions of the AF course. They are trainined to the same EMT standard as the AF, but are not EMT certified.
All Army medical skill competencies are at the EMT-Intermediate / Paramedic level. All tasks encompass skill levels 1, 2, 3, and 4 soldiers.
The Air Force training is more adult trauma oriented while the Army Flight Medic gets broader training to include pediatric care.
Michael was on a Pedro that took off in between 5 and 6 minutes. A Pedro pilot confirms this timing on this blog.
You are correct that a lot of this problem lies with the PECC which is staffed by the unqualified second-guessing the on scene commander and the TOC Battle NCO or BATTLE Captain. The battlespace owner at BN and BDE level are in the best position to assess the threat-level in their AO. No one higher should have meaningful input on threat.
AF pararescuemen are paramedics and most have some trauma training stateside as well. That exceeds the training of the average Army flight medic - in fact just two weeks ago the AMEDD announced that it will upgrade the training of incoming medic trainees to get closer to that of the pararescuemen.
MERT and MERT-Enhanced do generally fly with more highly trained medical personnel and in of itself the CH-47 used is considered a Role 2 medical treatment facility. Technically, under NATO guidelines the "golden hour" clock could stop ticking when a casualty is brought on board the CH-47. The Chinook is also fitted with machine guns or mini-guns on each side and on the rear ramp for protection. MERT can also bring along a security squad of troops for extra LZ protection.
The shortcomings of the MERT model is the Chinook takes longer to runup than does a Blackhawk and is slower to reach cruising speed. (Once at cruising speed it can outfly - speed and altitude - most if not all helicopters in Afghanistan). It is a mighty big target when taking off and landing, so the usual practice is for the MERT copter to land some distance away and have casualties transported to it. This obviously can add time and logistical challenges when crossing IED strewn fields and roads. It also has been documented that Pedros have been called in several times when MERT missions could not land close enough - or in one well documented case when wounded British troops were caught in a minefield. Pedros were called in by the MERT crew and the pararescuemen were winched down, attended to the wounded, winched them and their comrades up in a series of sessions and then were lifted out themselves at the end.
The Brits have undertaken a lot of self-examination from the early days experience in Afghanistan which was not so successful.
units both Active and Reserve are spaced-out along the route. That should tell you something. I used to jump with them and they have to practice jumping into trees like smoke jumpers. Their record in North Vietnam is legendary. Because of their talents, they sometimes go on other Service's SOF mission. They are truly unique.Their creed:
"t is my duty as a Pararescueman to save lives and to aid the injured. I will be prepared at all times to perform my assigned duties quickly and efficiently, placing these duties before personal desires and comforts. These things I do, that others may live."
- MERT has a the same launch requirement during daylight hours and a slightly extended requirement during night hours. So the statement "The shortcomings of the MERT model is the Chinook takes longer to runup than does a Blackhawk" is incorrect. I have been on DUSTOFF missions where we launched within 6 minutes as well.
- I absolutely agree that the AF Pararescuemen's medical training far excedes that of the Army Flight Medic. Having worked with and trained Army Flight Medics and Air Force Pararescuemen, I am well aware of what each of their capabilities are. What I feel is not being communicated is that the PJ is not in theatre for the MEDEVAC mission. In fact, some sources are implying that they will be pulled from the standard MEDEVAC/CASEVAC mission to be available for their PR mission.
- The question I have is what are you really debating? Is it launch capability? Medical treatment team capability? Pilot capability? And where is your data to back up your statements?
Are you simply trying to get rid of the "red cross" and allow medical assets to fly as CASEVAC only? I feel that a large part of the discussion on this webpage is in realtion to GETTING THE AIRCRAFT TO THE POINT OF INJURY. As a member of the military medical community I would like to know what is your end game?
The Army underdeployed MEDEVAC copters in Afghanistan & mission times exceeded the "Golden Hour". Sec'y Gates ordered that MEDEVAC missions be measured against a 60 minute metric. To help achieve that he also ordered Pedros be integrated into the MEDEVAC mission.
I'll guess that Pedro MEDEVAC missions are flown in a ratio of x00:1 against CSAR for downed pilots. Functionally they are now MEDEVAC with CSAR as a secondary mission based on actual missions flown.
Why should Pedros sit idle waiting for a PR call when they can be actively recovering wounded ground troops?
GOAL: minutes matter in MEDEVAC - get help to the wounded as fast as possible. How that is achieved is not linear - there are a lot of interconnected pieces that need to change. Remove time sinks anywhere in the whole process related to MEDEVAC missions
Just as there a lot of issues, there are many ways to make progress.
- remove the red crosses and arm the Army's MEDEVAC helicopters
- adjust the mission approval and asset selection criteria to allow greater flexibility in responding to MEDEVAC calls
-etc.
Re training:
- since at least 1999 AMEDD has been publishing journal articles every few years by its staff stating the need to improve combat and flight medic training. After 13 years, AMEDD said two weeks ago training for new medics will be upgraded.
- stats reportedly show that Reserve/NG MEDEVAC units have the best survival rates due to the training level and experience of their medical crews
- a lot of the argument against Pedro in the last 4 months centered around Army medics being better trained than the pararescuemen. Funny how AMEDD is now seeking to match their training in medics.
CASEVAC vs MEDEVAC is a dead end discussion. Pedros fly Cat A MEDEVAC missions per the JCS own document. Arm MEDEVAC copters and let 'em fly their missions.
Another piece just appeared in New York Post:
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/hurry_wait_and_die_wyLvNsCxiZKASR4ePF3VyK
That statement will outrage the PJ community. I suggest using this statement with caution.
- "CASEVAC vs MEDEVAC is a dead end discussion." So you do not know the significant difference between the two?
- Statistics absolutely prove that Reserve and NG units have better patient outcomes than our Active Duty. I completely agree. I was a part of that research and saw it first hand. The Army has now started to fly ICU/Trauma Nurses with DUSTOFF until the Flight Medic training is up to par. Even after the Army Flight Medic reaches the EMT-P standard, the Nurses will continue to fly. In the same way that the PJ team often flies with a Flight Surgeon when they fly CASEVAC on PEDRO.
- So your goal is to shorten the time needed for launch authority. That is something I can completely understand and agree we need to do some further research and development.
- What are your methods to help this process? Mission statement or objectives?
- Have you spent time to investigate the fixed-wing CASEVAC assets in AFG? There is a much larger picture than what I think this site is focused on. I feel there is a lot of opinion and very little data to support it. I know that OPSEC makes this discussion a little difficult but there is data out there...
As to the differences between CASEVAC and MEDEVAC? I have spent days researching the topic. It is a muddle of mixed descriptions and overlapping capabilities. In the reality of the war in Afghanistan it is largely a distinction without a difference when it comes to calling Pedros and MERTS CASEVAC because they fly unmarked and armed, or can perform more than a pure MEDEVAC mission. Arguing about unclear and obsolete definitions is unproductive. The Army, AF and MERT all fly MEDEVAC missions.
I have been working 60+ hours a week on this issue reading AMEDD Journal articles and research documents, reading the very insightful Journal of the Royal Medical Corps articles about MEDEVAC in general and in Afghanistan in particular. I have been finding and reading Army FM's that affect MEDEVAC missions. I have scoured the web for any article on MEDEVAC since 2000. I have searched NATO Allied Joint Publications dealing with medical issues and guidelines, ditto for UK publications.
I am part of a group of individuals which include several Dustoff pilots and combat leaders who discuss this topic nearly non-stop. You will see a comprehensive web site in the near future that will serve as a 1 stop shop for the whole area of MEDEVAC investigation and review.
We are focused on RW assets right now for battlefield evacuation. I am assuming that since the V-22 is not used for MEDEVAC, the FW assets are used for TACEVAC movement of patients. That is another can of worms. Perhaps we can take it up off-line.
I will ask Michael to provide my contact information to you through his webmaster. I believe your continued input would help us polish our research and presentation.
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