The first report done in 2009 said that as of the time of the research that over 1000 of the deaths of American troops in Afghanistan and Iraq would have been avoided if the Army had implemented Tactical Combat Casualty Care training across the entire force. TC3 was developed for and by the Rangers and Special Forces in the mid-1990's and data showing its statistically superior life-saving results were available in the middle of the last decade. Instead, the Army waited to the end of the decade to begin expanding its implementation to regular troops.
The next DoD/Army report was based on extensive reviews of all the deaths of American troops in Afghanistan. It showed that 51.4% of all those that reached a medical treatment facility alive but subsequently died did so from potentially survivable wounds. So, when you hear about the Army gloating that its survival rate is 92% or 95% keep this in mind. On the other side of the argument, AMEDD doctors and researchers have made some very important breakthroughs in treatment philosophy in the field and operating theater, as well as improved equipment and supplies. Especially in the area of hemorrhages of the torso and upper leg. It finally set aside its conviction dating back to WWII that tourniquets were a bad thing that led to amputations and acknowledged research that showed advanced tourniquets properly applied saved lives and limbs.
Finally, the Army has known at least since the 1990's that survival rates for wounded soldiers was 67% higher if they were evacuated from the battlefied by a National Guard MEDEVAC helicoper and crew than if by a regular Army MEDEVAC helicopter and crew. The reason is largely due to the Army Medical Department's stubborn refusal to train its flight medics beyond the EMT-Basic level of skills. Meanwhile National Guard flight medics are commonly full-time paramedics in their civilian life. Despite literally decades of articles from the Army's own medical officers pleading for regular Army flight medic training to be improved to paramedic level the Army refused to act until February 2012 when it began a 5 year transition of flight medic training to paramedic level skills.
The failure of Army leadership has been appalling in this area. They failed the dedicated flight medics and surgeons who are limited by what the Army makes available to them in terms of training and equipment and supplies, and often quashes personal initiative when individuals seek improved skills using their own time and money. Most of all, Army leaders have failed to act to save American lives when the knowledge and ability was there to do so.