The Bridge
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Mission—March 1
On Monday, March 1st, an element from 5/2 SBCT was about to embark on a mission from KAF, up Highway 4 and into the Arghandab district, west of Kandahar. I was reading Afghan news just before breakfast when the latest report appeared claiming that Canada is preparing to withdraw from Afghanistan. That would create problems, considering BG Menard is commanding US combat troops.
At 7:35 a.m. I had just left breakfast en route to grab body armor for the mission when Karuummphh. . . . Having heard a thousand IEDs and car bombs during the last five years, something sounded wrong. Four miles away as the crow flies, the mushroom cloud could be seen.
A suicide car bomb had exploded on the Tarnak River Bridge, killing civilians and sending a heavily armored MRAP off the bridge. According to reports later that morning, the suicide bomber apparently had waited in ambush and had pulled into the convoy as it crossed the bridge.
American Soldier Ian Gelig was killed while comrades were wounded.
Our mission that day would have included driving over the Tarnak River Bridge. The suicide bomb damaged the structure. We could not cross. The mission was scrubbed and rolled back 24 hours.
Next morning, Tuesday, we made another go at the mission, and were strapped into the MRAPs and ready to roll when a FIPR text message scrolled on the MRAP computer that vehicles attempting an alternate route across a riverbed were getting stuck. (The riverbed was mostly dry, but just a short rain could render it impassable to any traffic.)
With this mission cancelled due to the bridge destruction, I started asking commanders who exactly was in charge of security for that bridge. Everyone said TF-K. Inside the TOC (HQ), I found Colonel Harry Tunnell, Brigade Commander of 5/2, who was busy reading some reports, and asked him who was in charge of security of that bridge. “Was it 5/2?” I asked. No, answered Colonel Tunnell, TF-K is responsible for the bridge. I clarified, TF-K, meaning Task Force Kandahar. The commander is Brigadier General Menard, Yes? “Yes,” answered Colonel Tunnell. So General Menard is responsible for that bridge, yes? “Yes,” answered the Colonel. Like most American soldiers who have worked with Canadians, Colonel Tunnell generally holds Canadian soldiers in high regard. He probably didn’t realize where this was leading. Nor did I.
With time on hand because of the cancelled missions, I spent the afternoon researching who exactly failed to secure the bridge. The attack happened Monday. This was still Tuesday.
Wednesday, I wrote on Facebook:
Task Force Kandahar, responsible for security of the bridge that was blown up on Monday, happens to be under Canadian command. This is causing friction. The Canadian government has clearly signaled that it will quit Afghanistan, yet a Canadian General is commanding US combat forces and resources -- all while allowing a strategically important bridge to be blown up. American officers have been held accountable by Americans for shortcomings in Afghanistan. Our combat soldiers should not be commanded from a country that is quitting the fight. The bridge fiasco on Monday underlines that fact. With our next big offensive set for Kandahar, command should be with British and U.S. forces. Canada needs to step out of the way.
Though numerous sources had confirmed that BG Daniel Menard was responsible for the bridge, the Facebook reports were provoking an array of responses, many of which were centered around hockey and nationalism rather than the strategic bridge. [Note: the entire Facebook dialogue remains public.]
Captain Adam Weece, Brigade Public Affairs Officer at 5/2, emailed to me:
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUOJust got another update- RAF is responsible for things leading to KAF, not Kandahar City. Bottom line, it's a messy gray area that has changed hands a few times.
v/r
CPT Adam Weece
BDE Public Affairs Officer
5/2 ID (SBCT), Afghanistan
Michael Yon email to Adam Weece:
What is bottom line? Who has responsibility for security of that bridge? Messy gray area is worse than black and white. Messy gray area means at least two commands are fully responsible.
Adam Weece to Michael Yon:
When we (Stryker) assumed the FOM mission, TFK assumed security for the bridge.
Michael to Adam:
Okay, Adam, but this does not specifically say that TF-K had responsibility for security of the bridge at the moment that it was blown up. That's the only answer that is needed. Who had responsibility at the moment the bomb detonated?
Adam:
Michael- I'm writing this out so it's clear. The bridge falls within the GDA or Ground Defense Area, responsibility of which is mutually shared by the Royal Air Force and TFK, depending on the intent of the missions occurring there. If activity there involves the security of Kandahar City then it is the responsibility of the RAF. If activity there involves just the area - like GR and D projects or maintaining the roadway - then it falls under TFK's responsibility. TFK is responsible for repairing the bridge.
END
So we’ve gone from TF-K is solely responsible to TF-K is partly responsible to we don’t really know who is responsible, meaning, at a bare minimum, the General Officers in RC-South and TF-K are responsible.
On Wednesday evening Colonel Tunnell called me into his office, pulled out a marker and began to explain matters on the white board. Colonel Tunnell was open and answered every hard question.
Colonel Tunnell said that TF-K Area of Operations is Kandahar, but the specific area around the bridge had been assigned to GDA (RAF), and that when units such as those from 5/2 conducting route clearance, or 82nd Airborne, drive over the bridge, they enter what’s called an “Ops Box.”
In this case, the Ops Box is a transit zone over the bridge. Transiting units radio up to RC-South “CJOC” saying they are entering the Ops Box, and call when they leave.
While GDA is responsible for the ground, TF-K is responsible for the ground around the ground and the ANP on the bridge, while TF-Stryker is responsible for the road but not the bridge or the ground around the bridge.
[Important point: Our people/NATO cannot stop bombs from exploding, nor can they stop people who are guarding the bridge from being killed. Someone must be on the outside perimeter checking vehicles. Some of those people inevitably get killed. Though bombs cannot be stopped, they can be kept off the bridge. This bridge should never have been blown up.]
In response to my Facebook entries, TF-K was swinging back in the press, speaking through willing Canadian voices:
Military rebuffs blogger's call for top Canadian general to be fired
This was going to be a good one: whenever the mainstream media disapproves, they call me a “blogger.” (Incorrectly; I don’t have a blog and only ran one for some months back in 2005.) When they approve of my work or opinion pieces, they refer to me as an “author,” or “war correspondent.”
Media outlets chose to cite a source that ignored the fact that a strategic bridge was attacked, and instead focused on diversions, such as the timing of the Olympics, versus the damage to a strategic bridge under the very nose of a NATO general. This diversion might serve to illustrate the ratings-driven focus from “news” outlets seeking manufactured, inconsequential controversy.
TF-K, for its part, tried to divert attention from the central issue, by introducing stresses created when US soldiers are under Canadian command. There is only one important thread: A strategic bridge was badly damaged because best practice for keeping it secure was not followed. A General was responsible. This controversy never would have occurred if Brigadier General Daniel Menard had secured the bridge several miles outside the gate from his office. He probably heard the explosion.
The failure of Canwest reporters—Canada’s largest media conglomerate—to grasp or acknowledge the point of the story, sadly reinforces the fact that the mainstream media has failed abjectly in accurately reporting the Iraq and Afghan wars. No media outlet acknowledged the importance of the bridge, if they even noticed.
This had become a media chess match. I used Facebook to sling a stone, while the TF-K Goliath used Canwest for cover.
General Menard denied responsibility. If true, this meant the commander of RC-South, Major General Nick Carter, was responsible.
Yet by Thursday afternoon, more than three days since the attack, nobody would answer who was currently responsible for the bridge. This was getting surreal.
With TF-K jumping for cover, the only thing left was to take it up a level.
My Facebook:
Menard vs. Carter
Bridge failure heating up:
TF-K has, for all intents and purposes, blamed RC-South for allowing the bridge to be attacked on Monday, resulting in the death of a US soldier and serious damage to a vital bridge. The controversy has reached the respective Generals at TF-K and RC-South. For those who understand the dynamics here, Brigadier General Daniel Menard (TF-K boss) has shifted the blame to Major General Nick Carter (RC-South boss).
This has become a dinosaur fight -- Menard vs. Carter. Little people can get crushed.
END
On Thursday, 4 March, three days after the bombing, traffic was flowing, including the fuel trucks from Pakistan. Normal trade was resuming and cancelled missions restarted. Crucial time was gone.
My Afghan cell phone rang. A British voice at the other end asked if I had time to talk with Brigadier General Hodges at 1710, about two hours later. I said sure.
Then came word that a 5/2 soldier had just been killed and others wounded, so I sat for a while. The soldier’s body was on the way back to KAF and the family apparently had not yet been notified.
At 1710 the meeting with BG Ben Hodges began in his office. A U.S. Naval officer, a British officer from Scotland, BG Hodges and me; I was there to answer only two questions: Which Coalition partner was responsible for the bridge on Monday? And, who is responsible for it now? General Hodges explained a bit about battle spaces. Then he said, squarely, that he, himself was the responsible officer. I didn’t believe him, but did not say so. He insisted that it was his fault. He took that bullet for—who? More to the point, he claimed responsibility for the security of the bridge going forward, knowing he would be under scrutiny. He won my instant respect. I believed he was trying to solve the problem and get on with war fighting. When he took responsibility, I said something like, “That was very courageous, Sir.”
As far as I was concerned, General Hodges ended the matter by taking the bullet, though now I had to summarize for people at home.
Facebook:
Summary of meeting with Brigadier General Ben Hodges: The result was unexpected. General Hodges courageously accepted full responsibility. My respect for him doubled in about 30 seconds. Henceforth, Strykers will "own" the bridge. Bottom line: problem solved. BREAK. Something very important came up tonight [was the death of a Stryker soldier], so will give accounting Friday. The accounting will include an apology from me to General Menard.
In apology to BG Menard, I should not have demanded that he be fired so early in the process, despite that my assertion that he was responsible has proven true. I should never have mentioned hockey, as that created room for a diversion from the central importance. Brigadier General Menard clearly was not the only responsible party for this strategic bridge that his soldiers depend upon. To single out BG Menard was a mistake, despite that he was ultimately responsible for the ANP.
Some hours after the meeting with BG Hodges, after midnight, there was another ramp ceremony at KAF. BG Hodges was there along with many others from Canada, Australia, UK, the US and other countries. A Marine was going home for the last time, alongside the soldier from 5/2 who had been killed earlier in the day. Helicopters and jets were nearly constant, and so loud that I could not hear the chaplain. Just in the background, across the busy runway, in the darkness, was Tarnak River Bridge. Ian Gelig had died there on Monday and been flown home from this same ramp.
Thursday night, two flag-draped coffins were delivered by MRAPs next to the runway. Comrades lifted their coffins onto the C-17. Stryker soldier Anthony Paci and Marine Nigel Olsen were going home. Hundreds of troops from different nations saluted one last time. The ramp closed and the jet flew into the night.
[Final note: About twenty troops have been killed in Afghanistan during the days since the Tarnak Bridge Bombing. A close source conveyed that Task Force Kandahar, under BG Daniel Menard, will henceforth be tasked with the security for Tarnak River Bridge, and that Task Force Stryker and the RAF are not responsible for the bridge.]
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Comments
If a certain general is responsible for a strategic bridge that his soldiers depend on, then it's his responsibility to make damned sure who else is responsible for what his mission, his men depend on, and that they know they're responsible for it.
If I'm in charge of hospital operating rooms, I want to know who is responsible for the blood bank, and the pharmacy, and anything else that my surgeons may need right now. And I personally want to know that they personally understand that they are responsible for that blood getting where it needs to go when it needs to get there, in the shape it needs to be in. Menard didn't do this.
To me responsibility is forward looking. Knowing who to blame when they fail you is a distant second best. Making sure you don't have to blame them is much better. Menard didn't.
Conversely, Hodges said, "Me, I'm the guy. I own it." If a guy is willing to take someone else's blame for yesterday, he's probably going to get the job done tomorrow, by getting peoples' eyes back on the ball today -- as he did. Please note, I'm talking about particular generals here; not entire countries.
The problem with having responsibility is you also need the clean lines of power to carry it out. In WWII, Ike was SCAEF. He was the guy. He could sit on Patton, and rein in Montgomery, and make it stick, and they knew it. Because Roosevelt and Churchill knew he had to have that power. Sadly, the lines are considerably blurred today when the RCs and even TFs feel they are under their National Authority as much as, or more than General McChrystal's. And whose fault is that? Not the General's.
And, ain't it funny how now the bridge is back under Menard's command.
Determining responsibility in this thing is like trying to nail jello to a board.
To start, thank you for the very detailed background information on the relevancy of the Tarnak Bridge. I have read and accept almost everything you have reported. However, the following quote from the report requires some supporting evidence;
Moreover, while Canada increasingly shies from combat, American units under Canadian command will spill blood under Canadian military leadership that answers to Ottawa.
I find this statement to be inflammatory in that it implies that Canada and thereby its forces is doing a less than acceptable job. Both the Canadian and US governments have indicated that they will be withdrawing from the combat mission. I am not sure about the other allies but I expect the same applies. What we have been told in Canada is that the "combat" mission will end sometime in 2011. Combat troops will continue their operations until that time and another deployment of troops recently trained in the Mojave Desert will arrive in Afghanistan in April or May of this year. There has been no indication that the combat effort has begun to wind down and at the same time there has been no indication that Canada will not take an active role in the post-combat activities.
If you have any substantiated information that the above is not accurate, I would appreciate reading about it.
Sincerely,
Lee
One minor point - Is GEN Petraeus technically GEN McChrystal's boss? I was under the impression that, technically, it was ADM Stavridis (SACEUR)
"TF-K Goliath used Canwest for cover"
"This controversy never would have occurred if Brigadier General Daniel Menard had secured the bridge several miles outside the gate from his office. "
"Brigadier General Menard clearly was not the only responsible party for this strategic bridge that his soldiers depend upon. To single out BG Menard was a mistake, despite that he was ultimately responsible for the ANP."
"General Hodges explained a bit about battle spaces.Then he said, squarely, that he, himself was the responsible officer. I didn’t believe him, but did not say so."
" while Canada increasingly shies from combat, American units under Canadian command will spill blood under Canadian military leadership that answers to Ottawa."
This is the logic Yon uses to defend his position:
"TF-K is responsible for Kandahar, but the specific area of the bridge belongs to the RAF. However, the Bridge itself is guarded not by RAF but by ANP (Afghan National Police) mentored by the American 97th MPs. The 97th is under Canadian command through TF-K. And so, at the time of the attack, TF-K was responsible for the physical security on the bridge itself, while GDA had responsibility for the land around the bridge."
"On Wednesday evening Colonel Tunnell called me into his office, pulled out a marker and began to explain matters on the white board. "
"Colonel Tunnell said that TF-K Area of Operations is Kandahar, but the specific area around the bridge had been assigned to GDA (RAF), and that when units such as those from 5/2 conducting route clearance, or 82nd Airborne, drive over the bridge, they enter what’s called an “Ops Box.”
In this case, the Ops Box is a transit zone over the bridge. Transiting units radio up to RC-South “CJOC” saying they are entering the Ops Box, and call when they leave. While GDA is responsible for the ground, TF-K is responsible for the ground around the ground and the ANP on the bridge, while TF-Stryker is responsible for the road but not the bridge or the ground around the bridge."
GDA = British
"Though bombs cannot be stopped, they can be kept off the bridge. This bridge should never have been blown up."
Even though a positive outcome has been made..."A close source conveyed that Task Force Kandahar, under BG Daniel Menard, will henceforth be tasked with the security for Tarnak River Bridge, and that Task Force Stryker and the RAF are not responsible for the bridge."....Michael Yon somehow manages to make is sound like a farce, and a mistake.
My take is that GDA is responsible for the bomb making it to the bridge. Yet Yon says this of GDA,
"The British Royal Air Force (RAF) is responsible for something called the GDA. The GDA is the Ground Defense Area, and is responsible for security immediately around KAF. By all accounts, the RAF is doing a fine job. The GDA includes the area around the Tarnak River Bridge."
This is an example of what journalism is supposed to be. Thank you for the clear information and the integrity to stick with the facts as they become available riather than twisting the facts to fit prior statements.
Keep up the great work Michael. If you hadn't raised the flag on this one many more troops would have been killed in the future.
Thanks for drilling down into the rat hole known as 'coalition command structure'. As you know, the complexity of that structure is caused by any number of reasons ... but mostly by 'treaty' or 'foreign policy' decisions made by national government officials (staffers?) far dislocated in both time and geography from the action .. and who will almost never have to deal directly with the consequences (unintended or otherwise) of their decisions. Yet somehow, the men and women on the various headquarters staffs that have to implement that policy cobble together an opeational framework that seems, for the most part, to work.
But I'm not surprised at all in what you discovered; e.g., these sort of unclear / ambiguous areas of responsiblities are everywhere (despite the best efforts of military planners at all echelons to eliminate them) ... not just in Afgahnistan but in any multinational/interagency/combined operation. They only seem to come to light, however, when something bad happens. And when those bad things happen, lessons are learned. And, as is the case for most military-related lessons learned, men and women pay for that lesson with their blood.
Yet, despite all the machinations and intricacies involved in trying to design an organizational command structure that is foolproof and accounts for all contingencies, the honest truth is that it can't be done. Good military leaders know this. Civilians back in DC and other government policy centers don't. Which is why the most fundamental principle of leadership at all levels in the military pertains here; e.g, those in command are ULTIMATELY responsible for the safety and well-being of those men and women under their charge. And so, BG Hodges acknowledgement that he was responsible may have seen 'courageous' to you at the time he said it, but to me .. as a retired 0-6 ... I would have expected nothing less. Accepting responsibilty for the lives of the those under their command is what good commanding officers do.
This bridge security issue highlights one of the major problems of counterinsurgen cy warfare. The insurgent has the initiative; he does not need to guard bridges etc, just a few small base camps if that. I have some experience with static security checkpoints. This is a simple mission but it takes alot of troops and a high level of discipline. Checkpoint duty is etremely boring, you have to rotate soldiers frequently to combat complacency. Guarding the Tarnak bridge must take at least a platoon to support a 24 hour mission probably more. I'm sure that US/NATO battalions are nickeled and dimed plenty enough with different taskings. putting US or Canadian troops on the bridge takes them away from other missions. Another problem is that checkpoints on major routes block traffic for miles if you thoroughly check all vehicles which can be piss off the population. Multiple inspection points speed up the process but require more troops. It is presumptious to suggest this from thousands of miles away but a military only bypass bridge would solve the congestion problem but would also tie down take US or NATO troops.
I hope you write about 5/2 Bde's freedom of Movement mission. This is more complicated than it sounds, especially if, as I suspect, the Bde has a bn plus under command to do it.
An armed drone should be over this thing 24/7, and a cordon of American Marines in a 360 config with sniper overwatch. Put ONE mean-ass Colonel in charge, and kill anything not authorized that comes near it, including livestock and Italian officers.
>>General Hodges explained a bit about battle spaces. Then he said, squarely, that he, himself was the responsible officer. I didn't believe him, but did not say so.
That you can keep raising counter points -- or quoting -- does not make them valid. Give it up. Please.
The British were responsible for GAD who were responsible for who got on the bridge.
Try to follow the story. He didn't declare he wanted it to go away. You give up.
Your article points out the need for clarity and honestly in reporting, which your article is a great example, and militarily, the need for clarity of command and unity of command.
For whatever reason, it's not really clear now who's responsible for that damned bridge. That's a shame and will kill more good soldiers.
In practice they are a herd of cats, lacking unity of effort. The reality is that each command reports back to its own leadership—in Rome, Paris, Berlin or wherever.
and two paragraphs earlier:
The man behind the letters is General Stanley McChrystal. General McChrystal’s boss is General David Petraeus at CENTCOM.
it seems that the americans are suffering from the same "calling home" problem as the other ISAF allies. because the boss of McChrystal (in his function as COMISAF) is not Petraeus/CENTCOM, but General Egon Ramms, Commander Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum of NATO.
"If a certain general is responsible for a strategic bridge that his soldiers depend on, then it's his responsibility to make damned sure who else is responsible for what his mission, his men depend on, and that they know they're responsible for it."
Yes so Hodges was responsible....and so was Menard. ...and so was the bureacratic system that prevents establishing clear authority in these situations.
To all the commentors who seem to feel Yon is unfairly targetting an ally, you may want to read his older material. He doesn't hold back on anyone whether its US, UK, Canada or others. Don't take it personally. The noise he made over this issue very likely resulted in a faster and more effective resolution to the root issue. If some general, or a dozen generals, gets bad press in the process, whether fairly or not, it seems a small price to pay for potentially saved lives and successful missions.
More importantly....the issue now should be about what we're going to do about bureaucratic complications....today and tomorrow in light of the lessons learned and in light of post incident analysis to ensure the safety of soldier's lives today and in the future...
That said, I'm sorta torn. I've got 13-14+ years in, and I sorta think Michael is a victim of his own success. In the beginning, we got dispatches that was an after the fact review of what happened. Now, it's more of a real-time, ops impacting, listing of what's happening. Much of what he reports, I see in NATO classified sitreps. This is where I get uncomfortable. I'm still wrestling with WHY I am uncomfortable with the level of detail and real-time nature of these reports, and more importantly how I'd do it differently or better (after alll any one can point and criticize, it's better to have a solution).
Yon made a mistake apologizing. BG Menard is a general and should have realized how important that bridge was which was in his area. Not his area of responsibility but his area. Instead he acted like the USSR trained it generals -- ie worry only about your job and nothing else. For example there have been cases during WW2 of a Russian general seeing a German flank open and not attacking, because he did not have orders to worry about that flank. In WW2 with our forces, if a commander seen his flank or a bridge was not secure that if assaulted or taken would effect the battle, they used what ever spare forces they had (cooks, supply, etc) to do the deed. During the famous Chosin battle in Korea, a small Marine company commander who was ordered to another town, noticed a very important road that went around a mountain and could easily be cut, was wide open to the Chinese taking the hill over looking it. On his own he dug his unit in. That unit took horrible causalities. But if it had not been for that small company, the Chinese would have destroyed not only that US Army composite regiment, but a whole Marine division.
Again, BG Menard was a general who ignored his duty. As the British Royal Navy use to tell young officers. Those brass button (the sign they were an officer) are the curse of god. You can be court martial for what you do and even WHAT YOU DON'T DO and cashiered and even hanged!
Jack E. Hammond
.
Just to clarify. Canada is withdrawing from Afghanistan, because its' ground units soldiers and equipment are just plain worn out. A top Canadian general even stated it would take two years back in Canada to get them back to being ready to deploy if need be. Unlike the US, Canada has a small army. It just does not have the depth like the US military and other worlds military's ground forces which can rotate battalion or brigades in and out of Afghanistan. For the number of soldiers and the size of their ground forces, Canada has taken a pretty big hit in Afghanistan. It is other NATO nations (German being the main one) that let us down in Afghanistan. Not CANADA.
Jack E. Hammond
Gen. Hodges commands Strykers. Strykers are moving vehicles. They protect moving convoys while they are moving down the road. They are riding shotgun as it were. They do not dismount and set up roadblocks to check approaching vehicles, and then chase after their convoy to catch up after it has passed by. That would be ridiculous.
Do you really not grasp the two very different concepts of protecting a stationary bridge vs. protecting a moving convoy?
Should the Strykers really have opened fire on the car while it was still well away from the convoy, and was only a possible threat? Maybe, in a different war. But in this COIN war we deliberately try very hard not to shoot up what may well be a family trying to get to town. That is why we have -- or are supposed to have -- STATIONARY check points that are supposed to stop such vehicles, or engage them before they can do this kind of damage. That didn't happen, and that is definitely the fault of the commander.
What would you be saying about Gen. Hodges and his Stryker's fire discipline if they HAD riddled a car carrying a family far enough away from the convoy such that it could not damage the convoy -- or the bridge? What? What would you be saying now, Kit?
By trying to shift blame to the British you are agreeing the job needed doing, but wasn't done. Whether they had the men isn't the question. Who was assigned the job is the question, and that person was Gen. Menard. If he didn't have enough men, or enough anything, he should have been hollering to whomever would listen. Did he? No, because he has denied it was his bridge to protect.
By your reasoning, Gen. Hodges' troops should have been lining the many miles of entire route from where they started to the front gate of KAF.
Certainly it is not entirely Gen, Menard's fault, but that bridge WAS his responsibility, and he should have been screaming for what he needed to protect it from the very predictable attack that happened. But, he didn't. Why he didn't we don't know, but he didn't.
As far as Strykers go, mechanised units set up checkpoints all the time. BG Menard is in charge of US Strykers and Canadian LAV IIIs (stryker with a bradley turret) which sometimes setup checkpoints, and sometimes they don't. Bill Smith, it is rather short sighted of you to dictate the doctrine that any of these Officers should have used.
Hopefully someone will learn from this whole deal and sort this type of thing out, but a bridge being blown up is not so unusual in a war.
Finally, Canada is NOT leaving the "combat" mission in Afghanistan because it's military is too small or worn out. I know, I've been in it for a long time, and have done several tours in Afghanistan. We are leaving the mission because of a lack of POLITICAL will. Period. The size of the military and the resources can easily be fixed by increasing the size of the military and buying/borrowing new gear. We had an infusion of money several years back, now the government is cutting the Defense budget AGAIN so that we can "balance" the books. It saves their ass. There are plenty of soldiers who want to deploy, and plenty of gear as long as we pay for it. The government (2 successive opposing parties) didn't make a good enough case for the war to the public, so now they have an out when the going is rough. The Canadian Forces still isn't even close to the size it was only 20 years ago.
Don't worry terrorists, you want to bring your garbage to our soil and make it a bigger fight, it will only turn things around and we will actively destroy your ability to fight.
From Yon's facebook>>Michael Yon Summary of meeting with Brigadier General Ben Hodges (US deputy commander RC South): The result was unexpected
Clearly TF-K was responsible for the bridge. TF-K is commanded by Menard. Hodges took the bullet (Yon didn't believe him) which is what honourable officers do. Read the email exchange, please.
my understanding of the situation is that CENTCOM is responsible for all US-led operations in AfPak. That includes OEF, but not ISAF. because ISAF is a NATO-led operation. So McChrystal as COMISAF should not report to CENTCOM, but via JFC-B up the NATO chain of command. if McChrystal also plays a role in OEF, he'll report to CENTCOM for that, and that's fine.
mainly i wanted to highlight the hypocrisis in michaels statement, that the US is pure in its adherence to the chain of command (in comparison to the other NATO forces that he claims lack unity by reporting back to their countries).
If McChrystal reports to Petraeus/CENTCOM (as michael proudly states in his opening paragraph), he's doing exactly what michael criticizes the other NATO partners for.
Exactly right and well put.
Imagine if every setback in war saw this much 2nd hand hand ringing? We'd all collapse in dispair. Learn from the mistakes, and correct them. Don't make instant gut reactions and over-reactions, calling for dismissals, etc.
Well spoken also on Canada's withdrawl "Actual Canadian". Our withdrawl has everything to do with political, and by extension, societal, will. The politians and the people are going to bring our involvement to a halt. The Canadian Forces could and would continue the fight if asked to.
- Junker, another actual Canadian who served in Khandahar
The defense budget is a third higher today than when Harper first came into power....about 20 billion. Remember, our population is 33.3 million.
However, the question is where else do we need to deploy our military and it's investment into it? There is the arctic, there is equipment, there is the inevitable natural disasters, there are other wars in progress that need world attention, or wars on the cusp that look urgent and threatening to world security. Where is our skill, values and most importantly, loss of potential life or permanent wounds the best sacrifice? Please google to read "Is it time to give up on Hamid Karzai?" by Brian Steward of the CBC to help weigh in one of the many Afghanistan considerations.
BTW, good points about what is clear in the blame, ie, nothing is clear. The bridge is, or nearly is, repaired by the Canadian military engineers, and there is a clear contingent now in charge.
Going to be a hard year. Much death ahead.
As for being mentioned in passing...it is an important point. Shows how they work together. Shows the confidence NATO has for getting the job done.
Anyhow, keep up the good work Michael.
That quote of Michael's really bugs me. Canadian troops have a casualty rate (killed and wounded) in the order of 23% (highest of all NATO countries). A part of this statistic is 4.9% KIA of troops sent to Afghanistan (highest). The American casualty rate is, I believe, somewhere in the order of 14-15%, of which 1.3% KIA of troops sent. A total of 5.7% of the total US military personnel are currently in Afghanistan, for Canada it is 4.4% of total military personnel (as per WSJ feb 24, 2010).
These are sobering and saddening (to say the least) numbers. I don't know why the casualty rates for the Canadians is so high, but I don't believe it is because Canadians are not good soldiers, and I certainly don't believe it demonstrates that we are shying away from combat.
Maybe everyone should just stay out of your way and you should just do it all yourselves. MY wants everyone to stay but everyone is ineffective. Just go unilateral then and to he'll with it.
2. Colonel Tunnell - Commander of the U.S. army's 5th Stryker Brigade - Ops Box explanation - for units driving over the bridge they radio RC-South
3. The Canadian Millitary - Spokesperson Lt.-Col. Danny Fortin = The bridge, "does not fall within Canada's area of responsibility for security"
4. CanWest media - Reporter Matthew Fisher from Kandahar
5 .Brigadier General Hodges - Under command of British Major-General Nick Carter of the RC-South- I am "the responsible officer" PLUS, as noted were in the office as Hodges explained this:
6. A U.S. Naval Officer - witness to this statement
7. A British Officer from Scotland - witness to this statement
All these 7 groups/people conspired to say Menard was not responsible. That's the only explanation here. But Michael, you saw through all of that...it was 'proven true' by your own reasoning, that Menard was responsible, and you did not believe Hodges. You saw the conspiracy. And your cult following Sheeple, who can't piece information together, support that. They jump on board because you provide a bridge to the war for them - a noble thing, a good thing. But a voice can do both good and bad. The thing is, you created the grey area you rally against. You're not a team player, are you? You created the notion as you say, that, 'Canada needs to step out of the way'. And you were right to do so, that conspiracy, right?
Or, or, maybe you can't deal with the fact that the very thing you so vehemently felt/feel about Menard, is true about yourself. Because you will not clear this up by connecting the dots...and the dots say something profound about you. There is a fine line between being a cynic (healthy) and being narrow-minded (dangerous). Your ego, is beyond inflated...you are not a saint, or God, a valid crusader, or any other blasphemous adjective, you are human. What kind, well, I just wonder about what those 7 groups/people think about a man who can't accept their judgement. I mean, it's not like they're there, in the battlefield, like you are. Not like they have the manual, and the specific details of who's got what responsibility, to draw from, like you must have.
Partially true ... Canada's military is very small, but I believe it is much smaller than it should be and can be. Canada neither spends enough to defend itself nor contributes its fair share to its collective defense commitment as a member NATO. Canada spends about 1.1% of GDP on defense, just above half of the 2.0% NATO treaty "mandated" minimum, and less than a quarter of the percentage of GDP the U.S. spends. In essence, Canada, and most other NATO nations freeload on American defense spending, and have for sixty years.
I'm not saying that the U.S. hasn't gained from this arrangement, only that such altruism is not sustainable. Current U.S. budget woes demonstrate that America cannot fund both the level of defense spending needed to meet its military commitments around the world and it's current welfare entitlements … let alone the kind of comprehensive cradle-to-grave welfare regimen, including universal health care, provided by most EU and NATO nations.
The question is, what happens to NATO (and South Korea, Japan, Israel, etc.) when the U.S. inevitably slashes real defense spending? The EU possesses a GDP larger than the U.S., yet spends so little cumulatively on defense that it has proven itself unable even to address issues in their own back yard (e.g., the Balkans mess), until the Americans participate.
William Drozdiak, President, the American Council on Germany
Interviewer:
Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor, CFR.org
Council on Foreign Relations
March 2, 2010
In criticizing Europe for not paying its share of NATO's costs, Gates said NATO troops don't have enough helicopters, tanks, and other equipment. Is this because of the budget crisis through the world?
It's because in Europe there is no security threat on the horizon, while there was one during the Cold War days, so it's harder to get voters to accept that they need to spend more on defense. Europeans now spend about 1.7 percent on average of their gross domestic product on defense, with the United States spending 4 or 5 percent. But the real problem has been the concern within Europe that continuing the war against the Taliban is not going to bring about a long-term peaceful solution and that European politicians have a hard time convincing their public that fighting on behalf of the regime of President Hamid Karzai--which is widely viewed as corrupt--is a worthy cause.
December 10, 2009
OTTAWA—A new report shows that Canada’s rising National Defence spending is $21.185 billion in 2009-2010, making Canada’s rank 13th highest in the world, and 6th highest among NATO’s 28 members, dollar for dollar. (The 15 countries with the highest spending in the world account for over 81% of the total)
-"Canadian Military Spending 2009" is published by the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. Bill Robinson is a defence analyst and senior adviser of the Rideau Institute.
BTW, for Canada and Nato, it's currently 1.3% of GDP. Still, size wise, the military is small. We only have a population of 33.3 million and so far doesn't look likely we'll be a military nation like North Korea, or Israel, etc.
Still, not that shabby - all things considered for a country that not many country's have a beef with. Canada, is not a permanent member of the UN security council, ie, U.S. France, Uk, Russia and China. Those 5 permanent members have a mandate to be a "Great Power" that can project their military muscle around the globe. The United Nations Security Council is the most powerful body of the United Nations. The Security Council can authorize the deployment of troops from United Nations member countries, mandate cease-fire during conflict, and can impose economic penalties on countries.
So what good is Canada?
The Global Peace Index is an attempt to quantify the difficult-to-define value of peace and rank countries based on over 20 indicators using both quantitative data and qualitative scores from a range of sources. The top ranking nations on the global peace index were, New Zealand, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Austria, Sweden, Japan, Canada, Finland, and Slovenia.
Or, there are potentially other strengths:
From Embassy, Canada's Foreign Policy Newspaper By Carl Mayer, March 10th, 2010:
Less than 48 hours after an earthquake devastated Haiti, Canadian soldiers were en route to help provide security, humanitarian aid and other assistance.
The speed of the response—a sharp contrast to previous Canadian military endeavours—did not pass without notice. Their speed and effectiveness in deployment were and are unsurpassed in the world."
In an overview of required capabilities for force projection, Vice-Admiral Dean McFadden, the head of the Canadian Navy, as well as the other chiefs of staff, pointed to rapid deployment as one of their preferred policies during a presentation at the Conference of Defence Associations. Vice-Admiral McFadden, who talked optimistically about the idea, said it such deployments are a clear example of "what we do."
Trouble is, if a security threat arises, it is likely to happen more quickly than an adaquate responding military build-up can be executed, given the long lead times to develop and produce modern weapon systems. This is especially true because governments and populations will stay in denial as long as possible due to constraints on their spending.
The U.S. will face this too once it inevitably cuts its spending sharply. Given Europe's experience, a U.S. spending 2.0% or so of GDP on defense is likely to find itself hard-pressed to defend just it's continental heartland against an aggressor. American defense platforms are rapidly becoming obsolescent, and are not being replaced adaquately by next generation systems. This trend will only become worse as dollars dry up.
It mentally shortcuts past the process of examining risks and alternatives, assuming that of course the others have taken them into due consideration.
- The short and easy definition of Groupthink - longer ones are easy to find.
To blindly follow and support a cause, sports team, religion, protest, political figure, etc. without first looking into it or researching it
-definition of the phrase 'Drinking the kool-aid'
Related to - groupthink.
I think you fall into one of the major symptoms: Mind guards — self-appointed members who shield the group from dissenting information.
Btw, what's all the love, and 'I am''s got to do with it? and, I didn't coin that phase, nor am I the only one to see Americans drinking the 'kool-aid' (retired US Army officer, W. Patrick Lang, comes to mind - that was the name of the article!) there are literally hundreds, mainly within your own country. Although, I may be the only one to point it out regarding this specific topic to which I specifically was referring the phrase to, that being the topic of 'The Bridge' and the facebook comments.
But thanks for reinforcing my observation.... Pick a flavor.
Read the comments on Army to Army, it's not just here:
>>It also scares me how most, not everyone, but most seem to trust the words of Michael Jon blindly, with any critical consideration. I have seen very few posts here that actually seem to critizise or atleast have a somewhat open view on the matter. Makes me think slightly about a totalitarian state where no other views are accepted.
This message is sort of late and I have a feeling I might be the only one to read it even, but I thought someone should post what has happened after that bridge was damaged so bad it could not be used. Below is a link to some photos of the Canadian combat engineers making a temp repair to that bridge. I had to use tinyurl.com to shrink the web address as it is on Militaryphotos.net very long.
Jack E. Hammond
http://tinyurl.com/yjrkomq
.
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