Nobody crucifies common sense like the US Army.  During my morning search for anything MEDEVAC related, several new stories emerged, including one with these illustrative quotes from a Soldier returning from Iraq:

“You have to land where you never had to land before,   surrounded by the enemy.”

In conventional warfare a vehicle or aircraft bearing a red cross is considered almost sacrosanct. Not so during the open, no holds barred atmosphere that permeated Iraq.

“There are no rules. They see a red cross, they see a target,” Nicoletti said of rebels. “They don’t abide by the Geneva Convention.  You know they’re there,” he added. “You try to avoid them.”

“Technically a medivac is unarmed, though Nicoletti did have a rifle and handgun. In extreme cases, an Apache gunship would be called to provide cover when a medivac landed.
That was Iraq in a story this Thursday morning in the Palm Beach Daily News.

Now this comment, also on Thursday, but from a Dustoff MEDEVAC pilot currently in Afghanistan:

“A German friend pointed at the red cross on my helicopter the other day and told me how he'd heard that the Taliban will pay anyone who can prove they shot one. Peachy. How much of a laughingstock must we be to our allies here.”

What more is there to say?

An Army officer writes:

The Army is not resisting Dustoff policy change because our leadership honestly believes the current policy is superior, but rather because of AMEDD's [Army Medical Department] protectionist attitude toward "their" Dustoff MEDEVAC helicopters. I'm an active duty infantry officer, and I've been following the Dustoff issue since you first brought attention to it.  More importantly, I have a lot of contacts within the Medical Service branch.  While we have discussed this issue "around the watercooler" at work, Medical Service officers have been receiving briefings from senior members of their branch about a selectively edited account of SPC Clark's MEDEVAC mission, and what their message should be if anyone asks about it.

My contacts have highlighted that AMEDD's number one priority is protecting their "ownership" of the helicopters in question. They are concerned that removing the Red Cross from AMEDD's birds will result in those helicopters being assigned general purpose tasks, outside of the Medical Service Corp's control. In other words, their top priority is NOT providing the best possible care for our Soldiers and partners, but rather protecting their own fiefdoms. AMEDD is choosing to put Soldiers' lives in danger rather than chance losing "their" birds. Never mind that our sister services, special operations forces and allies are all able to field armed, dedicated CASEVAC/MEDEVAC helicopters! Somehow, despite all the evidence to the contrary, this is still the irrational argument AMEDD is sticking to, and directing its officers to spread. I'm concerned that in the dust-up over policy recommendations, comparisons with Pedro, and rebutting the JCS letter that we may be losing sight of the real obstacle in our path to reform. Sincere thanks for all you do, and keep up the fire!

A Gold Star Mother is one who lost a child in service of the United States.  Ms. Keyko Clark-Davis is a recent Gold Star Mother.  I was present when her son Chazray was mortally wounded.  We have communicated many times.  Chazray’s mother is strong and inspirational.  She sends this letter in hopes that other Americans will take a few minutes to absorb her message.

The letter from Chazray’s Mother:

U.S. Army Evacuation Policy Change Request Letter from the Mother of a fallen soldier:

Hello to all American Citizens at home and abroad. My name is Keyko Clark-Davis and I am a military parent whose first-born son, Army SPC Chazray Clark was killed in Kandahar, Afghanistan on 18 Sept 2011.

The fact that my son decided to risk his own life to protect the basic freedoms so many of us take for granted makes me extremely proud in spite of the devastation and sadness that his untimely death has caused us as a family. Chazray was only 24 years old. He and I had a long discussion prior to his decision to enlist; and like the majority of mothers I reluctantly agreed and reassured him that I supported his decision 100%. I even went with him to be sworn in after signing up.

I am having a very difficult time dealing with his death and as are his four siblings. Although this is not the sole content of our conversations, my maternal instincts causes me to feel their pain; just as they can feel mine even in the absence of words. My difficulty in coping is compounded by the fact that the US Army has failed to provide me with honest, full disclosure of ALL the facts that caused the death of my son. Although not the official next –of-kin on behalf of my daughter—in law I have requested a complete copy of the Army investigation, autopsy reports, photos, etc., which at the time of this letter I have not yet received.

Thus, after several failed attempts to obtain honest official answers to my many questions from the US Army, I began conducting my own research into the circumstances surrounding my son's death. My grief began to give way to anger when I viewed video footage shot by a reporter named Mr. Michael Yon, who was there at the time my son was injured. Casualty Assistance Officers advised us initially to not believe possible rumors or media propaganda which we might be exposed to prior to us having any knowledge of Mr. Yon. When I thought about that, it actually raised even more unresolved questions with regard to the US Army's "Golden Hour" and "9-line" evacuation policies involving rescue missions. Mr. Yon's footage makes him an eyewitness to what happened to my son, and not just a media person spreading rumors.

It has come to my attention that there was a PEDRO that was operational and could have responded to the 9-line call the day my son was injured; thereby alleviating the 59minutes that my son had to wait for a MEDEVAC. However, due to policies and/or politics within the US Army with respect to other branches operating under CENTCOM the MEDEVAC was delayed.

The loss of my son has become the most life-altering event that my entire family has ever experienced. I feel that the United States Army, has an obligation to every soldier, every family and every US citizen to re-evaluate current protocol and implement WHATEVER CHANGES are needed to save the lives of wounded soldiers by whatever means necessary.

The Army’s contention that they are following protocol of the Geneva Convention is fallacious and without substance. Not only are the Taliban not signatories to the Geneva Convention but the Geneva Convention does not mandate that a MEDEVAC transport identify itself with a Red Cross.

I do not want another family to feel excruciating pain and suffering from the devastating loss of a loved one while policy makers and high ranking officers continue to turn a blind eye to the inherent failures in existing policies. With vivid images of my son's final moments of life FOREVER BURNED into my mind, closure can only be made possible by doing everything in my power to bring about these much needed changes in current policy.

In the name of my fallen hero, SPC Chazray Clark,  I am making a personal appeal to ALL United States Citizens who enjoy the freedoms for which he unselfishly gave his life, to join me in this crusade to bring about an immediate change to an Army Policy that requires alerting the enemy the MEDEVACs are unarmed.

God bless you all and thanks in advance for your prayers and support.

Respectfully,

Keyko Clark-Davis

An overview of harmful Army medical evacuation practices not endorsed by other service branches, and a response to official arguments defending this policy provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to the House Armed Services Committee (HASC).

30 January 2012

Introduction

Michael Yon is a combat writer, and a former member of the US Army Special Forces.  The New York Times noted in 2008 that he’d spent more time embedded with combat units than any other journalist in Iraq, and the reporting on his blog won the Weblog Award in 2005, 2007, and 2008.  It is probable that he has also spent more time with combat troops in Afghanistan than any writer, photographer, or journalist of any sort.  He is widely respected inside the military and beyond for the quality of his journalism, and his pursuit of the truth alongside US and allied combat personnel in the most dangerous theaters of operation.

On 18 September 2011, Mr. Yon accompanied an element of the US Army’s 1st Infantry Division, the 4-4 Cav, on a nighttime combat operation in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan.  During this mission the unit was attacked with an Improvised Explosive Device, deafening one soldier, and amputating both legs and one arm of a second—Specialist Chazray Clark.  Specialist Clark was conscious and communicating up until the time he was evacuated.

US and allied forces have two primary helicopter medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) assets in Kandahar: US Army “Dustoff” flights, and US Air Force “Pedro” flights.  Unlike Army Dustoff flights, the Pedro flights—as well as British, Dutch, US Marines, Navy, and US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) medical flights—do not bear the Red Cross.  The core reasons for this difference involve rapid reaction and maximum flexibility with limited air assets.

While Pedro, SOCOM, and Marine rescue flights can launch and insert quickly due to being armed, US Army Dustoff flights—following Geneva Conventions requirements for bearing the Red Cross—are unarmed, with Army policy requiring armed escort before they are allowed to launch their rescue missions.  Consequently, unlike other MEDEVAC/CASEVAC flights, Army Dustoff flights are regularly delayed while they await escort gunships, often from other areas.  There is no obligation under the Geneva Conventions to wear the Red Cross.

Specialist Clark and others probably died because of this delay.

During the incident in question, a Dustoff helicopter was approximately three minutes away, parked at Forward Operating Base Pasab.  Both Dustoff and Pedro aircrews report being able to be airborne within roughly six minutes of receipt of orders.

However, because there were no Apache gunships available, the Dustoff flight for Specialist Clark was delayed.  Official records state that he was delivered to hospital facilities 59 minutes after the MEDEVAC flight was requested by his unit—one minute from falling outside DoD standards, and within the “Golden Hour” from the moment of injury.  But the military deceives here.  Their fictitious Golden Hour does not begin at the moment of injury, but from the time the 9-line casualty report is received.  This deadly deception was revealed in Golden Seconds.

Pedro helicopters also sitting at Kandahar Airfield could have completed this mission in less than 35 minutes.  If Pedro or armed Dustoff had been stationed at Pasab, Chazray Clark could have been delivered to the trauma center in roughly 24 minutes.

The official record states that it took 59 minutes to deliver Chazray Clark to the combat support hospital.  Video shot by Michael Yon provides conclusive proof that the military has deceived the Congress.  Patient delivery took about 66 minutes from the time of injury, and about 65 minutes from the time of first report.  There is no argument on this point.  This clear deception brings in question all other military statements on this issue.

The death of Specialist Clark attributed to these delays is not an isolated incident.

The purpose of the Red Cross on Dustoff aircraft is to officially designate non-combatant status, granting immunity from hostile fire.  Like many 20th Century rules of war, they are simply not recognized by any hostile elements the US is currently in conflict with.  Even if they were recognized, the Red Cross is hard to see at night or during limited visibility.  Helicopters do get hit with fire at night.  For instance, a CH-47 was shot down at night last August, killing all 38 aboard.

According to the Geneva Conventions, "If there is no agreement, belligerents will only be able to use medical aircraft at their own risk and peril."

The reality is that helicopters bearing the Red Cross receive no protections, they are banned from participating in other high-need combat missions, and they have been delayed in their official duties to the point of permitting the deaths of US personnel.

It is also worth noting that because Geneva protections were not being afforded to clearly designated US Army Medics, they were ordered to cease wearing the Red Cross-marked armbands and helmets and to start carrying weapons—back in Vietnam.  They have not worn them since.

Air Force, SOCOM, Marines, Navy, British and Dutch aircraft have foregone the Red Cross and its legal restrictions, resulting in vastly more flexible MEDEVAC capacity.  In addition to being better positioned to save lives, it is notable that these units also maximize the dollar-value to DoD and the US taxpayer by maximizing the utility of the airframes and aircrews involved.

The senseless additional trauma inflicted upon Specialist Clark after the IED by faulty Army MEDEVAC policy was witnessed by Mr. Yon, and in further researching and reporting on the incident, the full scope of the poor judgment involved in these MEDEVAC policies came forth.  Many seasoned professionals of all walks, including dozens of aircrew members of different service branches, reached out to him to provide further insight.   Dustoff crews, in particular, expressed deep frustration with these policies.

Of additional tremendous concern coming to light is that current Army Dustoff policies actually violate Chapter VI of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, to which the US is a signatory:

“Article 36. Medical aircraft, that is to say, aircraft exclusively employed for the removal of wounded and sick and for the transport of medical personnel and equipment, shall not be attacked, but shall be respected by the belligerents, while flying at heights, times and on routes specifically agreed upon between the belligerents concerned.

They shall bear, clearly marked, the distinctive emblem prescribed in Article 38, together with their national colours on their lower, upper and lateral surfaces. They shall be provided with any other markings or means of identification that may be agreed upon between the belligerents upon the outbreak or during the course of hostilities”

Unless agreed otherwise, flights over enemy or enemy-occupied territory are prohibited.

Medical aircraft shall obey every summons to land. In the event of a landing thus imposed, the aircraft with its occupants may continue its flight after examination, if any.” (Underscore emphasis added)

The reporting of this incident and calls for a change in Army MEDEVAC policy resulted in significant pushback from Army authorities in-theater.  Congressional interest and inquiry resulted only in further resistance from military authorities, including at CENTCOM, all the way to the highest levels of Pentagon military leadership—the Secretary of the Army and the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It is the opinion of Mr. Yon and many of his readers who are subject matter experts, that documentation provided to Members of Congress and the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) regarding Army MEDEVAC policy contains falsehoods and is obfuscatory in nature.

In particular, the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided HASC an unsigned document  with neither title page nor date, which was riddled with egregious errors and deceptions.  With this document, JCS deceived Congress.  While the author is unknown, and may have come from lower commands, the document was provided to HASC by JCS under the color of their authority, without caveat.

The remaining portion of this article addresses this document, and sheds light on the reality on the ground as our troops experience it.  Of particular note, thirteen active duty helicopter pilots contributed to this analysis of the JCS document—five Army Dustoff, five Air Force Pedro, and three additional non-Dustoff Army.  All have completed at least one tour in Afghanistan, or are there now.  Many have also completed combat tours in Iraq.  In total, these 13 pilots have roughly 25 combat tours between them, and thousands of missions.  More than twenty subject matter experts contributed to this analysis.

A copy of the JCS document is published here.  JCS Bogus report to Congress

Commentary and Analysis

The JCS document begins:

“The information below details the circumstances surrounding the event in question as first reported by Michael Yon in his blog titled ‘Red Air’ and followed up by an open letter to Secretary Panetta and President Obama.

After examining the facts and circumstances of this particular incident and compiling data regarding all MEDEVAC/CASEVAC missions in theater, we have found no merit to Mr. Yon's claims that any change in MEDEVAC policy or procedures would provide any improvement in current casualty survival rates.”

Mr. Yon: Both the White House and Pentagon were offered copies of the original, unedited video of the attack in which Specialist Chazray Clark was wounded, described in “RED AIR”, which extended over an hour and included the long delay of the Dustoff arrival.  Neither the Pentagon nor the White House accepted the video, nor have they accepted argument from MEDEVAC crews, and aircrews from other services regarding the speed and effectiveness with which they can conduct rescue operations without the Red Cross designation.  The edited, public version of the video may be found here.

According to JCS:

“Below are definitions that are useful and commonly used when discussing MEDEVAC procedures:

MEDEVAC- Unarmed, specifically designated (Red Cross), US Army UH-60s
CASEVAC- Any evacuation asset other than MEDEVAC (CH-47, UH-1, UH-60, etc.), may be armed or unarmed.
PEDRO- Air Force HH-60 armed with.50 caliber guns on both doors; primary mission is personnel recovery/CSAR; in RC-South, only located at KAF”

Mr. Yon: Pedro units are stationed not only at KAF (Kandahar Airfield), but at Bastion and Bagram as well.  (In other Regional Commands.)  More importantly, however, while their primary mission might be stated as “personnel recovery/CSAR”, the reality is that they are doing MEDEVAC/CASEVAC daily, and even patient transfers in other areas.  Argument has been made that Pedro assets are limited strictly to special operations-types of rescues.  This is not the reality of their employment in-theater.

JCS:

“THUNDER- Unit designation for the Army MEDEVACs in RC-South
CHASE- accompanying helicopter, generally "slick" Blackhawk (.240 caliber door weapons, no external tanks/rockets)”

Mr. Yon: No “.240 caliber” weapons exist in the US inventory. This is such a conspicuous error that the author simply cannot have had any experience with combat units.  Within a combat unit, this is as glaring as saying, “The Houston Red Sox won the Super Bowl. It was a great soccer match.”  Perhaps the author was interpreting this from the M240 machine gun, chambered for the 7.62mm cartridge.  Further discrediting the author was a note I received from a Dustoff pilot currently in Afghanistan, stating that most Chase flights in Afghanistan are “MED on MED chase,” and are thus unarmed.

JCS:

“ESCORT- accompanying, full armed helicopter (Apache, Kiowa, Cobra, etc.); specifically not a PEDRO or lightly armed UH-60”

Mr. Yon: This is false—Pedro aircraft do perform escort.  Pedros are well armed with two .50 caliber machine guns per aircraft.  It is suspected that this duplicitous definition is an attempt to discredit or minimize the policy of other services to provide medical flights that are self-escorted, as Pedro flights are.

JCS:

“Category A (Cat A) - urgent case requiring evacuation within 60 minutes
Category B (Cat B) - evacuation required within 4 hours
Category C (Cat C) - evacuation required within 24 hours
First Up (1st up)- Primary flight asset with responsibility to be first to respond; generally assumed to have 15 minute "run up" time
Second up (2nd up)- Back up flight asset generally responding only after 1" 1 up is unavailable (on mission, mechanical failure, etc)
Run up -The time it takes to prepare an aircraft to fly; generally considered 15 minutes (some aircraft/crew take less time, some take more)”
9 line MEDEVAC Request- 9 lines of information requesting the evacuation (location, number and severity of injuries, condition of landing zone etc...)”

Mr. Yon: The assertion of 15-minute run-up times is inaccurate, and is likely being used to pad “acceptable” time into the delayed response in Specialist Clark’s MEDEVAC, and others.  Pedro and Dustoff crews need about six minutes to be airborne.  British MERT uses a larger helicopter and brings a surgical team and can take fifteen minutes during daytime, but up to thirty minutes at night.

JCS:

“Summary of events in response to ‘Red Air’.

The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 82 decision matrix on MEDEVAC asset allocation is similar to that of the previous battlespace owner, CJTF-10, in that a dividing line exists whereby those missions falling to the west would be assigned to the MEDEVAC assets based at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Pasab and those falling to the east would be assigned to the assets based at Kandahar Air Field (KAF). While similar decision points exist for the MEDEVAC assets at FOB Sakari Karez, Tarin Kowt, and Wolverine, only the previously described line was relevant as the casualty of reference was between Pasab and KAF. The Patient Evacuation Coordination Cell (PECC) in RC-South has the decision lines plotted to assist with rapid evaluation in assigning the evacuation to the location with the most expedient route to the appropriate military treatment facility (MTF).

Based on run-up times and distance from the appropriate MTF's, CJTF-82 determined that the MEDEVAC is the only appropriate asset for any Category A casualty found west of the dividing line; Pedro, from KAF, will only be used for the much less urgent Category B (if PEDRO is first up) or Category C (if Thunder is first up).  Those casualties to the east of the dividing line will be assigned to MEDEVAC or PEDRO based on which unit is first up and which is second up; the designation of which is alternated each Monday at 1300.”

Mr. Yon: The tone of this passage seems designed to appeal to authority and dazzle with vocabulary, but consistently, Pedro and Dustoff pilots report slow, weak, or poor decision-making processes coming from PECC.  Reports indicate this is a major problem with the medical evacuation system in Afghanistan.  A common complaint from pilots is that PECC will task aircrews in a way that makes little or no sense, including having a Dustoff or Pedro flight sitting “hot cocked” (ready to go), only to task a unit needing far longer to spin up, such as the excellent but slower British MERT (Medical Emergency Response Team).

Army and Air Force pilots insist the decision on who to send is often tactically senseless.  The worst examples involve using Pedro units—possessing the highest and most advanced rescue capability—on routine Cat-B or Cat-C patient transfers.  Mr. Yon accompanied such missions with Pedro.  It is fairly mindboggling to witness a Pedro flight used for routine medical transfers—it’s the equivalent of using a SWAT team to write parking tickets, being taken out of availability along with the most advanced gear.  Pedro HH-60G Pave Hawks are capable of entering very hot Landing Zones on the most dangerous or technically difficult of missions and terrain, on missions that may involve the most severe weather, heavy enemy forces, or require scuba (our vehicles are sometimes blown into rivers), or requirements where the medics may have to climb or parachute to patients.  Dustoff cannot perform all Pedro missions, but Pedro can perform all Dustoff missions, and more.  Pedro should be reserved for Cat A and very dangerous or technical work.  Had this policy been in place for Specialist Clark, he may have lived.

As one Pedro pilot noted: “[This is a] serious problem—our aircraft were never intended to fly as much as they have had to.  It is like owning a car with over 400,000 miles that you have to use as a daily driver.  Our maintenance folks are killing themselves trying to keep them flying.”

A second Pedro pilot noted: “Pedro is limited in performance due to weight from mission equipment on high altitude missions in hot temps.  We have HC-130s [Fixed-wing aircraft] in country and can still do a Jump Mission with the PJs to get medical care to them within the Golden Hour then call a Chinook for extraction.  Which the PECC would probably never think of.

This is the critical problem with the entire system.  ISAF PECC Qualifications are inadequate for the Medical Evacuation Personnel assigned.  They make the recommendations on which asset to use to the officer in charge of the JOC [Joint Operations Center] who then authorizes it.  The personnel who fill these positions try hard but are simply not qualified.  Many are Non-U.S. Forces and come from other ISAF Nations.  The only folks running Medical Evacuations in Afghanistan are American and British.  Last time I was there and went to the PECC at Kandahar to see for myself who was making these decisions I was surprised to see for myself that it was a Medical NCO with clinical but no evacuation experience.  Medical personnel run system not Personnel Recovery folks.  They simply don’t know anything about tactical operations.  They spend a lot of time thinking about what is the right thing to do rather than instinctively knowing what to do immediately.

This position should be filled by a Guardian Angel Combat Rescue Officer or Pararescueman, Pedro, Dustoff, or MERT pilot or crewmember that has completed at least one operational tour.  We need someone making the recommendations to the officer in charge that actually knows what he is talking about.”

According to the JCS document:

“MEDEVAC's will require an ESCORT if the casualty is in a area designated high risk landing zone, "hot LZ" by the 9 line request.  This is accomplished by the PECC alerting the supporting aviation brigade who then scans the airspace to locate the closest appropriate asset able to divert and provide coverage in to the high risk area.  In most cases, an appropriate asset is already in the air and can quickly divert to cover the mission; however, if no flying asset is readily available due to mission necessity, an ESCORT will need to be requested from KAF.  The latter is the least preferred as it will take more time to scramble the crew and "run up" the aircraft.”

Mr. Yon: This entire passage would be made largely irrelevant were Dustoff MEDEVACs armed.  In all but the most extreme cases—where Pedro units would be best tasked—Dustoffs simply would not need escort if they had their own weapons.  Pedro is armed and requires no additional escort.  Escort requirements cause delays, and further stress already stretched rotary assets.

JCS:

“The incident in question involved a casualty at approximately 0450 on 18 September 2011 in the TF Spartan AOR in RC-South.  Since the near entirety of TF Spartan's battlespace is west of the dividing line, the appropriate aircraft for any CAT A casualty in this AO is a MEDEVAC.  In this case, because the western LZ was considered high-risk the MEDEVAC required an armed escort.  Because none of the airborne assets were able to leave their mission to provide coverage an AH-64 was requested from KAF.  The crew was scrambled and the aircraft was "run up" and launched toward Pasab; the MEDEVAC from Pasab then joined the ESCORT in the air as it approached the objective.

Timeline:

a.  04:50 – 9-line request placed by unit in field
b.  04:52 – Time of PECC authorization (and begin tasking for ESCORT)
c.  05:24 – Wheels up for MEDEVAC from Pasab
d.  05:37 – Wheels down for MEDEVAC at Casualty
e.  05:39 – Wheels up with Casualty
f.  05:49 – Wheels down at MTF (KAF)”

Mr. Yon: Had the Dustoff stationed at Pasab been armed, the seven-minute run-up time and roughly three minute flight time from Pasab to the Landing Zone (LZ), plus a combat-realistic 2 – 3 minute loading time, would have meant Specialist Clark would have been airborne to the Combat Support Hospital at Kandahar Airfield within fifteen minutes of his unit calling in the 9-line request.

Instead, roughly half an hour was wasted in waiting for an escort, along with additional minutes in linking up with the AH-64 escort.

According to JCS:

“The only stated time goal for MEDEVAC is the 60 minute "golden hour" from time of 9- line request to wheels down at the MTF. This mission was documented at 59 minutes. The 60 minutes is derived from a combination of assuming it takes 15 minutes to "run up" the aircraft, 40 minutes to fly from the base-point of injury-MTF, and 5 minutes for casualty load time; however, this breakdown is only based on estimates and there is no rule that each specific subset must be met.”

Mr. Yon: This passage is a stunning argument for mediocrity, and shamelessly uses poor policy to provide cover for poor decision-making.  Given the circumstances and available assets, Specialist Clark should have been at the hospital within half an hour, maximum.  This letter argues a fictitious 59-minute timeline, in addition to ignoring the minutes it took Specialist Clark’s leadership to determine, in the dark in a combat environment, the nature of the blast and casualties, and to call in the proper information in the required 9-line format.

JCS:

“The extenuating circumstances in this case were the need for an ESCORT and the atypical situation where an ESCORT capable of diverting from its current mission could not be found. This circumstance delayed the MEDEVAC from departing Pasab and required an AH-64 ESCORT to be alerted from KAF. While it would appear that 32 minutes from the PECC notification to wheels up for the MEDEVAC is excessive, the delay was due to the need to confirm that none of the ESCORTs in the air were able to leave their present mission and then to notify an AH-64 crew to move out to their aircraft, run it up, and fly to meet the MEDEVAC.

Mr. Yon's allegation is that the PEDRO would have been more appropriate in this situation. There is no substantiating evidence for this claim. In hindsight, it might have been possible to transport this casualty to the MTF more quickly if the PEDRO would have been launched at the exact time of notification for this mission but that would only have been possible with the foreknowledge of no available local ESCORT.”

Mr. Yon: The mendacity (or ignorance) of this argument is made clear by this Pedro pilot: “Does not make sense. Why would there be no operational knowledge of which tactical assets were available for tasking?  Pedro was either first up or second up.  If Dustoff was first up but had no escort, immediately send the second up, Pedro.  Pedro goes either way.  [This is a] leadership failure— there is a system in place, and they should know which assets are available.  I knew when I was in Command of the Pedros who else was available besides us; there is no excuse for this.”

JCS:

“However, once the time had been taken to ascertain no active local ESCORTs were available, turning to the KAF-based PEDROs would not have decreased the mission time as the AH-64 and PEDRO would have similar preparation and flight times due to distance from the casualty.”

Mr. Yon: Again, the entirety of this argument would be irrelevant were the Red Cross removed, and Army MEDEVAC flights made by armed helicopters.  Mission time would have been less than half of what it was.  Critically, changing this policy also keeps those AH-64 Apaches on-station, on the combat missions they’re intended for, and protecting ground units.

JCS:

“If it is alleged that waiting for an armed ESCORT is an excessive delay it must be considered that to date, there have been only five escorted MEDEVACs that have encountered surface to air fire resulting in degraded operations, two of which were PEDRO helicopters.”

Mr. Yon: In light of the many counterfactual statements above, these numbers should be looked at with suspicion, especially considering that medical flights are not all qualitatively equal.  It should be kept in mind that in August 2011, an ESCORTED helicopter was shot down during a combat operation, with 38 people being lost, including 22 Navy SEALs.  This JCS red herring is discussed in detail in “Golden Seconds” .  Importantly, Pedro units are far more frequently sent into far more dangerous situations than are Dustoff.  Per capita, Pedro takes more fire.

JCS:

“Based on all the facts regarding this incident it is ISAF's contention that the MEDEVAC assets were properly managed according to well established protocol. Based on the information provided, the timeline appears reasonable for the conditions on the ground. The well established PECC procedures appear to have been followed and the casualty arrived at the MTF within the established 60 minute goal in spite of being injured at a high risk location requiring an ESCORT aircraft.”

Mr. Yon: Medical professionals know that the Golden Hour starts ticking at the moment of injury, and adding in the requirements of assessment and reporting for Specialist Clark’s unit, the overall time was well over the “Golden Hour.”  Importantly, we were taking no ground fire on the LZ.  A more courageous and sensible decision by PECC would have been to launch Dustoff and let the pilot and ground commander decide on whether to complete extraction, or to wait for escort.  Pedro and Dustoff pilots complain that PECC tends to be risk averse to the point that troops die.

A pilot with a tour in Iraq and a recent tour in Afghanistan was livid with the JCS document: “This ‘Golden Hour’ thing is, as you have pointed out, a flawed way of thinking about it. Why not make it a ‘Golden Half Hour,’ or a ‘Golden as soon as possible’? It is just a statistical construct. Each wounded American soldier must be looked at and cared for individually in terms of what is best for them. In most cases, that means getting them there fast. It makes a big difference. Believe me, if the leadership had their own sons in harm’s way as I have [his son is also a combat veteran], they would think much differently, and become totally committed as I have to fly as many as possible to the hospital as fast as possible.”

JCS:

“Theater-wide MEDEVAC Statistics

For the period May to Oct 11 there were 1209 Coalition Forces (ISAF and USFOR-A) CAT A missions of which 95 CAT A missions were Out of Standard (OOS), meaning they exceeded the 60 minute Golden Hour planning factor.  This equates to 7.86% of CAT A MEDEVAC missions that were OOS. There are several factors that can cause a mission to become OOS, including weather, mechanical, distance, enemy situation and waiting for air weapons team (AWT).  Of the 95 OOS CAT A missions from May-Oct 11, seven were categorized as being a result of waiting for an AWT and none of these seven OOS missions had a clinical impact on the casualty.”

Mr. Yon:  Considering Specialist Clark was alert and talking up until the point of being evacuated, but succumbed shortly thereafter, it’s fairly outrageous to read a claim that says nobody experienced “clinical impact” from these delays.  This short timeframe and the attempt at wielding statistics to cover poor policy and judgment only adds to this outrage.  Essentially, this document argues for a Military Golden Hour to be treated as a “pass all.”  By self-scoring, if no more than 59 minutes of the debatable Golden Hour are used, they get a 100%.  How many more wounded veterans would have died if evacuations were delayed by an additional forty minutes?  According to iCasualties.org, 46,542 US troops (not to mention contractors and allies) have been wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan.  If an additional 40 minutes were added to each before they reached a hospital, how many more would have died?  One percent?  Two percent?  That’s anywhere from 465 – 931 additional dead.

“The overall trend line for OOS missions is decreasing over time.  In 2010, 11.8% of the total CAT A missions were OOS compared to 7.86% OOS from year to date.

In the last six months, there have been a total of 57 surface to air fire events involving MEDEVAC aircraft.  Of the 57, none resulted in aircraft being shot down.  Five resulted in hits which degraded operations, including one British ‘Tricky’ CH-47, two US Army ‘Dustoff'HH-60s, and two US Air Force ‘Pedro’ HH-60s.”

Mr. Yon: Is this for the entirety of Afghanistan, or just Regional Command South?  Importantly, the JCS admit here that the Red Crosses do not stop the enemy from shooting at Dustoff.  We’ve seen too many faulty numbers and statements in the JCS document.  None of the numbers can be trusted.

JCS:

“Summary

The MEDEVAC circumstances surrounding the specific incident highlighted in Michael Yon's ‘Red Air’ did not contribute to the untimely death of a brave Soldier who suffered a triple amputation due to an IED strike.  Removing Red Cross from Army ‘Dustoff'  helicopters will not improve the exceptional MEDEVAC capability already in place.  Not only is there a policy implication with making such a decision but more importantly an operational impact which actually may degrade current MEDEVAC capability.”

Mr. Yon: This note from a former Ranger and Green Beret, who is also a combat veteran, clarifies the obfuscation: "Not one point that they have made in their letter supports the above contentions. They have written a letter and included arguments and made points, but not for the ‘conclusions’ above. It is as though the Chiefs wrote a different letter and then omitted all discussion of the Red Cross, not to mention ‘policy implications’ (and what does that mean?), not to mention their reference to ‘an operational impact.’ The Chiefs have not explained their nebulous ‘policy implications’ or their reference to potential ‘degraded capabilities’ or their reference to ‘operational impact,’ whatever that actually means.  More artful public affairs sleight of hand.  The Chiefs obviously think that we are stupid."

JCS:

“The primary mission of Pedro helicopters are for Personnel Recovery and Combat Search and Rescue.  Pedro's in the Afghanistan theater are routinely integrated into the MEDEVAC rotation to maintain crew and medic proficiency.  Because of advanced avionics and other organic armament and weaponry, the Pedro is rated as being able to only carry two litters at a time, compared to the Army Dustoff which is rated as being able to carry four litters at a time.  The extreme altitude and often unpredictable weather conditions in Afghanistan make the weight of a helicopter a critical planning factor in being able to conduct flight operations.

Mr. Yon: A Dustoff pilot currently in Afghanistan disagrees.  JCS states that four litters can go, but according to the Dustoff pilot, the Dustoff can carry four litters only “if carousel litter carriers are installed, in which case we would be power limited because the stupid things weigh over 500 pounds and make it impossible to work on any part of a casualty but their head or feet.  We don’t use carousels in Afghanistan.  We strap litters to the floor, and three will fit but two will be ignored.

The Dustoff pilot says two patients will be ignored.  Experienced combat medics will say that no matter how great the medic, he or she cannot work on three Cat A patients simultaneously. Dustoff carries one medic and so more than a single Cat A will just be strapped down for the flight.

A flight of one Dustoff and one Apache can treat just one Cat A patient.

By comparison, Pedro escorts Pedro.  Each of the two Pedro HH-60G Pave Hawks carries two or three pararescue “PJ”s.  (Often a total of five PJs between the two birds.)  And so a normal flight of two Pedro Pave Hawks can work five Cat A patients.  (There is some nuance depending on types of wounds, etc.)

As medics, PJs are well trained.  They also receive rigorous combat training and can parachute to patients, mountaineer, and scuba dive, all of which can be needed in Afghanistan.  PJs are trained to fight.  In the case that a Special Forces (Green Beret) team medic is wounded in Afghanistan, at least one Pedro unit planned to leave a PJ or two behind to cover for the team while another medic could be found.  When patients are trapped in twisted wreckage of armored vehicles, PJs have gear and training to cut into the vehicles.  PJs are something of mixture (for argument’s sake) between Rangers and highly trained medical personnel.  And so with a Dustoff flight, you get one medic whose mission often must wait for launch authority.  Pedro brings four .50 caliber machineguns with dedicated gunners, along with five commandos (PJs) who can get off the birds.  Dustoff is an air ambulance: Pedro is more of a special operations force.

Pedro pilots dismiss the weight argument.  As one highly experienced Pedro pilot noted: “…I've had three litters back there…and if the survivors can sit up (ambulatory) you can quite literally pile them in. I haven't limited the aircraft yet over there. The considerations are patient care, time en route, aircraft performance (do I have the power to take off) and the ground threat…if I don't take the survivor now does he have the time to wait for the next trip?  As a Flight Lead, I'll weigh all available info, and lean on the Pararescue Team Lead to determine how many. If it’s a mass casualty event, we'll triage the survivors and take the Cat A’s first and return for the B’s and C’s and lastly the Heroes [KIA]. But yesterday here at [training] I put 9 people in the back of one aircraft, and 9 in another, total of 18 bodies in two aircraft. They were all ambulatory and the ground threat was high so comfort went out the window. It was about getting their asses out.”

JCS:

“Arming a Dustoff helicopter, whose primary mission is MEDEVAC, would require approximately an extra 600 lbs.  This is based on two door gunners, 200 lbs each; two .50 cal machine guns, 841bs each; plus conservatively estimating 100 lbs of ammunition.  This extra weight would have a severe impact on lift capability and also limit the ability to evacuate four litters vs. two.  This trade-off of lift to armament is unacceptable and would result in severely degrading MEDEVAC operations.

Mr. Yon: Combat experienced Dustoff and Pedro pilots address this:

Dustoff pilot: “The weight argument is crap.  My platoon flies UH-60A+ aircraft (Alpha slicks with Lima model engines) chased by UH-60L with [M-240 machine guns] mounted.  Our chase birds outweigh us by about 1000lbs.  The HH-60L and M models weigh significantly more but still much less than the Pedros' birds.”

Pedro pilot: “Remember that arming 2 x Dustoff helicopters means no chase aircraft and allows you to use both aircraft as evacuation platforms.  You have a greater capability not less.”

Dustoff pilot: “…The notion that 600 extra pounds would exclude us from carrying 4 litter patients is wrong.  We have a ‘PPC’ (performance planning card) that we use to tell us exactly how much we can carry…I can guarantee the Lima and Alpha+ models can handle that no problem...in RC S/SW.  In east and north the altitude starts to get much higher so I can't speak for that region as we do not fly there. Second carrying 4 Cat A litter patients would most likely mean there was a mass casualty, of which my unit has responded to at least [stricken for anonymity] and to my knowledge they were all local nationals …Apart from that my medics generally put one Cat A on board because they can only efficiently work on ONE patient at a time, especially in the Clark case, with a triple amputation that medic has his hands full.  That's not to say we leave anybody behind but the most critical are treated first.  Which is why we spread the patient load.  The example of 4 Cat A just sounds like deflection when the real point of all of this is not to increase patient capacity but to get the wounded off the battlefield in the quickest manner possible. If need be we can take as many patients as will fit inside, but as one of my medics told me, it comes down to who he thinks has a chance as to who gets treated on the flight as the majority of our flights are less than 30 min.  Like I said above if one aircraft HAS to take 4 litters there have already been calls made and at least three more hawks will be en route.”

Pedro Pilot: “The DUSTOFF aircraft I escorted as a Pedro [were faster than] me; they were much lighter than I was and had a large power reserve that I did not possess because of my extra weight in armaments.  That being said, the Pedros record on being able to still execute the CASEVAC goes without question.”

Mr. Yon: These pilots find no merit in the weight argument.

JCS:

“In conclusion, the MEDEVAC system currently in place is truly a success story.  This level of capability has never been delivered before and demonstrates the degree of commitment that is expended in supporting our US, NATO, ISAF and Afghan forces. While it is not a perfect system it is truly unprecedented and we should ensure any changes to the system is carefully examined and only done after a thorough evaluation in order to ensure our service members receive only the best care available.”

Former Ranger and Green Beret: “I am really tired of the Chiefs [congratulating] themselves over a ‘level of capability that has never been delivered before.’ So what? [They] send the best men in the nation to war, who go willingly, who volunteer. They deserve the best. They are not receiving the best now, and worse, they are not receiving the best now due to bureaucracy and parochialism and the egotistical protection of fiefdoms.  The JCS should be ashamed of themselves.”

While reading traffic in a closed forum between current and former military officers, I stumbled across this message from a British officer.  I’ve known him since the Iraq days, and he’s also served in Afghanistan.  He’s an honest and very smart officer, and so I pay close attention to him.  With his permission, I reprint:

Message from British officer

I've been following Michael's work for years and I watched that painful video some while ago.

Michael makes a perfectly valid, arguably indisputable point that, in some circumstances, US Army MEDEVAC policy can delay the movement of casualties to hospital. The fact that the Golden Hour can still be met in most cases is immaterial. If we could make it work, we'd want a Platinum 30 Minutes as we all know that a few minutes can make the difference between life and death. Accordingly, there should be a continuous effort to shave extra minutes off of the time it takes to reach the wounded and what is proposed by Michael will often do just that.

The arguments presented by the US Army for why a change is not necessary are unconvincing, in fact in parts they seem somewhat fictive. I just hope there aren't people out there telling their boss what they think he wants to hear when they know differently in their hearts.

Therefore - and as a British Army officer I do think carefully about criticizing an organization I admire in many ways - my opinion is that there should be a quick meal of humble pie at the upper levels of the US Army and a change to match the USAF and RAF methods which do not mark MEDEVAC aircraft and do arm them. Saying "We were wrong" need bring no shame, it would be a fine example of leadership that would be respected within the Army itself and wider - and it'll likely save a few lives.

DEADLY DELAYS

“What the hell happened to Medevac, sir?”

That was a question an angry sergeant asked me as I was eating chow last February at Forward Operating Base Kalsu, Iraq. I didn’t understand the question or the anger in his voice at the time, but I do now and would like to try to offer an explanation.

In the past, medical evacuation units reported to a medical command. These Medevac units had aviation assets, namely Black Hawk helicopters, but at the end of the day, Medical Service Corps officers were in charge. Recently, the Medevac units were realigned to fall under an aviation command as a part of the new General Support Aviation Battalion (GSAB).

My unit, the 571st Medical Company (AA) became C Company, 2nd Battalion, 227th Aviation Regiment, and our new command decided to implement new Medevac procedures. Ultimately, it was decided that Medevac aircraft would require gunship support for all off-FOB missions even if the landing zone was reported secure.

The new policy often caused significant delays in our response time, namely in the southern Multi-National Division-Baghdad area at FOB Kalsu, and a few soldiers may have died as a result. I will say that after seven years of flying Medevac missions, including three Iraq tours, I believe without a doubt that soldiers who could have lived died due to these new policies, but that is only my opinion based on experience.

The launch policies were against the recommendations of the senior officers in my unit, and conflicted with MND-B Medevac policy, but the new restriction remained and we were forced to wait to launch.

In retrospect, the sergeant who spoke to me had every right to be upset since we were not always allowed to rapidly evacuate his soldiers when they were wounded. How upset would you be if your friend was dying and Medevac was not allowed to come immediately?

As one of the pilots in C Company, 2nd Battalion, 227th Aviation Regiment, I would like to apologize to the soldiers in the southern Baghdad area of operations for the delays in Medevac from November 2006 until May 2007. The Medevac flight crews tried our best to launch as fast as possible, despite the unnecessary delays.

I was even relieved of my duties for launching immediately to save a fellow soldier after being instructed to wait 25 more minutes to launch.

Our mission has never been easy, but it was always simple: Launch as fast as possible, fly as fast as possible and give the wounded the best chance to survive. The new policies of the 1st Cavalry GSAB prevented us from doing just that, and for the first time in seven years of flying Medevac, I am ashamed to be a part of this mission.

It would be easy to focus on the thousands of Medevac missions that my unit performed without delay and ignore the small percentage that went so very wrong. I, however, believe we need to do the opposite and focus on those soldiers we failed due to a flawed policy and an arrogant command.

I hope members of the 1st Cavalry Division take notice to what I have written and help me fix the problems with Medevac before the next combat tour. I tried my best and was reprimanded, relieved and insulted by my battalion commander.
I hope that the next time one of our Medevac crews is sitting down at chow and a soldier walks over to speak, it is to say, “Thank you for a job well done.”

Chief Warrant Officer 3 Eric V. Brodeur
Fort Carson, Colo.
Newcastle, Calif.

http://www.armytimes.com/community/opinion/army_opinion_letters_080204/

The MEDEVAC issue continues to grow.  There have been many articles and it's becoming difficult to keep up.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff is preparing something for Congress.  My guess based on conversations is that JCS will try deflection and will not solve the issue.  SecDef has done nothing, to my knowledge.  And so this is set to become an election issue.

This list below is not comprehensive but can be a helpful resource.

Please listen to my interview with Dennis Miller.

LINKS
Op-eds by James Simpson

American Thinker
http://www.americanthinker.com/2012/01/incomprehensibly_stupid_army_regulation_killing_americans_in_afghanistan.html

Breitbart Big Peace
http://bigpeace.com/jmsimpson/2012/01/09/incomprehensibly-stupid-army-regulation-killing-americans-in-afghanistan/

Examiner.com—D.C. Examiner
http://www.examiner.com/independent-in-washington-dc/incomprehensibly-stupid-army-regulation-killing-americans-afghanistan?cid=PROD-redesign-right-next

Washington Times
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jan/16/bureaucracy-killing-us-troops-in-afghanistan/

----------
Army Times
Article in the Army Times about Congressman Todd Akin's (R-MI) letter to Sec Def Panetta:
http://www.armytimes.com/news/2012/01/military-lawmaker-arm-medevac-helos-to-save-more-lives-011712/

Navy Times
Article in the Navy Times about Congressman Todd Akin's (R-MI) letter to Sec Def Panetta
http://www.navytimes.com/mobile/index.php?storyUrl=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.navytimes.com%2Fnews%2F2012%2F01%2Fmilitary-lawmaker-arm-medevac-helos-to-save-more-lives-011712%2F

------
Dispatches by Michael Yon
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/

31 Jan 2012
Important Letter from Gold Star Mother
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/important-letter-from-gold-star-mother.htm

30 Jan 2012
13 Military Pilots Rebuke the Joint Chiefs of Staff
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/13-military-pilots-rebuke-the-joint-chiefs-of-staff.htm

28 Jan 2012
British Army Officer on US Army Medevac
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/british-army-officer-on-us-army-medevac.htm

26 Jan 2012  
Comments by Dustoff pilots
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/thoughts-from-a-dustoff-pilot.htm

23 Jan 2012
E-mail exchange with JCS concerning document from Joint Chiefs of Staff
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/messages-from-joint-chiefs-of-staff.htm

20 Jan 2012
CBS interview with LTG John F. Campbell
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/cbs-video-of-medevac-issue.htm

19 Jan 2012
Contact with staffer at Congressman Todd Akin’s office
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/jcs-curiouser-and-curiouser.htm

19 Jan 2012
JCS letter to the House Armed Services Committee (HASC)
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/joint-chiefs-of-staff-bogus-report-to-congress.htm

17 Jan 2012
Congressman Todd Akin’s (R-MI) letter to SEC DEF Leon Panetta about the JCS document and RED AIR
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/congressman-akin-medevac-letter-to-secdef.htm

17 Jan 2012
Danger For Senators and Representatives Army Deceptions May Cause Embarrassment
Letter to Senator Jon Kyle (R-AZ) regarding RED AIR dispatch of 12 Oct 2011
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/danger-for-senators-and-representatives.htm

16 Jan 2012
Progress on Removing Dustoff Red Crosses
Posting of an Alaska Op-ed on RED AIR
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/progress-on-removing-dustoff-red-crosses.htm

10 Jan 2011 (sic)
MEDEVAC/CASEVAC links
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/medevac/casevac-links.htm

9 Jan 2012
Take me to your Leader (if you have one); CENTCOM passes buck back to Army
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/take-me-to-your-leader-if-you-have-one.htm

9 Jan 2012
Link to Breitbart Big Peace Blog, piece by Bill Tuttle:  A Pilot’s Perspective on Michael Yon’s Medevac Debate
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/delta-force-commander-former-on-dustoff-medevac.htm

3 Jan 2012
Passing the MEDEVAC Buck to CENTCOM, response by SEC of the Army John McHugh to Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA)
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/passing-the-medevac-buck.htm

30 Dec 2011
DELTA Force Commander (Former) on DUSTOFF MEDEVAC
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/delta-force-commander-former-on-dustoff-medevac.htm

09 Dec 2011
Embarrassed Army
https://www.michaelyon-online.com/embarrassed-army.htm

23 Nov 2011
Crusader Copters
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/crusadercopters.htm

22 Nov 2011
Mark of the Beast: Evil Symbols in Afghanistan
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/mark-of-the-beast-evil-symbols-in-afghanistan.htm

14 Nov 2011
Marked for Destruction
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/marked-for-destruction.htm

10 Nov 2011
Leadership: More than a Word
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/leadership-more-than-a-word.htm

8 Nov 2011
Question for Congressman Pompeo: What is your Position?
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/question-for-congressman-pompeo-what-is-your-position.htm

7 nov 2011
Report to Congress: Army called to Report on MEDEVAC Failure in Afghanistan
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/congressional-report.htm

6 Nov 2011
Fool’s Gold & Troop’s Blood
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/fools-gold-troops-blood.htm

27 Oct 2011
Dustoff Traction
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/dustoff-traction.htm

26 Oct 2011
Machine Guns on Dustoffs
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/machine-guns-on-dustoffs.htm

24 Oct 2011
Golden Seconds: Open Letter to Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and President Barack Obama
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/golden-seconds.htm

12 Oct 2011  
RED AIR—America’s medevac Failure    
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/red-air-americas-medevac-failure.htm

14 Sept 2009
Pedros, USAF SAR in Afghanistan
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/pedros.htm

------
CBS NEWS
CBS News interview with LTG John F. Campbell regarding RED AIR and the Army's policy:
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563_162-57362374/did-military-rules-cost-a-soldier-his-life/?tag=mncol%3Blst%3B1

MEDEVAC Photo Essay by Nicole Sobreki
Photographs by Nicole Sobecki of an Army medevac unit in Afghanistan.  Photo 3 shows the interior of a UH60A medevac helicopter.  The gunners would sit in the two seats behind the sitting Marine that face outward toward the windows just behind the pilots.  This configuration belies the Army's argument that he UH60 would suffer degraded performance and cause the removal of two litters from the helo were two .50 caliber machine guns to be mounted on the fuselage.
http://www.nicholesobecki.com/#/dustoff--us-army-medevac/NS_AF_113010_Medevac14_002
            
U.S. Army
The U.S. Army's Public Affairs Office response to the criticism of the Army's medevac policy:
http://www.army.mil/article/72250/Army_statement_on_MEDEVAC_issue/

Larry Wood
14 Jan 2012
Frontiersman (Wasilla, Alaska) Medevac policy is costing lives
http://www.frontiersman.com/opinions/columnists/medevac-policy-is-costing-lives/article_3bf39468-3f52-11e1-8999-0019bb2963f4.html

24 Jan 2012
Examiner.com, Is Army medevac policy killing our wounded troops?
http://www.examiner.com/alaska-gubernatorial-in-anchorage/is-army-medevac-policy-killing-our-wounded-troops

Stars and Stripes
26 Jan 2012
Controversial debate brewing: Should Army medevacs be armed?
http://www.stripes.com/news/army/controversial-debate-brewing-should-army-medevacs-be-armed-1.166840

New York Post
01 Feb 2012
Hurry, wait ... and die Army rules stalling Medevacs
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/hurry_wait_and_die_wyLvNsCxiZKASR4ePF3VyK

I am a Dustoff pilot (Instructor pilot) with over 1000 hours of combat time, and over 300+ combat medevac missions under my belt.  In 2004 (Iraq) we flew single ship, responding to thousands of medevac 9-line calls.  Not one helo shot down, but we sure got shot at a lot.  On a few occasions, we had to ask armed helos, who were out on missions, to divert and escort us into some hot areas.  On a few other occasions, we had the Air Force Pedros request to go along with us on missions. We responded quickly and efficiently.  When we got the call, we went.

When there were multiple casualties, we as crews made the call to launch more than one medevac bird to accommodate the number of patients.  No bureaucracy on launch authority or escorts.

Now, all medevac calls must go through channels, must be approved by commanders at battalion level or higher, must be escorted etc etc. This is what slows us down.

Some facts as I see it:

1.  With only 1 medic on the helo, we will NEVER take more than 2 critical patients.  More than that will overload the medic’s ability to treat the patients.  So arming medevac will NOT lower the ability of the Blackhawk helicopter to carry patients due to weight.  (Hawks in medevac configurations, typically launch at about 16K lbs, but have a max of 22k, so are they saying that guns and ammo weigh 5000+ pounds? Ridiculous.

2. Medevac can launch within 3-5 minutes of a call. Pedros always took at least 10 to get spooled up. [Note from Michael Yon: Pedro can go in about 6 mins.]  Apaches and Kiowas must sight in their systems and take at least 15 minutes to get up, assuming they are fully armed, fueled and ready to go.  So escorts always keep us waiting.

However, the biggest problem we face in combat today is not waiting for escort (though they are slow), it is not the Dustoff crews, it is the current command.  Commanders and their representatives (usually battle Captains on duty) are so worried about their careers being effected by enemy action, they will take any Dustoff call and send it so high up the chain of command (cover your ass) that it takes 30-45 minutes to just get launch approval.  This usually has little to do with our escorts.  We sometimes are all (medevac and escorts) ready to fly, but sit for 20 minutes for launch approval, because someone has to wake the general, brief him or her and then get approval for the mission.

So taking off the red cross, arming the medevac bird is a great thing, but will only solve half the problem.  We need commanders willing to allow the Dustoff crews to do their job, without multiple layers of approval for every mission.  We need to solve the problem of every commander having to fear for his career (or worse) over making decisions on the battlefield.  We need to empower the lower levels of command again instead of waiting for the generals to micromanage the entire war.

====END====

Separately, this comment was found under a dispatch:

RE: MEDEVAC Issue — Dustoffer

I'm a Dustoff pilot that returned from Afghanistan in April 2011. There is a launch criteria that we have to be off the ground within 15 minutes of the 9-line call. The problem is, we have to be approved by our battalion commander or the battle captain on duty to launch. There were several times we were sitting on the ground at REDCON 1 (100%) waiting to be told that we could launch. I actually launched my bird early once and proceeded to get an ass chewing once we returned via telephone. I honestly believe if I were closer to the flag pole, they would have relieved me of my position. I was about 6 hours away by air. Oh, and I launched at 15 minutes and some change.

To add injury to insult, approx. 70% of the missions I flew were MEDEVAC on MEDEVAC coverage. Meaning we had no gunship escort to the pickup site (one MEDEVAC aircraft covering another MEDEVAC aircraft).

There was more than one occasion that if we would have had mounted M249's or M240's we could have laid suppressive fire and/or engaged the threat. That is my personal and professional opinion. Unfortunately, my opinion doesn't matter.

This comment was found here.

And I strongly disagree with “my opinion doesn’t matter.”  The opinions of Dustoff and Pedro people are extremely important.  Dustoff and Pedro opinions carry the overwhelming weight of this fight.  The force behind all this is the Dustoff and Pedro communities.  Every morning they crack the whip.  I am only the public face.  My website is your website.  This is your microphone.

A young Iranian woman has written to me off and on for a couple of years.  Yesterday she sent a note.

I responded in part with a few questions:

What do young Iranians think about our government and about the Iranian government?  Also, do you think there will be war?

She replied immediately.  I corrected some minor grammar:

“To make the long story short people in Iran, not just youth, hate the government and want to move out of the country as soon as they can.  My sister [deleted] is moving to [deleted] with her husband this July and then when my mother gets retired, me, my younger sister [deleted] and my parents will sell our house and move to live with them.  My father isn’t convinced yet but all he needs is time, I’m sure he will choose to come with us.

“I am a patriot and I will remain one no matter where I am, but lets face it. Things are bad and getting worse as every day goes by. I have plans for my future and do not want to stay in a country where my skills and capabilities are most likely going to waste.

"The Iranians do not hate you nor do they hate ur government.  This is all the media.  The people have nothing to do with the media Michael.  No one is against you here except for those on the government's side.  Unfortunately they’re not few, they’re actually many, but they won’t last forever. Someday this is all gonna turn upside down.  Sometimes I ask myself do I wanna be here for the next revolution?  I dunno ...

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) provided a document to the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) about MEDEVAC issues in Afghanistan.  The document was provided with no cover or signature page.  Congressman Todd Akin (MO-2), a senior HASC member, received that document.  A staffer for Mr. Akin passed the letter to me asking questions.

I publicly acknowledged receipt of the JCS letter before publishing it.  My acknowledgement prompted an email to me from the Public Affairs Officer for the Vice Chairman of the JCS.

Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Seiber (Public Affairs Officer to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) wrote to me, “Your citing of a JCS letter is inaccurate.  Please correct/update your website accordingly.  Background information is below:"  I immediately contacted Congressman Akin’s office.  A staffer again confirmed that this document came from JCS to HASC.  The denial by JCS itched for explanation.  JCS then backtracked, saying it had provided the letter to HASC, and “We don't necessarily refute what is in the document itself, it's just a matter that it isn't a Joint Staff document.”

JCS has had plenty of time to review the document they provided to HASC, and my analysis of the document is forthcoming.  That JCS holds “We don't necessarily refute what is in the document itself…” is tantamount endorsement.  Under these circumstances, the letter can appropriately be called “The Orphaned letter from JCS to HASC,” even though I now believe that JCS did not author the communiqué.  It may have come from CENTCOM.

The document is demonstrably filled with deceptions and errors of fact.  If the JCS refuses to refute the document, the act can be considered a willful deception of the HASC.

This has become curious, and so in the interest of disclosure and allowing JCS to have its say, here is the pertinent email trail.

Five emails:

======

From: Seiber, Patrick LTC JCS OCJCS PA [mailto:Patrick.Seiber@js.pentagon.mil] 

Sent: Tuesday, January 17, 2012 11:01 AM
To: inquiries@michaelyon-online.com

Cc: Lapan, David Col JCS OCJCS PA; McNally, Patrick CDR JCS DOM OCJCS PA

Subject: Correct the Record--JCS Letter

Michael-

Your citing of a JCS letter is inaccurate.  Please correct/update your website accordingly.  Background information is below:

From OCJCS Legislative Affairs:

Spoke to Army LL on this issue and can provide the following synopsis:
- In early November, an info paper was provided to SEN Inhofe drafted by Army G-3
- In late November, SECARMY drafted a response letter to SEN Grassley (found on Michael Yon's website)
- In December, a similar/same info paper was provided to SEN Lugar
- In late December ARCENT Chief of Staff BG Bishop sent a response letter to SEN Kyl re: the "medical evacuation of SPC Chazray Clark" (found on Michael Yon's website)

On his website, Mr. Yon states the "the Joint Chiefs of Staff [recently] sent a deceptive communiqué" to the HASC, and that the "HASC forwarded the JCS missive to Representatives" including Rep. Akin.  He also states that he has not yet published the letter, and describes it as "complex".  It is reasonable to conclude the "JCS missive" is actually one of the info papers drafted by Army G-3.  This is confirmed by separate correspondence from HASC PSM John Chapla, as well.

Mr. Yon is mistaken in his belief that the document originated from the Joint Staff.  The error likely comes from the fact that the attachment is unsigned, with no identifier as to origin.

Thanks.

V/R,
Patrick R. Seiber
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Public Affairs Officer to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Pentagon 2D932
(703) 571-9471 (Commercial)
(703) 332-9790 (Blackberry)
(312) 227-4272 (DSN)

==========

Michael Yon <michael.yon@gmail.com>;
Thu, Jan 19, 2012 at 10:10 PM
To: Patrick.Seiber@js.pentagon.mil
Reply | Reply to all | Forward | Print | Delete | Show original

LTC Seiber,

Just got your email a few minutes ago.

The information to me that the letter is from JCS came from the office of HASC Member Todd Akin.  It is important that this be corrected ASAP.  I literally just published something else on this.

I am surprised that JCS does not have my direct email address.  It seems like everyone else in the USG has it.

I will correct the record.  And for the record, what is the JCS stance on this issue?

V/r,

Michael

======

I then emailed to Congressman Akin’s office asking for confirmation that the letter came from the JCS to HASC:

Response according to STAFFER of Congressman Todd Akin:

“The memo in question was originally provided to the HASC by the Joint Staff, with no signatures and no indication that it had come from anywhere but the Joint Staff.

“This week, after questioning, the Joint Staff indicated that they were not the original source of the document. Initially they indicated it was a CENTCOM document (which is how Congressman Akin referred to it in his letter).

On Tuesday, we were told that the memo actually originated with the Army."

If you have any other questions on this, contact Steve Taylor: Steve.Taylor@mail.house.gov

======

I again contacted LTC Seiber at JCS:

Michael Yon <michael.yon@gmail.com>;
Thu, Jan 19, 2012 at 10:31 PM
To: Patrick.Seiber@js.pentagon.mil
Reply | Reply to all | Forward | Print | Delete | Show original

LTC Seiber,

This is becoming more curious by the minute.  Mr. Akin's office says that HASC got it from JCS but that nobody wants to claim authorship. (I certainly would not want to claim it.  Someone must have been getting electroshock to be forced into writing that.)

Before I make any announcement, we need to know what the truth is. The truth is that Congressman Akin's office is holding that it came from JCS to HASC, but the author is unknown.

V/r,

Michael

======

Seiber, Patrick LTC JCS OCJCS PA <Patrick.Seiber@js.pentagon.mil>;
Fri, Jan 20, 2012 at 11:42 PM
To: Michael Yon <michael.yon@gmail.com>;
Reply | Reply to all | Forward | Print | Delete | Show original

Michael-

Sorry for the delay getting back to you, we're short staffed this week and with the Chairman on the road we've had our hands full.

Regarding the document, here's what I have from our Legislative Affairs (LA) team:

1) One of our LA team members was talking with HASC staffer about a separate topic and the medevac topic came up in the conversation.  Our LA team member showed him a document about medevacs and he said he had already received it.  Our team member told the HASC staffer at that time it was not/not a joint staff document.

2) Our understanding is HASC Staffer then provided the document to Cong. Akin's office and stated he had received it from the Joint Staff, but did NOT clarify with him that it was not a Joint Staff document.

3) We don't necessarily refute what is in the document itself, it's just a matter that it isn't a Joint Staff document.

4) As the investigation into this incident is ongoing, we would not provide a detailed JCS response on the incident to Congress.

Hope this helps...

Pat

V/R,

Patrick R. Seiber
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Public Affairs Officer to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Pentagon 2D932
(703) 571-9471 (Commercial)
(703) 332-9790 (Blackberry)
(312) 227-4272 (DSN)

======

The letter

This war is going to turn out badly. We are wasting lives and resources while the United States decays and other threats emerge.  We led the horse to water.

Importantly, there is no value in pretending that Pakistan is an ally. We should wish the best of luck to the Afghans, and the many peaceful Pakistanis, and accelerate our withdrawal of our main battle force. The US never has been serious about Afghanistan. Under General Petraeus we were starting to gain ground, but the current trajectory will land us in the mud.

The enemies will never beat us in Afghanistan.  Force on force, the Taliban are weak by comparison.  Yet this is their home.  There is only so much we can do at this extreme cost for the many good Afghan people.  We must reduce our main effort and concentrate on other matters.  Time to come home.

Sincerely,

Michael Yon

What do you think of Lieutenant General John F. Campbell's remarks in this video?

Please click to view.

I published a letter that I received from Congressman Todd Akin's office.  Mr. Akin is on the House Armed Services Committee.  According to Mr. Akin's office, HASC received the letter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  After I published the letter, I read an email to me from a Public Affairs Officer at JCS saying JCS didn't author the letter.

Curiouser and Curiouser.

And so just now I contacted a staffer at Congressman Akin's office who responds:

"The memo in question was originally provided to the HASC by the Joint Staff, with no signatures and no indication that it had come from anywhere but the Joint Staff."

“This week, after questioning, the Joint Staff indicated that they were not the original source of the document. Initially they indicated it was a CENTCOM document (which is how Congressman Akin referred to it in his letter).

"On Tuesday, we were told that the memo actually originated with the Army."

"If you have any other questions on this, contact Steve Taylor:Steve.Taylor@mail.house.gov "

The letter.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a bogus letter on MEDEVAC to the House Armed Services Committee.  The JCS letter is so filled with errors and deceptions that it has taken more than a week for me to respond.  The JCS directly refutes my work on MEDEVAC.

Thirteen pilots have read my draft response.  Ten of those pilots are Pedro or Dustoff.  (Five each.)  The remaining three have or do fly MEDEVAC escort in Afghanistan.  Twelve are active duty and one is retired.  All have served in Afghanistan or are there.  Some also served in Iraq.  Together they have done about 25 combat tours.

Details are crucial.   Other veterans, and civilians, are providing feedback to keep my response to the JCS accurate.  My response should be ready by Monday.

Meanwhile, the Secretary of Defense, Senators, and Representatives are cautioned to avoid embarrassment by not taking the JCS letter at face value.

Representative Todd Akin (MO-2) has rejected the JCS letter and directly contacted Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta.

The JCS letter to the HASC:

You can download a pdf version here.

The bad judgment exercised by a handful of Marines should be treated like an ND: a Negligent Discharge.  In the US military, if you “accidentally” pull the trigger and launch an unplanned bullet downrange, you should not even bother trying to explain away the “accident.”  If that bullet kills someone, it’s called Negligent Homicide.  The bullet did not fire accidentally; it was fired negligently.  Bottom line.

This should be treated like a negligent discharge of the penis, and of the video camera, and then of common sense.  What a dumb thing to do.   And super dumb to video tape it.  And ultra-dumb to then let the video make it to the Internet.

Those few Marines should be busted, but they don’t deserve prison.  They made a big-league mess up, but they did not commit murder.  They were young men in combat who committed stupid.  But how many of us who have reached the age of 30 cannot look back and find at least a dozen instances of major league stupidity that we committed?  Most of us are lucky that our dumbness did not make it to the Internet.

And that commander…   Sheesh.  He should be busted for all the distraction this has brought.

Punish them, but do not tar them.  Do not send them to prison.

17 January 2012

The Army has been deceiving members of Congress about MEDEVAC issues in Afghanistan.  This poses a danger for civilian leadership who may run with the Army information, expecting accuracy in detail and in spirit, only to be ridiculed later.

In Afghanistan, I first brought up the MEDEVAC issue at Task Force Spartan in Zhari District, but this was above their level.  There was excellent leadership at TF Spartan, yet nothing to push because there was little they could do.

Next, Regional Command South in Kandahar addressed the issue but did nothing.

Next, the IJC (combatant command in Kabul) did nothing.  The issue was taken up by ISAF HQ in Kabul, who did nothing. (When I write, “nothing,” it means they wrote false accounts of the events and demanded that I publish them.  I refused.)

Next, thanks to concerned readers, many letters went to Representatives and Senators.  Some elected leaders took steps.

Senator Charles Grassley (Iowa) wrote to the Secretary of the Army, John M. McHugh.  Secretary McHugh responded to Senator Grassley with bogus statements and passed the buck to CENTCOM.  Secretary McHugh’s letter is published here.

CENTCOM rightfully rejected this weak bureaucratic maneuver and passed it back to the Army in Washington, where it belonged in the first place.

CENTCOM made no false statements, to my knowledge.  The Commanding General of CENTCOM is the highly respected General James Mattis, USMC.

Importantly, General Mattis has a war in Afghanistan to think about, and a potential war with Iran unfolding, not to mention other responsibilities in the CENTCOM area of responsibility.  He’s no doubt disgusted with this bureaucratic waste of energy.  The Marines and Air Force, from what I can derive, are equally repulsed with the Army maneuvering.

The struggle went higher than the Army when the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a deceptive communiqué to the House Armed Services Committee.  The JCS letter directly addresses my dispatches on the MEDEVAC failures.

HASC forwarded the JCS missive to Representatives.

The Honorable W. Todd Akin represents the 2nd District of Missouri.  His office forwarded the JCS statement to me, asking questions.

Congressman Akin’s office did not take the word of JCS.  His office also did not take my word.  I respect that.  Mr. Akin’s team conducted its own investigation and is taking up this issue.

Mr. Todd Akin, from “The Show-Me State,” is on point.  The first serious government credit goes to his team.

Congressman Akin is demonstrating how to effectively represent constituents and how to exercise oversight of the executive branch and the military.

As with Senator Charles Grassley (Iowa), Senator Jon Kyl (Arizona) deserves credit for taking the step of contacting the military.  However, when the Army responded with straw, the apparently well-intentioned Senators may have dropped the issue.  At minimum the Senators are in danger of repeating false information supplied to them in bad faith.

There is much going on with other members of government, and the Army is trying to get ahead of it.

Take the above letter from Brigadier General David Bishop to Senator Jon Kyl.  If Senator Kyl were to use this information in good faith on television, the Dustoff and Pedro communities might think Senator Kyl is selling out service members.  In fact, the good Senator might be doing what he thought was best, unaware that he had been ill advised by an Army general.

My previous dispatches such as Red Air, and Fool’s Gold & Troops’ Blood, have addressed many of the deceptions coming from the Army.

Civilian leadership is strongly encouraged to use maximum circumspection before quoting the above letter from BG David Bishop, or the letter from JCS.

I have not yet published the complex JCS letter.  Several more days are needed to properly counter; I’ve drafted a response but am running it by various Air Force Pedro and Army Dustoff pilots, and combat-experienced officers and NCOs.  It takes time to ensure the facts.

What we know:

The Army has affixed its final stamp that no policy changes are underway.  SecArmy punted to CENTCOM (a joint command under Marine General James Mattis), who booted it back to Big Army.  JCS wrote their own letter.

SecArmy is the end of the Army road, and JCS is the end of the uniformed military road.

Three layers remain: Secretary of Defense; President of the United States and Commander-in-Chief; Voters.

Now to Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta.  Secretary Panetta seems like a fair man.  There is a chance he will intervene.  If Secretary Panetta stops the buck, that’s it.  Credit to SecDef.  Case closed.

If Secretary Panetta lets it slide, the next stop is President Obama.

Some people have put this on President Obama, but that is inappropriate.  The Dustoff Red Cross policy, for instance, has passed through many presidencies.  Today, this has not yet worked its way through the current chain of command.

All issues should be solved at the lowest possible level.  This has failed.  The Army has failed.  JCS has failed.  If this makes it to President Obama, and he sets it straight, the credit goes to the President.

If the SecDef passes it and the President does not take it, this becomes an election issue about troop welfare.  Ultimately, the buck stops with voters.

CBS is working on a major nightly news story about the Dustoff MEDEVAC issue.  I do not know when it will air.  CBS interviewed numerous people, including me.  I will publish the schedule immediately upon notification from CBS.

Finally, a huge Thank You to the people who are quietly making this happen.

Caring people are becoming involved from Hawaii to Texas to Washington.  There has even been help from the United Kingdom.  Thank you in the UK!

Please see this OpEd from Larry Wood in Alaska:

The original article can be found here.

12 January 2012

First came the rumors.  Innumerable US Soldiers claimed to have seen large cats in Kandahar Province.  More than once I saw Afghan Soldiers laugh it off, saying our folks were seeing apparitions.  The Afghans would say, yes, there can be big cats in the mountains, but not here.

But time after time, men said they saw the cats with night vision gear, thermals, or in broad daylight.  Some who made these claims were country boys who grew up hunting, and so their words carried particular weight.  They said the cats did not just come and vanish quickly, but our men often watched the cats for minutes at a time.  They said the cats could even jump over the large Afghan walls.

A Soldier just sent these new photos from Afghanistan.  They were taken from a helicopter just a couple of miles northwest of Kandahar Airfield.  Maybe these cats know who launches those rockets onto the airfield.

Unfortunately, I never got a chance to photograph or even see one.  Thank you to the Soldier who transmitted these images.  This is much appreciated.

NatGeo has some great shots of other AfCats:

Snow Leopard Population Rebounding in Afghanistan

"Lost" Leopard—And Poachers—Seen in Afghanistan

Many folks have asked me about selling camera gear.  I’m starting to offload some glass.  These four Canon lenses have all been used downrange either in Iraq, Afghanistan, or both, and probably in many other countries.  This gear is in great condition.  Many of my published photos were made through this glass.

The four lenses are on eBay and bidding starts at 50% off new price.

50mm F/1.2L USM (Start bid 768.50)

This is an incredible lens.  Many of my best shots came from this glass.  Excellent for low light.  Very sharp.  I love this lens but have three.  (Two if someone buys this.)
http://www.ebay.com/itm/300648095140

Canon EF 16 mm - 35 mm F/2.8 USM II Lens (Start bid 759.50)

Another excellent lens: I have this range covered.
http://www.ebay.com/itm/300648086148

Canon EF Macro 100 mm F/2.8 USM Lens (Starting bid: $212.00)

This lens is okay.  Very sharp, but the lack of IS (Image Stabilization) on a Macro makes usage difficult in handheld mode.  I got the newer version with IS.  If you have a tripod, this is great. If you are going to shoot macro handheld, don’t buy this.
http://www.ebay.com/itm/300648087073

Canon EF 24 mm - 70 mm F/2.8L USM Lens (Start bid: $671.09)

Another incredible lens, but I have two and no longer need the back up.  This is a favorite among pros.
http://www.ebay.com/itm/300648092698

Letter from home

10 January 2011

Increasing progress is being made on the Army helicopter MEDEVAC problems.  Media attention has been building and appears that it will soon break big.  Communications are coming in spontaneously from key places.  Support for improvement is snowballing.

Pilots and crews continue to help behind the scenes but the active duty folks cannot speak publicly due to career concerns.  Without their help and encouragement, we would not have made it this far.  There is more going on than I can now track.

Most of the more significant areas of progress are still behind the scenes.  It is a fact that many Senators and Representatives are now aware of the issue.  (And more than just in passing.)  The Secretary of the Army has passed the buck with his letter to Senator Grassley.  The Army is openly playing hot potato.  CBS and other media outlets are taking keen interest.

Much has already been written.  The list of links below is far from exhaustive, but provides a basis of knowledge.

(Note: inclusion of links to outside writers does not imply that I agree with everything they’ve written.  For instance, this has nothing to do with Presidential politics.  Separately, certain milblogs not listed have written about the topic with apparently zero research under their belts.  No links to the prattle.)

Red Air: America's Medevac Failure (Major Description of Attack and MEDEVAC failure)

Fool's Gold, Troop's Blood (Important video of MEDEVAC failure)

Golden Seconds (On Tactics)

Crusader Copters (Red Cross: Mark of Crusades in Afghanistan)

Passing the Medevac Buck (Secretary of Army Passes the Buck to CENTCOM)

Take Me to Your Leader - If You Have One (CENTCOM Passes the Buck back to Army)

Pedros (Doing it Right: US Air Force Pedro Combat Search and Rescue in Afghanistan)

Delta Force Commander (Former) on Dustoff Medevac (Former Commander in Delta Force Weighs in)

BigPeace: A Pilot's Perspective on Michael Yon's Medevac Debate (A Former Pilot Weighs in)

The American Thinker Weighs in

09 January 2012

Jordan Schneider has done an excellent job helping to push the MEDEVAC Red Cross issue.  Her energy seems bottomless.  It was Jordan the active citizen who contacted Senator Charles Grassley, who quickly inquired to the Secretary of the Army, who passed the buck to CENTCOM.

Yet this is not per se a CENTCOM issue; this is an Army-wide policy failure.  However, CENTCOM could fix the issue at least in Afghanistan.

Today we see CENTCOM tossing the grenade back to the Big Army.  This email to Jordan came from CENTCOM Public Affairs.  (Underlining is mine.)

Hi Jordan

Sorry for taking so long to get back to you.  Was out sick yesterday and am heading home early; thus, I’m shooting you an e-mail reply.

As promised, I shared the materials you provided with my superiors. I have been informed that Army Public Affairs in Washington definitely the lead on this and not we here at CENTCOM.  I have also learned that David Martin is interviewing senior leaders in Afghanistan and Washington, and there should be something on CBS next week or the week after.

Hope this helps.  Good luck!

Oscar

OSCAR P. SEARA, GS12
Public Affairs Officer
United States Central Command
MacDill Air Force Base, Florida
COMM: 813-529-0218
DSN: 529-0218
oscar.p.seara@centcom.mil

Our Army medical evacuation helicopters in Afghanistan frequently come under fire.  These helicopters are clearly marked with the Red Cross on a white background, signaling to the enemy that they are unarmed.  The Red Cross is also a symbol from the Crusades.  A poster found in a village listed crosses as symbols to be destroyed.

Unarmed medical helicopters lead to delays in medical evacuations due to the fact that Army medical helicopters need armed helicopter escorts.  Also they often will not land on very hot landing zones, causing yet more delays.  Air Force rescue helicopters do not wear Red Crosses and are heavily armed, and so can get in more quickly and safely.

The Air Force, Marines, British, and Army Special Operations Forces do not use the Red Crosses.  Only Army medical evacuation helicopters alert the enemy that they are unarmed.

It is a travesty that our Army medical evacuation helicopters are forced by Army leadership to continue to alert the enemy that they are unarmed.  This situation and the battlefield consequences have been brought to the attention of many ranking officials.  They have done nothing.  (Well, not entirely nothing.  They have stated clearly that I am unwelcome to return to combat embeds and even put out an alert for me.)  Their actions and inactions are uninspiring.

Here we see the Secretary of the Army passing the buck to CENTCOM:

Former Delta Force Commander “Dalton Fury” makes a very informed opinion on the MEDEVAC issue.  Delta is the special forces of our special forces.  Opinions from this community carry significant weight.

(This was published in Soldier of Fortune online.  I’ve highlighted certain portions.)

BLEEDING OUT FOR POLITICS
By SOF Editor on Thu, 12/29/2011 - 5:26pm

History has been made in Iraq and Afghanistan, and unless you are a security contractor or special ops troop, your long months away from home and your family are quickly coming to an end. Our servicemen and women have fought an extraordinary fight against impossible odds and reestablished America’s military prowess around the world.

We’ve learned a great deal in the last 10 years of war, like the immediate power of miscommunication from the battlefield, or the importance of committing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) drone aircraft to an area before going in blind.

At every level of war, from tactical to operational to strategic, we’ve shown exceptional adaptability, mental and physical agility, and a willingness to audible early when the enemy changes their formation at the last second. But for some crazy reason that can only be tied to weak kneed senior leaders, in-service turf wars, and gross politics, there is one thing we still can’t seem to fix, even if it kills. We’ve known for years that the Taliban and Al-Qaida fighters target specifically dressed personnel. They aim for the American advisors that wear uniforms distinctly different in color and shape than their Afghan counterparts. It’s smart on their part and something we should have seen well before it became a problem. Our forces were quick to learn, though, and have been taking steps to prevent standing out to the enemy for years now. The reason is obvious—kill the leader and the masses crumble. They aren’t the first to realize that standing out from the crowd isn’t such a good idea on the battlefield.

Combat medics realized long ago that the enemy knows that killing the medic means the other wounded might die. This is still true on today’s battlefield, especially if the Army medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) helicopter is grounded at the departure airfield by general officer policy number whatever because it must wait for an armed escort before launching.

Two thousand years ago, if a warrior was wounded in battle, he bled out where he lay. Nobody was coming to help. Fast forward about 18 centuries and some bright guy in Napoleon’s ranks decided it was a good idea to employ the “inept and expendable” troops to serve as aid and litter teams.

In our grandfathers’ life time, WWII and Korean War front line medics wore red crosses on their helmets and red arm bands to distinguish themselves from their fighting peers. The Korean War also ushered in helicopters flying in to evacuate the wounded from the tip of the spear back to surgical field hospitals. In Vietnam these same helicopters started to bring medics with them to allow life saving measures to begin in flight back to higher level care.

At some point, at least by Vietnam, these helicopters started flying into hot areas with red crosses painted on their sides and noses. Of course, shooting at anything with a red cross is like shooting into a mosque window. We all know that because we follow rules. We just don’t do it, unless there are obvious reasons to believe the building is no longer functioning as a no-fire structure, like an RPG rocket was fired at you from an upper window. We learned about 55 years ago that it was stupid to have American combat medics continue to paint identifying red crosses on their helmet or wear red arm bands. Why? Because our WWII and Korean War troops were sniped at by enemy sharpshooters. The enemy didn’t follow our gentlemen rules. They baited our medics and medical evacuation helicopters and tried to shoot them down.

Today, in the 10-year long war in Afghanistan, the enemy continues to bait our medical helicopters just as they do our Special Forces troops dressed differently from their Afghan counterparts. The Taliban are smart enough to know that the helicopters with the red crosses are unarmed.

By the time Vietnam rolled around somebody decided the medics should carry a gun along with their aid bag. More important than the weapon, some leader somewhere decided to stop highlighting American medics on the front lines and removed the red crosses from the helmets and tossed the red arm bands. It took a while, but it got done for the right reasons. Okay, quick review. Old school—medics used to stand out like a sore thumb, unarmed, but expected to come to a wounded soldier’s aid. Smart school—medics are armed, dressed like every other soldier, and expected to come to a wounded soldier’s aid. Simple, right?

Then why is it that our Army MEDEVAC helicopters are still required to fly into battle with the same identifying red crosses that our grandfathers and fathers figured were stupid and removed from our ground medic’s uniforms? Why aren’t the same Army helicopters armed yet? Moreover, why are the Air Force and Marine MEDEVAC helicopters not flying with identifying red crosses but also flying with mini-guns? The answer appears to boil down to turf wars within the Army organization itself.

None of my commanders would have ever asked a medic to don a red cross on his helmet, or a red arm band, or to dress differently from everyone else. Today, most soldiers carry an individual med kit to save their own life while their mates continue the fight or secure the target. Troops are not taught to lie there in agony and simply bleed out if they still have the mental and physical capacity to stop their own bleeder with Curlex and a tourniquet.

They call it “self-aid.” If things are generally okay in the immediate area, your buddy might be able to lend a hand. Once the actual medic gets to your position, your chances of survival shoot way up. Stabilizing and prepping for transport become the priority here until the ground commander can bring in a helicopter to evacuate the casualty.

As a commander, I wouldn’t consider asking a helicopter to fly in to accept a casualty until, in my best judgment, the threat to the helicopter was mitigated.

Even dedicated ISR and gunship support can’t be 100 percent sure that there is not a threat. A single AK round or RPG rocket can take out a helo inbound and miles away from the urgent casualty.

Urban sprawls and rocky mountain ridges along the typically long flight path provide numerous hiding spots for enemy gunners just waiting for the sound of an incoming helo.

An Apache escort might be able to ruin the enemy gunner’s day, but that is reactive, and the damage to the Army MEDEVAC they are escorting might already be done.

My radio transmission might sound like this.

“You this is Me, request CASEVAC ASAP, location marked by IR strobe, over.”

“Um, uh, negative Me, please specify exactly which type of helicopter do you need. Do you need an Army MEDEVAC, or an Air Force Pedro, or a DUSTOFF, or a Marine asset, over.”

“You this is Me, whichever one can get here the fastest to save this brave American’s life, over.”

The point here is that warriors rely on speed to survive, both on the assault and after they’ve been hit. If Army policy in Afghanistan is to wait for an armed escort before the red cross-marked MEDEVAC can fly, then the answer is obvious. Remove the identifying red crosses to appease the Geneva Convention and arm the aircraft for self-defense. The enemy doesn’t care about the Geneva Conventions or any laws of land warfare.

Haven’t we at least learned that after 10 years of war?

It’s time for some courageous Army general to stand up and correct this before our current wars end and the next one starts. They might even take some recommendations from the Air Force and Marine leaders that solved this same problem years ago.

Just as some courageous general stood up, put politics aside, and removed the red arm bands and red crosses from our medics’ helmets some five decades ago, it seems a no-brainer that a current serving Army general officer do likewise.

Dalton Fury is the NYT bestselling author of Kill Bin Laden and the new, fictional Delta Force thriller, Black Site, available 01.31.12.

Article by Dalton Fury
http://www.sofmag.com/bleeding-out-politics

Before Christmas, I met with General (ret.) Barry McCaffrey in Virginia.  We talked for about 2.5 hours, mostly about Mexico.

My meetings with General McCaffrey have not been random.  Among many other key experiences, he is a former “drug czar” with a deep military background.  He was awarded three Purple Hearts and his son is currently in Afghanistan.  Great Americans.

After that excellent meeting, I spent about two hours with David Martin at CBS.  We did an on-camera interview about the loss of Chazray Clark, and Army Dustoff issues.  Mr. Martin was well prepared.  After the taping, we went through the unedited video of the attack that took Chazray Clark on 18 September.  The CBS piece should run sometime just after New Year’s.  (Date to be announced.)

I may still return to Afghanistan in late January, but it looks like that is off.  Various invitations have come in from the Air Force, Marines and even the Army, but some Army officers are very angry about my Dustoff coverage.  They issued what amounts to an all-points bulletin for me in Afghanistan and have said no embed will be granted.

Command in Afghanistan is hiding behind the failed Dustoff policy.  Good luck with that. I don’t care.  If they are upset now, they’ll be apoplectic before this is over.  Many Army Dustoff and Air Force Pedro people are fully behind what I am doing.  This must be driving the Army crazy.

If Afghanistan is out, I’ll finish some writing projects and shift to Mexico/US coverage.  This will entail moving probably to Texas or Arizona.
Meanwhile, please check out this interesting and informative speech by General McCaffrey.

By the way, General (ret) McCaffrey told me that he fully supports a giant wall across the entire frontier with Mexico:

20 October 2011

Mexico: Drugs, Crime and the Rule of Law

Barry R, McCaffrey, General, USA (Retired)

Presentation to:

The US Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership and George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute

“The Hybrid Threat: Crime, Terrorism, and Insurgency in Mexico”

Let me thank you for the kind introduction. That was very generous. And more importantly, let me thank you for the opportunity to be here. I really came because I wanted to hear the two panels. You have brought together a number of people I have enormous respect for and who really understand the issues.

To set up remarks for the remainder of the session today, I must confess a bias. In my mind, the most important nations to the U.S. today in terms of economic health, in terms of political realities, in terms of our future—are Canada and Mexico. With us, they constitute this giant economic basket. To a very large extent, we have enjoyed a tradition of open borders, allowing for the free movement of goods and services across a huge economic zone that was formalized by NAFTA[1]. I would also tell you that, when we examine our relationship with Canada and Mexico, we are taking into account 100 million-plus people who are central to our economic well being.

When you look at the United States, 307 million people who comprise the wealthiest society in the history of the world, and you look internally at how we keep this unprecedented prosperity going, a lot of it is based on immigration. Whether it is Nigerian petroleum engineers, Russian bridge engineers, Polish aviation engineers—we reap the benefit of a huge amount of intellectual talent that comes by way of immigration into the United States. They arrive just like many of our forbearers, with little else than hope and talent…and like those forbearers, they have done, and will do, okay.

But the inescapable fact is that 10 to 12 million of those migrants (depending upon the numbers you want to believe) are here illegally. And the majority of those are Central American and Mexican laborers. They are growing our food, providing for the foundation of our construction industries, and running our daycare centers. Increasingly they are getting Green Cards[2], gaining U.S. citizenship and voting. They are buying businesses. That is all to their credit. To our shame too many of these people incapable of going to the police and asking for protection, not receiving minimum wage, not working under OSHA[3] safety standards, and are unable to wire money home to their mother (which is why they came here in the first place). All while carrying a significant portion of our economic vitality on their backs.

These things figure prominently when we start talking about counterterrorism or counterdrug activities or border control, because until you recognize that you have a million people a day crossing the border from Mexico—legally or illegally—we’re still talking about a half-million or more moving across the frontier. So, we have to regularize immigration, without which very little of the discussion that follows makes much sense.

In that discussion, I will tell you that I am an unabashed friend of Mexico’s. When you look inside Mexico, filled as it were with a hardworking, humble, spiritual people—terrific businessmen, terrific friends—we find a culture that has permeated much of the United States. This is true in terms of food, music, and language; in fact, the only language (other than English) you can speak in the United States—freely, anywhere in the country, and be answered immediately—is Spanish. The inter-penetration of our two cultures that has been beneficial to both of our peoples.

Our response and interaction on a people-to-people basis is extremely positive. There is an enormous affinity shared between the Mexican and American people, both along the border and throughout the country. But on an official level, for hundreds of years, there has been a tremendous anxiety—bordering on paranoia, on the part of Mexico. The classic saying, “Poor Mexico: So far from God… So close to the United States,” is indicative of this “official divide” that is not manifested in a “personal divide” between us. And I think a corresponding position on the part of official Mexico calls for a frank discussion of the political realities will be a harmful thing because it will negatively affect foreign investment and tourism.

So the dialogue between the United States and Mexico, outside of the last ten years, has been based upon a combination of U.S. ignorance and arrogance, and Mexican paranoia…and that does not lead to sensible policy. And the problem is exacerbated by chasing policies that are based on what I consider to be a misnomer. What we are facing now in Mexico is not a “war on drugs.” It goes well beyond that. What’s happening in Mexico is a struggle to establish the rule of law; not just on a police and military level, but also on a cultural level. We are struggling with a contradiction: on the one hand, you are trying to create a society that is internally democratic and self-governing; on the other hand, a significant element of that society has operated with impunity under the law. The short-term problem—chief among the realities they’re facing in Mexico—is that somewhere between $19-$35 billion a year of drug-related commerce is being generated there. The numbers vary depending on your source, but the impact is clear. That amount of money is a blowtorch that melts democratic institutions. It establishes a level of violence…a sophistication of violence…that is perpetuated in and among 120,000 people directly involved with the drug cartels.

Some of them are organized in platoon- and company-sized units—and I use those phrases provocatively to tell you that we are dealing with 50 to 70 people with automatic weapons, RPGs[4], other military-grade grenades, machine guns, and 50-caliber anti-aircraft guns, who will engage in direct firefights and engagements with Mexican Marines and Soldiers. And they will abduct squad-sized units of the Army and the Federal Police, torture them to death, decapitate them, and leave them as provocative gestures. And they will abduct Mexican general officers and murder them, and leave them with a sign around their necks. They have created an internal atmosphere of intimidation that is so pronounced that, in some ways, it has become impossible for local police (and to some extent state police) to deal with it. It is some kind of threat.

How many people have died at the hands of these elements? Again, the numbers vary with the sources you choose; but one could safely posit 42,000 murders during the current struggle to establish the rule of law.

To reiterate, it’s more than just drugs. It’s also prostitution, abuse of women in the immigrant population, violation of commercial control laws, and potentially (although I don’t think this is a dominant concern) it bears an associated threat with terrorism.

As Frank (Cilluffo) mentioned, we have just been through a Congressional hearing[5] surrounding a report I recently released[6] with (Major General–Retired) Bob Scales. As the hearing progressed the focus shifted to the cartel’s cross-border drug activity. There were a lot of sparks flying, with U.S. Congressmen in denial over this situation; but basically, I think, there is an unwillingness to accept the fact that the problem is not just internal to Mexico.

You have to start with the fact that there are seven major cartels and forty or so subsidiary groups which, combined, represent a peril to the United States. Yes, Stupid, they do. There are 280 some-odd cities in the United States whose dominant organized crime activity is Mexican cartel. They have associates in more than a thousand cities. I just did a seminar for the Portland (Oregon) Police. They are facing a Mexican cartel activity. I participated in the Alameda County “Urban Shield” exercise. They house another Mexican cartel activity. The cartel and their gang foot soldiers are all over the country. They are armed, they are dangerous, and instinctively (because they are a business) they don’t want to confront the FBI.

You and I ought to thank God for the FBI, because the other threat to U.S. democracy associated with the ones we are dealing with here is corruption. You know, when you are talking about the amount of money being offered at this level, it’s not “silver or lead” being thrown up against a U.S. Border Patrol agent—it’s silver. And we’ve had some problems because of it.

Some of our institutions are almost impossible to penetrate: not totally impossible, of course; but when you consider the Coast Guard, the FBI, the Marshall Service, the U.S. Air Force (with regard to radar operators)—it’s pretty hard to penetrate our institutions. That impenetrable nature keeps those institutions from crumbling.

But that cross-border threat from Mexico is real, and—as I said—is using gangs in America as its foot soldiers. There are 30,000 gangs in America, with a million gang members in them. In Texas alone there are 18,000 gang members. And unwittingly, we are contributing to their numbers. The United States has some 2.1 million people in our prisons—nearly the highest incarceration rate on the face of the Earth. Within those prisons we are providing a means for these gangs to socialize, recruit and expand. When the incarcerated leave the prisons (and we turn out a half million every year) many of them are schooled and prepared to enter into the Mexican cartels’ activities. We have found that to be particularly true along the southwest border. And the ranks of the foot soldiers grow, with guns and power distributed from the rural communities of the southwest to the streets of our major metropolitan areas.

And by the way, these are not hierarchical organizations. This is not an ideological struggle. This isn’t a religious struggle. It’s a criminal struggle. And that’s the threat we are facing.

Now we put something in the report that raised ire and anxiety in the law enforcement community.   We said the conditions along the Texas border are like “working in a war zone.” That doesn’t mean El Paso, that island of tranquility that stands as the Geneva of the Southwest. The zone we are talking about is at “the end of the fence,” where people are crossing the border in gangs of 20 or 30 people with automatic weapons, cutting fences, intimidating ranchers, and abducting people. We had a wonderful Texas veterinarian rancher, Dr. Mike Vickers, testifying at the hearing, and he said, “Well, you know, in my county alone there were maybe 600 homicides in the last several years, primarily Mexican migrants crossing that frontier—absent the protection of U.S. law.”

We have completely, inadequately resourced the control of our own frontiers with federal law enforcement. This isn’t a military operation…that “working in a war zone” comment didn’t come from me—it came from a Texas Ranger…and a similar comment came from one of the border communities’ Sheriffs. If you put together those border counties in Texas, and said “you are now a state,” it would be the poorest state in the union, bar none. And it would rank number 1 in federal crimes recorded. We’ve got a struggle going on in the frontier. And the frontiers are inadequately resourced.

We’re doing better. Thank God for Janet Napolitano and Judge Chertoff and Tom Ridge who have led the building of a Department of Homeland Security that is effectively the third largest department in the government. We have consolidated law enforcement organizations. We have put $40 billion-plus a year into their works. So a lot of good has happened. When Mark Coomer[7]—who intellectually propped me up through several assignments in life—and I were working on the Colombia issue, we had—I think—approximately 4,000 people on the U.S. Border Patrol. That was it. And now we are up, I think, to 19,000[8]. I tell people that the right answer is 45,000 people on the U.S. Border Patrol…and the Attorney General—for budget reasons and programmatic issues—will ask, “Well, General, what are the analytical underpinnings to your argument calling for that number?” Underpinnings? I just made the number up out of whole cloth! 45,000 was the high water mark number of the NYPD and its civilian component.[9] They’re protecting 8 million Americans. How would you expect to control 5,000 miles of Canadian frontier, a couple of thousand miles of Mexican border, the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico and the Gulf Coast states with less than that number?

Nonsense. We have not yet created the institutions of domestic security that we need along the borders. And by the way, you can’t just count on uniformed officers of the law. You have to include the justice system in the ultimate equation, along with detention capabilities and a host of other functions. If you end up with a Mexican family being used as surrogate mules for drug smuggling, you can’t just turn them back to Mexico…you have to have some legal resolution that will incorporate all these functions and more. We haven’t built that capacity yet.

Finally—what do you do about it all? If I was running for public office I would want to now proceed to tell you whatever you wanted to hear. But since this is such a complicated issue involving such a broad diversity of people, you can’t offer a quick message with a single solution. I think that one of the things you have to do is to hit upon a decent strategy to approach the complexities. When we used to talk about complicated strategies of these sorts at the Kennedy School in Harvard, we sought after an architectural framework on which to hang our policies. The framework would necessarily include the resources that will be required to carry out the concepts you are trying to convey and apply, and the ends you are trying to achieve. I make no argument against Iraq, Afghanistan and other foreign terrorist operations we have undertaken; but right now the economic “burn rate” in Afghanistan is $10 billion a month. We are running 300 to 1,000 killed and wounded a month. And it’s a pretty primitive and desperate struggle being executed 7,000 miles away from home, with 150,000 NATO troops. Compare that to the expenditures being devoted to the requirements we are addressing here.

The Merida Initiative[10] is the biggest slice of those expenditures to date. All told, it has cost $1.3 billion over the last three years. We have given the Mexicans 11 helicopters so far. Are we kidding ourselves? Colombia has experienced a night-and-day change—primarily because of the courage of the Colombian people, the Colombian National Police, and the Colombian Armed Forces. President Santos Calderón had me down there a year ago to witness the change. The last time I was there in public office in 2001 there were a couple thousand people in my security detachment, because it would have been considered embarrassing to have had me “whacked” on my farewell visit. When I visited last year, there were a dozen of these professional security officers. You could drive all over the country. The ELN[11], a goofy group of Marxists, is coming apart…they’re disappearing. The FARC[12] is overwhelmingly repudiated by the Colombian people. The Plan Colombia story is a good one…but a lot of the reason is that we stood with them, often to the tune of a billion dollars a year for several years. We gave, for instance, 250 aircraft and other means that allowed the Colombian national police to establish the rule of law across the one-third of the country where it had been lacking.

It is a success story. Earlier some of us were reminiscing over the work that we had done in support of the Plan. Once I was at a Congressional hearing, with 14 Representatives who spanned from the far-left to the far-right. All of them badgered me and whined and sniveled for the entire four-hour hearing; and then all of them voted for Plan Colombia. Afterwards we went with a bi-partisan delegation down to Colombia, with the Republican Speaker of the House and the President of the United States on hand to sign that treaty.

There is a similarity here. And what I am suggesting is that, besides immigration reform, besides border control, I think what we need to do is to provide better support to the government of Mexico. There is no danger of a failed state there—in spite of alarms to the contrary. You are not going to be able to take down the Mexican Marines and Army in a firefight with 70 narco-terrorists. That’s not going to happen.

But the question is, when the new Administration comes in—whether the PAN[13] or the PRI[14]—are they going to come to an accommodation with these criminals and dismiss our concerns as a “gringo problem, not our problem”?

That would, of course, constitute a disaster for the rule of law in Mexico…but it would also be a huge problem for us. So we need, it seems to me, to demonstrably stand with these brave men and women in Mexico—to include the media, local police, local mayors, business leaders—all of whom now stand on the edge.

It is time for us to come out of the state of denial. Some of this is normal, bureaucratic behavior. If you come in with a critical evaluation of any issue, the tendency of an Administration—U.S., Mexican or what have you—is to roll up in a ball and deny the critique. In the hearing last week I called for a coherent strategy for border security. There is no unifying strategy for the border. We are better off with DHS, thank God; having an agency that is overseeing and coordinating the issues is essential. But you still run into these bizarre things; for instance, where the Border Patrol for the longest time was forbidden to set foot on Department of the Interior land. Now I think they have to “negotiate” their arrival to the same one to three days ahead of the requirement. What are we thinking? I recently heard that the Border Patrol responded directly to an unnamed television media inquiry having to do with the situation on the border by saying “I’m sorry we can’t take you out there. We’re not allowed to demonstrate that the 2011 Department of Justice threat report is valid.” We’re in denial. And we have to get over it.

We have got to decide what is important to America; and that, it seems to me, is to work coherently with both Canada and Mexico on a range of these inter-related issues. And I think we will.

So again, Frank, thanks to you and Bert for allowing me to make these opening comments, and I look forward to learning from the subsequent discussions.

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IMMEDIATE RELEASE     No. 1036-11

December 22, 2011

                 The investigation into the 25-26 November engagement between U.S. and Pakistani military forces across the border has been completed.  The findings and conclusions were forwarded to the Department through the chain of command.  The results have also been shared with the Pakistani and Afghan governments, as well as key NATO leadership.

                The investigating officer found that U.S. forces, given what information they had available to them at the time, acted in self defense and with appropriate force after being fired upon.  He also found that there was no intentional effort to target persons or places known to be part of the Pakistani military, or to deliberately provide inaccurate location information to Pakistani officials.  

                Nevertheless, inadequate coordination by U.S. and Pakistani military officers operating through the border coordination center -- including our reliance on incorrect mapping information shared with the Pakistani liaison officer -- resulted in a misunderstanding about the true location of Pakistani military units.  This, coupled with other gaps in information about the activities and placement of units from both sides, contributed to the tragic result.

                For the loss of life -- and for the lack of proper coordination between U.S. and Pakistani forces that contributed to those losses -- we express our deepest regret.  We further express sincere condolences to the Pakistani people, to the Pakistani government, and most importantly to the families of the Pakistani soldiers who were killed or wounded.

                Our focus now is to learn from these mistakes and take whatever corrective measures are required to ensure an incident like this is not repeated.  The chain of command will consider any issues of accountability.  More critically, we must work to improve the level of trust between our two countries.  We cannot operate effectively on the border -- or in other parts of our relationship -- without addressing the fundamental trust still lacking between us.  We earnestly hope the Pakistani military will join us in bridging that gap.
 

U.S. Department of Defense
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

On the Web: http://www.defense.gov/releases/
Media Contact: +1 (703) 697-5131/697-5132
Public Contact: http://www.defense.gov/landing/questions.aspx or             +1 (703) 428-0711

This powerful statement comes from the Commandant of the Marine Corps.  I like it.

===

Statement from the Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. James F. Amos

The series of McClatchy news articles have cast doubt on the decision to award the Congressional Medal of Honor to Sergeant Dakota Meyer.  I stand firmly behind the process and the decision to award the Medal of Honor to Sgt Meyer.

The Medal of Honor is our nation's highest award for bravery.  Fittingly, it involves the most demanding of investigations and multiple levels of review.  This process, followed scrupulously in this and other cases, is designed to confirm with as much certainty as possible that the level of bravery and self sacrifice displayed is worthy of this singular honor.  Selflessness of this caliber cannot be measured under ordinary circumstances, because the ordinary does not evoke the extraordinary.  Rather, the Medal of Honor requires that a display of heroism take place under the most difficult circumstances our service members can face.  With life and death hanging in the balance, brave warriors, like Sgt Meyer and those who have gone before him, override their natural, instinctive impulses of self preservation and risk their lives to save others.  Our highest honors are reserved for those who perform such deeds in combat while facing the enemy and braving his fire.

The Marine Corps has reviewed the investigations, the many and varied statements submitted by those who observed the battle in the Ganjgal Valley, the statements of those who participated in pieces of it, and the multiple reviews and endorsements confirming that Sgt Meyer exhibited the rare courage and selflessness worthy of our nation's highest military honor.  The ambush and ensuing six hour firefight was without a doubt a "life defining event" for those present that fall morning.  As such, it was seen and subsequently recorded from many different perspectives, each with a personal view of how events unfolded.  This thorough review did not cause me to question the extraordinary heroism of, then, 21 year-old Corporal Meyer, nor the worthiness of the award; just the opposite occurred.  Sworn testimonies substantiated the events of that morning and the extreme heroism of Dakota Meyer.  The facts are that he saved many lives and recovered the bodies of his fallen comrades.  In this, he did not act alone; other brave warriors-soldiers and Marines and Afghans-were also in the fight for their lives.

In the final analysis, I did not find cause to question any single fact, nor minor discrepancy that may be buried in descriptions of a battle that lasted for hours and evoked such bravery in our troops.  My only question is - where do we find such men?

Gen. James F. Amos
35th Commandant of the United States Marine Corps

I’ve made it back to America after being away about one year.  I cannot begin to tell you how good it feels to be on US soil.  This morning, in Tucson, two A-10 Warthogs flew overhead.   The last time I saw A-10s was in Afghanistan.  They were shooting just about every day.

Now for some sad news.  Today there are more stories about Dakota Meyer.  Dakota was awarded the Medal of Honor for actions during his incredible and honorable service in the Marines.  These stories are saddening because the more you read, the more you realize that Dakota is being tarred and feathered.  This clearly is about politics and business.

And so this morning I emailed to someone I know to be close to Dakota, offering moral support.  This American remains beside you.

A trusted source also sent this dissection of recent comments that are designed to cut down Dakota:

Jonathan Landay has alleged that the Marine Corps deliberately inflated the heroism of Sergeant Dakota Meyer. This allegation has tarnished the reputations of the Marine Corps and of Sergeant Meyer. Landay quoted not one individual. Instead, he used statements made two years ago by those on the battlefield.

There are many contradictions internal to those statements. For instance, Staff Sergeant Rodriguez-Chavez at one point stated, “… the fourth time we went into the valley.. we saw Swenson.” Actually, that happened during the second trip into the valley. Such inconsistencies in memory are normal. Ask eleven football players what happened in a game, and you will receive eleven different answers. Imagine how much more confusing it is in battle!

Landay spent months poring over written statements. He wrote, “It's impossible to reconstruct a clear, chronological account of much of what followed from the statement.”  He then selected some sentences that supported his bias, and ignored other sentences. The result was a series of half-truths, inconsistencies and errors, as illustrated below.

1 Landay: “Rodriguez-Chavez recounted the Afghans got into the vehicle themselves on both runs. He said Meyer stayed in the turret, firing a Mk 19.”

Error: On the first run, the Mk 19 jammed. They switched to a truck with a .50 cal for the second run.

2 Landay: “Meyer didn’t save the lives of 13 U.S. service members… helicopters saved the remaining (six) Americans.”

Comment: Two outposts with four Americans and over a dozen Afghans were under continuous fire, as were the six Americans pulling out of the valley. Meyer and Rodriguez-Chavez, in the only vehicle in the valley, became the bullet magnet for the insurgents, drawing their fire and, with Meyer on a .50 cal in the turret, preventing open enemy maneuver.

Consider these written statements: Rodriguez-Chavez: “Meyer laid down suppressive fire” Swenson: “They (Meyer and Rodriguez-Chavez) drive forward; they provide suppressive fire.”

The fact is there was suppressive fire both from the light helicopters and from Sgt. Meyer’s .50 caliber. Landay knew that, because he saw Meyer. Yet he chose not to report what he saw.

3 Landay: “Meyer killed one, not eight”

Comment: The most famous Medal of Honor recipient in World War II - Audie Murphy - is credited with killing over one hundred Germans. His book is filled with killings. Yet if Murphy required eyewitnesses, nowhere near one hundred would have been credited. Similarly, this is true of the MoH for SEAL Lt Murphy in the 2005 battle in Afghanistan. There wasn’t the verification or exactitude Landay is demanding.

Consider these other statements not used by Landay: Fabayo: “I saw 2 woman/children fire two RPG at CPL (Meyer).” Swenson: “How close the fight actually was, we are talking about people 20 meters away..” Rodriguez-Chavez: “Meyer shot one right next to the door with his M4.”

(Rodriguez-Chavez drove over another one, and later Meyer killed another in hand to hand combat)

Meyer, a deadly shot, fired over a thousand rounds of .50 cal and 7.62 machineguns. Are we to believe he killed insurgents at point blank range, but missed every other target over the course of six hours of shooting?

4 Landay: “Statements undermine the claim that Rodriguez-Chavez and Meyer drove into the valley against orders… Marine Corps doctrine authorized the two staff sergeants to take that initiative.”

Error: the night before, Meyer told SSgt Rodriguez-Chavez he had arranged with his team to drive in to get them if an ambush occurred. When the ambush began, over the radio 1st Sgt Garza ordered Meyer not to   come. When Rodriguez-Chavez and Meyer called a second time, they were told to get off the radio. Meyer then said, “we’re going in”.

Two staff sergeants did not discuss this; up at his observation post, SSGT Valadez was told they were going in. He then offered to observe the road. It is disingenuous to assert that Marine doctrine authorized the two staff sergeants to take initiative. It was Meyer who persistently showed initiative, despite orders to the contrary.

5 Landay: 1st Sgt Garza “called Meyer forward” when he (Garza) was at the Casualty Collection Point”

Error: Meyer had already been forward in the valley on three trips, and had covered Garza’s escape to the Casualty Collection Point.

6 Landay: “Meyer didn’t ride in the unarmored Ford Ranger pickup with Swenson.”

Error: Meyer was in the Ranger with Swenson. It was just the two of them. Swenson has said this repeatedly. Swenson was driving. He helped Dakota put the body of Dodd Ali, Dakota’s best friend among the Afghan soldiers, in the back of the Ranger while they were under fire.

7 Landay: “The account of the battle in Swenson’s nomination is sharply at odds with the Marines’ account of Meyer’s deeds.”

Error: the fact is that the Marines and Meyer have struggled for two years to insure Swenson is recognized as equally courageous and determined. In fact, Meyer has sent to the Army two pages of testimony, explaining in detail that Swenson was the man in charge on the battlefield and concluding that he, Meyer, is alive only because of Swenson. By portraying battlefield confusion as deliberate exaggeration, Landay has jeopardized Swenson’s nomination.

8 Landay: “No sworn statements refer to him leaping from the Humvee’s turret to rescue 24 wounded Afghan soldiers.”

Error: Both Rodriguez-Chavez and Swenson have said that Meyer repeatedly left the safety of various vehicles to run in the open under fire to aid Afghan soldiers.

9 Landay: “The official account doesn’t explain how the pair could have evacuated 24 Afghan soldiers."

Misleading:  Does not take account of the whole battle. Meyer began picking up Afghans at about 0700. First trip: 5. 2d trip: 4. That’s nine.

Then from 0930 (when Landay left the battlefield) to 1130, Meyer stayed in the valley. Between 0930 and 1130, at least six Afghan pickups drove in and out behind the gun truck. Meyer was in at least five different trucks during six hours of battle. All witnesses attested that Meyer was hopping in and out of the trucks to help the wounded. There were 90 Afghan soldiers in the valley when the battle began. Meyer had an overstuffed medbag, with more than 14 tourniquets. He used all the tourniquets.

Nine plus fourteen equals 23, not 24. But the figure of 24 is not misleading; it is illustrative of Meyer’s efforts.

In sum, Landay selected sentences to buttress his assertions. But other statements contradict Landay. There is no evidence of deliberate exaggeration. There is ample evidence of battlefield confusion. That is to be expected.

Many people remember Command Sergeant Major Robb Prosser.  Robb is the man who shot the man who shot Erik Kurilla.  This firefight is described in Gates of Fire.

I spent about five months with his unit in Iraq, and so Robb later invited me with his unit in Afghanistan.  We were roommates in Kandahar.  Robb was the Command Sergeant Major of the 5th Stryker Brigade.

Unfortunately, the upper leadership (above the brigade) had the brigade so spread out over a huge area of southern Afghanistan that it was near about impossible for Stryker leadership to keep tabs on everyone, much less make progress.

The Brigade Commander, Colonel Harry Tunnell, was later villainized by other officers and by the media, partly due to the fact that a small number of Soldiers committed murder.  The vast majority of the brigade consisted of normal combat troops, meaning they were highly disciplined.  But we know how this goes.  If a few bad apples fall off a tree, we often chop down the whole tree or even the entire orchard.

I have a different view of Colonel Tunnell.  I like him immensely.   He’s also the highest ranking officer who comes right out and supports this Dustoff fight. That’s part of why I respect him.  He knows that supporting this Dustoff fight hurts him professionally, but he knows it’s the right thing for our troops.

Colonel Tunnell got shot in Iraq and came back for seconds in Afghanistan.  Incidentally, Colonel Tunnell also gives high praise to the courage and professionalism of Dustoff crews who he credits with saving his leg in Iraq, and many of his troops in Afghanistan.

Colonel Tunnell’s problem is that he is his own man.  He’s a very smart man and he speaks his mind.  Speaking your mind in the military with an opinion that does not carry the line is nearly guaranteed to leave you shipwrecked.  That’s what happened.  Bottom line: I respect Colonel Tunnell, and Robb Prosser is a close friend of mine.   Robb was Command Sergeant Major for Colonel Tunnell.

Robb sends this note:

Mike, we go way back and have been through much together both in IRAQ and AFGHANISTAN. These GO [General Officer] Leaders are completely disconnected and seem hell bent on proving their points regardless of the consequences and making unsound directives regardless of the loss of life. Mike, as you know I was a BDE [Brigade] CSM during my last deployment and I have always stood up for what is right--This time it only got me into trouble.

I have much more to say but will stick to the point. My BDE Commander [COL Tunnell] wrote the Sec of Army direct on the problems leaders were facing when it came to the NATO Forces and how US service members were being placed in questionable positions and conditions which had dire consequences on the battlefield.  Thank God some of those leaders were relieved!

[Colonel Tunnell] in his address to Sec of ARMY also commented on how units are showing up not trained for missions and that some leaders are selected for the wrong positions based on little experience and knowledge, but regardless are still being placed in these positions.

Commander wrote a memorandum of concern directly to the G8 about the survivability of the Stryker and was classified a difficult leader to work with by folks at the Pentagon.

Our nation’s sons were dying and being injured and he was doing his duty to report a vehicle that was not equipped for the environment it was employed to fight in.  That message and the loss of over 22 Soldiers cost the ARMY 3.1 Billion dollars for a new fleet of Strykers we should have had from the beginning.  The amount of waste/fraud/abuse that is going on over there would make the taxpayer sick!

But yet all this sits on the sideline and the AFGHANISTAN PEOPLE are priority # 1.  Generals were putting out units need to love the Afghan People.  I was called “difficult to work with” because I hated the enemy that hurt and killed my teammates more than I liked the Afghan people.  I loved my Soldiers more than anything.

When I went to Walter Reed to visit my wounded Soldiers not one mother/father/sister/brother asked me about how the Afghan people are doing. These Americans asked about our service members and how they are doing—maybe we need to start focusing on them instead of the Afghan people.

Maybe having a writer who reports about the tough uphill fights units have each and every day in Afghanistan [will help].  A writer who addresses some of the issues above with hard facts could be doing the war the best thing that could possibly happen—writing about the truth. . . .

Mike, keep up the fight brother!!!

Robert Prosser
US ARMY CSM (RET)

This weekend I spoke for several hours with a retired Special Forces Soldier.  Much of the numerous conversations revolved around the terrible Army policy of sending unarmed Dustoff helicopters into combat.  These helicopters are emblazoned with Red Crosses.  The Red Crosses are intended to alert the enemy that the helicopters are unarmed.  The Taliban and other enemies in Afghanistan do not abide by the Geneva Conventions and they shoot at the unarmed helicopters.

Some members of the Army, Air Force and Marines are very happy that I have taken on the cause of arming the Dustoff helicopters.  However, some top brass in the Army is extremely angry to be called out for supporting the dangerous policy of sending unarmed Soldiers into combat.

The retired Green Beret friend, whom I sometimes call for advice, has warned me about this one.  He wants the crosses off, and recognizes that this is a fight with people in big places.  My friend warns, “If they can argue with facts, they will fight you with the facts.  The facts are not on their side.  You won that argument.  When the facts are not on their side, they will argue the law.  There is no law to argue here.  The facts are against them and the law won’t help, and so they will shoot the messenger.  Watch your back on this one.”

Advice taken.

The current Army strategy is to paint me as paranoid or mentally unstable.  They did this last year with regard to Brigadier General Daniel Menard and General McChrystal.  Both were then fired and so it turned out that I was not so crazy after all.  But I was months ahead of the curve in saying they should be fired, and I admit it looked crazy at the time to say that two general should be sent home.  And I was saying this during a time when I was being disembedded.  But my disembedding could have also stemmed from the fact that I was publishing, while still embedded, that Menard should be fired.  Bottom line: my efforts created powerful enemies.

That would have been my final Army embed had General Petraeus not invited me back.

McChrystal’s fellas and Menard’s wildcards tried to paint me as mentally unstable, but it backfired when they both were both fired.

Importantly, I had possession of military communications that I never released that would have proven there was a conspiracy between McChrystal’s staff and some milbloggers to defame me.  Some of the milbloggers are little more than mouthpieces for the military.  In fact, one of General McChrystal’s staffers secretly ran a milblog (The Quatto Zone) before I outed him.  It’s back online these days.

Let’s invest a few sentences to review a 2010 history: 

They disembbeded me while I was writing positive things about the troops.  (But was saying Menard needed to be fired.)  And so they disembbedded a writer, me, who consistently praises our combat forces, and they embedded the Rolling Stone guy who got McChrystal fired.  And so who is crazy here?

In addition to kicking me out and welcoming Rolling Stone in, they embedded a 21 year-old guy named Michael Enright.  Mr. Enright did a quick and uneventful embed in Afghanistan.  When Mr. Enright returned to America, he got drunk and slashed a taxi driver’s throat.

The Army kicked me out (not the “military” but the Army), then embedded Rolling Stone, who got their boss fired, and in the same era they embedded Michael Enright.  Yes, I am the writer who has written three books and hundreds of dispatches praising the troops.  Rolling Stone is the one who got their boss fired in 2010, and separately in 2011 tried to make US troops looks like psychopaths, and tried to get another general fired.  I defended the military with inside knowledge.

So, when they say that I am crazy, they are saying that the man who writes good stuff about them has no credibility.  That’s crazy.  (And don’t forget Rolling Stone and Michael Enright.)

The Army knows that I am making moves to return to Afghanistan.  And so messages have gone out over classified channels that I will not be able to embed.  It’s crazy for the Army to think I won’t hear about this.  Huge numbers of troops read my work and you can bet the house that someone in every HQ in Afghanistan knows how to reach me.  This stuff floods back.

Sadly, the IJC (basically the HQ in Afghanistan) has not told me that they will not credential an embed.  It’s clear to insiders that they are trying to bait me over to Afghanistan before turning me down.

When I wrote that the IJC put out a CCIR (Commander's Critical Information Requirements) for me, mouthpieces again kicked in saying I am being paranoid.  But again, I have proof.

The red ink is mine, but the “Michael Yon Alert” is theirs:

=====
Email from MSG Nicholas J Conner, CJTF-1CD PAO NCOIC
Subject: Michael Yon Alert

All:

I have received word from IJC that Michael Yon announced that he is coming back to Afghanistan. I do not know if he intends to travel to RC-East. This is to notify you that he WILL NOT be credentialed by IJC/ISAF. As such, he is to have NO ACCESS to ISAF bases, personnel, transportation or life support.

His presence in any AO is considered CCIR and reported up the chain onf command immediately. Please ensure that this message is disseminated to ALL units; including PRTs and ADTs. Do not be the one that ends up in the fishbowl.

Call me if you have questions or concerns.

MSG Nicholas Conner
RC-East
Nicholas.conner@afghan.swa.army.mil; Nicholas.conner@us.army.mil
DSN: 318-431-4102

The IJC is under the command of Lieutenant General Curtis Scaparrotti.  I am told that LTG Scaparrotti is a good commander.  Yet battle lines are being drawn, as they were with Menard and McChrystal.  It’s possible that someone has misrepresented the IJC position and thus misrepresented the intent of LTG Scaparrotti.  If LTG Scaparrotti’s staffers are misrepresenting him, they are endangering his reputation.

At present, the benefit of the doubt is going to LTG Scaparrotti.

After this dispatch is published, LTG Scaparrotti is considered to be alerted that IJC, under his command, is banning me without cause and have put out a CCIR.  The CCIR is the police equivalent of an APB.  This is serious business and is the stuff they wake up commanders for.  If LTG Scaparrotti’s people put out a CCIR for a New York Times writer, this would be headline news.

The Army is upset that they are being called out on a faulty MEDEVAC policy, and they are responding in ways that will cause damage to military officers.

Since I’ve started writing about the Dustoff problems, the Army has practically put a bounty on my head.  A theater wide alert has gone out that I am to be denied access to ISAF bases in Afghanistan, and that my movements are to be reported.  This went out through classified channels.

These dispatches are embarrassing for the Army.  They have been allowing troops to die on battlefields in Afghanistan for politics.  I don’t care about Army embeds, but I do care about my friends in uniform.

Recently, a combat unit invited me to go with them in about January.  I kept it confidential for some time, but decided to mention it publicly on Facebook to check for Army reaction.  The Army overreacted as predicted and put out the classified alert to report any sightings of me.

Shutting me out is not shutting me up, or down.

Stranger still is that an Army PAO officer just asked if would be a guest speaker at a conference.  There is much love-hate going on.  Increasingly hate as I drive home this medical evacuation problem.

I’ve been working on another dispatch about the Dustoff issue.  It should be ready by Monday.

Meanwhile, a military friend sent this neat video of a US Air Force Pedro landing on the USNS Yukon.  The video was made with an iPhone4 through night vision.

US Air Force "Pedro" CSAR Landing on USNS Yukon

For more on the Dustup about the Dustoffs, please read:

RED AIR
Fool’s Gold & Troops Blood (Video of combat MEDEVAC failure)
Golden Seconds (More on MEDEVAC failures)
Pedros (Air Force Search and Rescue)
Marked for Destruction
CrusaderCopters
The Army ain’t Dumb (It’s Crazy)
Dustoff Helicopters: Violating Geneva Conventions in Afghanistan

4-4 Cav on Mission in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan

The Soldiers were on a mission.  One day had become the next and they had moved into an Afghan family compound until the morning.  The moon crept along, shadows tracing arcs, the shine so strong it caused one to wonder if photosynthesis might still be occurring.  Tonight, in Florida, the mockingbirds would sing beautifully through the night, perched on the branches, searching for mates, as they do under such moons.

This was enemy territory.  Soldiers stood under a tree.   A dim headlamp splashed blood red under the leaves, creating a fleeting, accidental art.

Steadiness for these photographs came from putting the camera on the ground, or on the mud chicken coop, or on the roof.  The camera’s dim red light appears bright from long exposure.  Normally, the light is hidden with thick tape to cover any signature.  Behind the compound walls, safe from enemy eyes, the tape is removed.  While the light burns, a moment in history is being captured.  When the light vanishes another memory is sealed.

A handful of Soldiers stood at the walls while others slept.  Family homes are ensconced within strong, defensible fortifications.  When you fly far out over a desert, away from the villages, and look down and see a single home miles from any other, it will still be surrounded by walls.  For Afghans, there is no emergency 911 to call.  Every man must defend his own.

Afghanistan is the Mud Empire.  The Land of a Million Alamos, where East meets West, Old meets New, and where in many villages clocks are little more than spinning wheels.

The Air Force JTACs and TACPs earn every penny of their checks.  Their job is crucial and clear.  They come on dangerous missions to coordinate air power.  In the west our jobs are specialized while villagers here mostly have no specialties.  They are farmers, and farmers around the world tend to be conservative people.  Farmers with wild ideas sooner or later will starve.

There were raisins on the roof.  Afghan grapes and sun-dried raisins are of a special class.  In some areas the grapes seem average, but in others the grapes are so delicious and sweet that they seem almost noble.  These grapes bring out the art in fruit.

The famers here grow many crops, such as corn, sunflowers, marijuana, and poppy for opium.  Last week in Australia, a huge shipment of heroin mixed with raisins was seized.  It’s possible that some of those products came from this village.  For all of Australia’s efforts in blood and money to stabilize Afghanistan, they get drug smuggling in return.  The Australians say that heroin use is on the rise due in part to increased production in Afghanistan.

This interesting little camera lens makes it appear that the camera is down in a well.

The Air Force comms were established in the event air strikes would be needed, and finally one man has a smoke, safely out of view of the enemy.  Though we were out of view of the enemy, nowhere in this compound was safe from enemy fire.  Sometimes they lob grenades into the compounds, or fire RPGs or recoilless rifles.

The minutes roll by.  Most everyone is asleep on the ground.  We are on the roof with the raisins and the drying stalks of opium poppy.

Trouble with comms.  More experimentation with the antenna.

The roof.

Two Soldiers are on watch through that door, and it might be tempting to just walk over these drying poppy stalks and go see them.  But in Afghanistan every step is bound to be your last.  The straw on the other side of the opium poppy is merely a thin, thatched roof, but it’s not obvious.  One step and you would plummet into the small room below, where the FET (Female Engagement Team) was in abode.  One small step for a man likely would result in the need for Dustoff for a couple of people.

It’s funny how often that I’ve written about women going on serious combat missions and getting into the middle of firefights, yet many Americans still believe that women don’t go into combat.  Or they are not “in” the combat unit.  It’s a silly thought.  When bullets start flying, it doesn’t matter what patch they wear.

One must wonder how many troops have fallen through roofs, or into unmarked water wells.  Some wells are very deep and equally sudden.  Just a hole in the ground.  No bucket hanging from a pole.  No bricks surrounding it.  Afghan wells can be up to hundreds of feet deep.   Retrieving a limp body would be a chore.

On the ground, the Soldiers sleep, the moon so bright that “Z” covers his eyes.

Second by second, earth and bodies radiate heat into space and the warm night has become cool, and then chilly.

Just now, Terry Taliban was probably sleeping.

That’s the 4-4 Cav squadron commander, LTC Mike Katona.  Most everyone sleeps on the ground here.  I slept on the roof.

Sergeant Major Greg Larsen is the Operations Sergeant Major.  As the night became more chilly, a few Soldiers used “Central Park blankets” and pulled under cardboard from MRE boxes.  LTC Katona went the Central Park route.  During other missions, they’ve slept in body bags.

The red tab on the Sergeant Major’s sleeve is a tourniquet in his pocket.  All Soldiers in Task Force Spartan carry a tourniquet here.  Oftentimes, several tourniquets are needed for one patient.  It’s crucial to have them quickly available.  I wonder how many lives have been saved by this simple policy.

The camera is steadied on the mud chicken coop.

Other Soldiers sleep inside the rooms where it’s warmer, nastier, and safer from grenade or other attacks.  These men know combat.  Many have already done multiple tours here and in Iraq.  You can’t swing a cat without hitting someone who has a Purple Heart.

Purple Hearts and medals can create weird dynamics.  Purple Hearts are awarded for wounds received in combat.  Some guys don’t care about medals, but a few want every medal they can get.  I’ve seen a lot of troops turn down Purple Hearts.  They do this especially in units in heavy combat and their reasoning is always the same: I wasn’t hurt bad enough, so I didn’t deserve it.  It would be embarrassing for them to take it.

I know many people with Purple Hearts, and at least two of my friends turned them down.  I believe both have two Purple Hearts each, but turned down a third.  One friend was a lieutenant colonel and the other an E4.  Same reason: The E4 was embarrassed because they were in a firefight and he got wounded by a vehicle.  He said it was his fault, so he didn’t want the Purple Heart.  He said he didn’t want to go through life explaining in shame how he got that one.  He really deserved it, but he was embarrassed and so that’s how it went.

The lieutenant colonel got shot in the hand but it was minor and so he didn’t want it.  In other units, you see troops who think they should get a Purple Heart for a bee sting.  There may be a little exaggeration there, but not much.  Anyway, unless you turn it down, you automatically get a Purple Heart when you get wounded in combat.  It could be a very minor wound for which you don’t miss an hour of duty, or it could be massive wounding.  The Purple Heart is the same.

Medals are a different story.  When the military is not in big wars, if they get into a minor clash like Grenada, medals seem to rain from the sky.  But if you get in a serious war situation like at times in Iraq and Afghanistan, where firefights can occur many times per day (as in this unit), lots of medals still are awarded but you don’t get them just for showing up.

The medals depend on the unit, too.  One guy in a non-combat unit might get a Bronze Star with V (valor) for actions that a troop in a combat unit would not even get a pat on the back.  You can often sense the guys who got medals for nothing because they can’t stop bragging about them.  They can also cause friction because if ten guys are in the same fight, and all did equally well, and one guy gets a big medal and the others don’t, jealousy can rear its head.  Not always, but it happens from time to time.

Medals also create a weird dynamic for numerous reasons.  For instance, awards go toward promotions, so there are financial and career incentives.  In Iraq, you would see a bunch of guys in the same fight, doing the exact same stuff, and the higher-ranking people would get the higher medals.  If you put everyone in for big medals, even if they all deserved them (often the case), they likely all will get turned down.  And so one Special Forces team told me that they rotated who got medals so that it would be fair.  That might sound hokey, and on one level it is, but on another level it more reflects the reality that everyone is fighting all the time.

Usually we think of medals for one heroic act, but in reality just going on mission after mission is a serious act in itself, even if the trooper never did anything particularly special other than shoot at bad guys.

We’ve all heard stories about guys claiming to have a Medal of Honor and it turns out to be fake.  Often these guys were never in the military, but less known is that a good number of people on active duty will flaunt medals they never earned, or they might wear a Ranger tab on their sleeve never having gone to Ranger school.  Sometimes they do it for years before being caught.  Some probably have gone their entire life without being caught.  But the one surefire clue that the medal is fake, or at least the circumstances are overblown, is when the guy keeps pointing out how he got the medal.

Everyone has lost friends and many have held them in their arms as they died, or carried them under fire through the swirling dust to a roaring helicopter.  Many of these men have not seen just a fight or two; they’ve seen hundreds of firefights and bombs.  Some have seen more than hundreds.  It’s a safe bet that half the men in this photograph have been wounded.  They’ve been shot, blown up, hit with shrapnel.  Sometimes they don’t get a scar.  Troops often get shot in the helmet and they usually get knocked out.  If you get hit in the body armor by an AK-bullet, the bullet won’t go through a plate but you are going down and your ribs might be broken.

Soldiers use chemlights as nightlights.  The troops in here are safer and warmer, but the floor and walls are unwashed by the sun.  The air is dank and smells of barnyard.

There is no electricity.  In many homes, nothing is present that uses electricity.  No radios, no flashlights.  Other times there might be a battery-operated clock.  Mobile phones can be charged on motorbikes.  Even the wheel has come to many villages during living memory of older Afghans.

On the mud walls, often there will be photographs or small posters from afar, of places like Hawaii or a big city in America or Europe.

During missions, if the troops are in an area where it is safer to sleep in family compounds, homes are chosen for tactical significance.  Sometimes the families choose to stay; other times they go.  Usually they go.

They will be compensated; the rates change based on a payment schedule from afar.  4-4 Cav pays about 4,500 Afghanis, or about $94 US per night.

The Afghan farmers will no doubt live better than many of our returning veterans.

There exists extreme unemployment of returning troops.  It has been reported that nearly 1/3 of young veterans do not have jobs.  What will we do when the more than 100,000 remaining troops still committed to the wars return to the land of opportunity?  About 18 veterans commit suicide every day.  Coming back from the war might be more dangerous than staying in it.  Meanwhile, the military is being slashed to gear down.

There is always a war after the war.  The AfterWar will be more deadly and more costly.  Some of my friends have returned home and done well.  One combat veteran from Deuce Four in Iraq emailed that he recently completed his Master’s degree after having started from scratch.

But for many there will be the AfterWar.  The AfterWar will cascade through generations in ways that can never be counted.  Many troopers have already orphaned children in body or in spirit, while others come back stronger than before.

Afghan Soldiers and an interpreter slept in a cluster.

A female Soldier stands guard.  There was a gunshot and she ducked and then someone said it was just the Afghan Soldiers in a different compound.  She stayed on the wall.

An Afghan Soldier covers his face from the moon and cold, while an interpreter sleeps in his armor.

Afghan Soldier uses armor for a pillow.

As morning creeps in, the Soldiers wake up long before daylight.

Someone uses a white light.

More Soldiers come to life.

The bomb dog wakes up.

Just in front of the green-lighted door sleeps a large “kuchi dog” left by the family.  Kuchi dogs have a reputation for ferocity and fighting.  This one has slept without bothering a soul.  There is something of a caste system for dogs in Afghanistan.  Normal dogs often are treated badly, while the fighting and hunting dogs are treated with respect.  A Soldier died this year from rabies contracted in Afghanistan.  The risks are minuscule, but rabies is RABIES, and so we play it up big.

Door to the right: Troops head to the Afghan family toilet before continuing the mission.

The Soldiers abandoned the place before sunrise and the mission continued.  There was a minor IED strike a bit later.

The majority of Soldiers are true professionals in Afghanistan.  They have a mission, a purpose, and a paycheck.  Many will return to no mission, no purpose, and no paycheck.  Many will have medals they earned in full, some will have medals for nothing, and others will have metal inside of them.

As the wars wind down and the military shrivels like a raisin, we must become ever more serious about the AfterWar.  Trouble is on the way.

If you ask ten service members “What is the difference between CASEVAC and MEDEVAC,” you might get six answers.  Five might answer, “I don’t know.”  The other five will surely give five different answers.

I’ve asked dozens and never gotten the same answer twice.  The people I’ve asked include Army Dustoff pilots, Air Force Pedro pilots and crew, and one Marine officer.  I’ve also asked plenty of Generals, Colonels, and senior-ranking enlisted folks.

Bottom line up front: if someone advertises that they know the definition, they don’t.  A single, widely accepted definition does not exist.  Definitions are easy to find in books here and there, but if you poke around enough, you will find that the definitions conflict.

Online dictionaries offer little help.  

According to OxfordDictionaries.com:

CASEVAC

•    evacuation of casualties by air.
•    evacuate (a casualty) by air.

MEDEVAC

•    the evacuation of military or other casualties to hospital in a helicopter or aeroplane:
•    transport (someone) to hospital in a helicopter or aeroplane:

Other dictionaries and military literature render other definitions.  Wikipedia is Wikipedia.

The working definitions of CASEVAC and MEDEVAC are so misleading that you must ask the person using the terms exactly what is meant.  For instance, US Air Force “Pedro” performs CASEVACs.  If you ask a Pedro pilot with hundreds of combat missions behind him, his definitions are likely to be simple:

1)    CASEVAC is armed.
2)    MEDEVAC is unarmed.

The Pedro likely will go on to say that MEDEVACs are protected under the Geneva Conventions and that CASEVACs are not.

I asked an experienced Pedro commander, and got this more granular response:

Well, I don't know that the AF actually has official definitions of either term, but the generally accepted definitions of each among my peers in the AF Rescue community are:

MEDEVAC - evacuation of injured personnel from the battlefield or a low-level care facility to a higher level of care.  In the AF, we generally view this as evacuation from a secured, no-threat landing area where the person is usually "packaged" (had some level of care and/or stabilization).  Sometimes, this can even apply to transport in between FOBs, CASFs, etc.  In fact, it's even called MEDEVAC when a C-17 airlifts people from Bagram to Ramstein.

CASEVAC - is different in that it involves evacuation of injured personnel from the battlefield or the point of their injury, with little or no prior care.  The landing area is not necessarily secured and troops may be actively involved in fighting.  In fact, what really differentiates CASEVAC from MEDEVAC for us is that when conducting CASEVAC we will fight our way in to get the injured person.  Some non-AF people will also add the level of care while en route to their definition - saying there is a higher level of care while en route with a MEDEVAC.  I don't think this really applies with MEDEVAC or CASEVAC on AF [H]H-60s because the PJs are very highly trained medically (in addition to tactically).  All have EMT training and some have up to PA-level training.  In a CASEVAC, they will leave the [H]H-60 to go get the injured person, provide initial medical care (sometimes under fire), bring that person to the helicopter, and treat them on the way home.

If you ask a Dustoff pilot, you’ll get a different answer.  A pilot said to me on the phone that Dustoff are called MEDEVAC because they have medics aboard, and that Pedros are called CASEVAC because they have no medics.  This is false.  Pedros have excellent medics on every flight.  And so by that pilot’s definition, Pedro is MEDEVAC.

Others will say that MEDEVAC aircraft/vehicles are specifically designated for medical evacuations.  Again, this falls flat: Pedros are designated for medical evacuations in Afghanistan, and they are called CASEVAC.  British “Tricky” (call sign for their medical evacuation helicopters) have real doctors aboard, and machine guns.  Army special operations forces often go with real doctors, and always with machine guns.  Their dedicated medical birds don’t wear Red Crosses.  So what are they?  CASEVAC or MEDEVAC?

Marines give another answer.   Let’s don’t even go there.

So I asked a very experienced Army man, and in his wisdom he cut through all the malarkey and put it like this, “You say potAtoe, I say potawtoe.”  He also tells me not to wrestle with pigs when I write something bad about milkooks.  (Few words, simple wisdom.  He’ll probably chastise me via email when he sees that sentence.)

The definitions make no difference, really.  But some people are trying to undermine the message that Dustoff helicopters should go without Red Crosses, and they have hung their greasy hats on the idea that I don’t know the definitions.  In every case, however, the inverse has been true.  I know the many definitions so well that I have mostly avoided the topic to prevent confusion.

Importantly, those people who are undermining the message are trying to leave wounded troops on the battlefield longer.  Many Dustoff and Pedro people, who actually fly these missions, are flooding me with information and encouragement.  All of the Pedro and the majority of Dustoff want the crosses removed from Dustoff helicopters.  Those who are trying to undermine the message are going against the desires of many people who are actually flying these missions today.

Bottom line: If someone says they know the definition of CASEVAC/MEDEVAC, they don’t.

For more information, please read:

PEDROS
RED AIR
GOLDEN SECONDS
FOOL’S GOLD Troops’ Blood
Marked For Destruction
US Army violating Geneva Conventions

After reading the above, please consider joining our private forum.

They Watch our Backs

05 December 2011

The US Army is today in flagrant violation of the Geneva Conventions in Afghanistan.  This was first pointed out to me by a very smart, highly experienced senior military person.  Though he has never steered me wrong, this seemed a bit much.  And so over the past month I looked into it.

He was right.  We are in violation of the Geneva Conventions in Afghanistan.  The explanation is straightforward.

Our forces take casualties every day.  US Army “Dustoff” helicopters evacuate wounded troopers seven days per week.  The Dustoff crews courageously fly over enemy territory to rescue our wounded.  Our Dustoff helicopters fly straight over enemy heads.  The Dustoff helicopters are clearly marked by the Red Cross and are unarmed.

The various enemies in Afghanistan are not signatory to the Geneva Conventions.  We have no expectation that they know or will follow the Conventions, and in any case the Taliban and others have not obligated themselves by agreeing to uphold the Conventions.

But our Army says that we are following the Geneva Conventions by sending unarmed helicopters marked with Red Crosses into enemy territory, flying straight over the heads of the enemy.  We say the enemy is in violation when they fire upon the clearly marked helicopters.

In fact, the enemy is within the law to shoot down the Dustoffs.  Importantly, the enemy is not signatory to the Conventions.  Most importantly, Dustoff helicopters violate Geneva Conventions in Afghanistan and behave as combatants.

Dustoff helicopters behave as combatants by flying over routes not agreed up between all the parties to the conflict.  Dustoff further violates the Conventions by flying over the enemy and over enemy terrain, and thus behave as combatants.  Dustoff will never obey a summons to land to be inspected by the Taliban, and thus are behaving as combatants.

Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949.

Art.22. Aircraft exclusively employed for the removal of wounded and sick civilians, the infirm and maternity cases or for the transport of medical personnel and equipment, shall not be attacked, but shall be respected while flying at heights, times and on routes specifically agreed upon between all the Parties to the conflict concerned.

They may be marked with the distinctive emblem provided for in Article 38 of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949.  Unless agreed otherwise, flights over enemy or enemy occupied territory are prohibited.

Such aircraft shall obey every summons to land. In the event of a landing thus imposed, the aircraft with its occupants may continue its flight after examination, if any.

And so there it is.  We are in violation of the Geneva Conventions in Afghanistan and are deceptively using the Red Cross.  Is this prosecutable as a war crime?  I do not know.  Is it a violation of the Conventions?  Yes.

The Marines, Air Force, British, and US Army Special Operations Forces do not sport the Red Crosses.

The US Army is forcing Dustoff crews to violate the Geneva Conventions.  American troops are trained not to violate the Geneva Conventions.  Our troops are trained to disobey orders that violate the law.

The Army has publicly communicated in writing that the Dustoffs wear Red Crosses in Afghanistan to abide by Geneva Conventions. This could obligate Dustoff crews to disobey unlawful orders, or put themselves at risk of violating the Conventions.

It could happen tomorrow.  A Soldier might say, “Sir, I want to go to Afghanistan, but I am afraid that by violating the Geneva Conventions, I could be accused of a war crime.  I am caught in a bad place.  I cannot violate the Geneva Conventions and so there is no need to send me to Afghanistan to fly.  I must refuse that unlawful order.  If ordered, I will go to Afghanistan but I cannot fly in violation.”

A Soldier is obligated to obey the law.  A Soldier is obligated not to obey unlawful orders.

What would you do?

The call sign for British medical evacuation helicopters is “Tricky.”  Tricky is constantly involved with medical evacuations in Afghanistan.   Their methods vary significantly from ours.  For that matter, US Army, Air Force and Marine methods vary dramatically from one another.

The underlying American philosophy for conventional troops is to scoop up casualties and get them back to the hospital, ideally while highly trained medics go to work.

US Special Operations Forces often bring their own surgeons.  Likewise, the British use Chinook helicopters with surgical crews who can push blood and start doctor-level work right there in the bird.

There are ups and downs to the British versus conventional US Army, Air Force, and Marine ideas.  At times, the British way of showing up in a faster-flying helicopter with a surgical crew can be superior to the US conventional forces.  Other times, the British way is inferior to all.

For instance, in many (probably most) cases in Helmand province, Dustoff and especially Pedro can have the patient inside the bird and possibly back at the hospital before Tricky even launches.  There is much nuance and circumstance to the ground realities.  The factors are myriad and dynamic.

As the months unfold you’ll likely see mention of “Tricky” on many occasions, and so this is a good time to introduce these outstanding British troops.

In this video, a Tricky pilot gets shot in the head, and in true warrior spirit he stays on mission.

(This video was shot at Camp Bastion, the same base where I embedded with Air Force Pedro.)

"Insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results."

From World War II, we’ve heard reports that the enemy shot at Red Crosses emblazoned on medical vehicles, tents, and helmets.  The Japanese were said to specifically target Red Crosses.  The Germans were reported to do it from time to time.  American troops in Europe and the Pacific sometimes covered the Red Crosses to avoid being hit.

World War II should have been enough to teach us a lesson.  But the Army seemed dumb.  There was a repeat in Korea.   A retired military man forwarded a link to this Korean War video.

Notice at the 4min57sec mark, our troops are hiding a Red Cross.  How many of our people were shot to pieces in WWII and Korea before they started covering the symbols?

Then our people fought in Vietnam.  Our Dustoff helicopters sported Red Crosses and were shot down.

Dumb learns from pain.  Insane just keeps bashing its head against the wall and expecting different results.

Fast forward past Iraq wherein people kept shooting at our Red Crosses.  Today the enemy is doing the same in Afghanistan.

The Marines, Air Force, and British did not and do not sport Red Crosses in Iraq or Afghanistan.

The Army needs intervention.

As we move into 2012, after a decade of war in Afghanistan, the Army continues an insane policy that been insane for about seventy years.  The policy has existed long enough to retire and draw Social Security.  Dumb policies don’t get smarter with time.

Meanwhile, the Army has redoubled efforts to send unarmed helicopters sporting Red Crosses into battle.  In Afghanistan, crosses often are seen as evil symbols.

Today, when you question the Army about the policy, they first try deception.  They say they are following Geneva Conventions.  This is untrue.  Curiously, when the Army says this, they imply that the Air Force, Marines and British are breaking the Geneva Conventions.

The US Army is allowing troops to die on Afghan battlefields.  It’s not just Soldiers who suffer.  Army helicopters also rescue Marines, Air Force and Navy personnel in Afghanistan.  The unarmed helicopters cause serious delays in medical evacuations, while exposing crews to greatly increased dangers.

This policy is wrong. 

Caring people are taking action:

10/26/2011

The Honorable Chuck Grassley
135 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON DC 20510

Dear Senator Grassley:

Senator Kyle was recently contacted by a constituent regarding the Army “Dustoff” MEDEVAC helicopters situation in Afghanistan. This constituent request was in response to Michael Yon’s reporting of the need to take the Red Crosses off the Dustoffs and allow personnel on them to be armed in order to protect themselves and our wounded from insurgent attack. [Please see: http://www.michaelyon-online.com/golden-seconds.htm]

On October 21, 2001 Senator Kyle responded to the constituent’s concerns by sending a letter to the Department of the Army.  With all due respect to Senator Kyle now is not the time for polite letters from Senators or to try and follow SOPs from the Senate to Departments within our federal government. Now is the time for Senators to demand an immediate response and fix of the situation from the Department of the Army.

As your constituent and as the wife of a Marine who was at the Pentagon on 911 I implore you to support Senator Kyle and to bring together all your colleagues from the Senate in resolving this matter post haste.

Moreover, I encourage you not to listen to the Officer desk jockeys at the DOD who have no knowledge of the situation on the ground in Afghanistan; but instead to directly contact Senior Officers on the ground in Afghanistan, their NCOs and Michael Yon [a very well respected former member of the Army and international photo journalist] to clarify any questions that you may have.

America’s military does not leave its wounded or dead behind and we should not let our wounded die due to DOD bureaucracy and ego.

This is critical situation with a simple fix.

Sincerely,

Jordan Schneider
CC: The Honorable Tom Harkin

Please consider joining our private forum.

Mission in Afghanistan with 4-4 Cav

02 December 2011

A groundswell continues within the Dustoff community to have Red Crosses removed from MEDEVAC helicopters in Afghanistan.  There is much behind the scenes work on this.  We’ve also set up a private forum to exchange information and ideas.  Numerous encouraging messages have come from loved ones of troops who have fallen in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I was honored when the mother of Chazray Clark contacted me.  I nearly missed it but someone saw her message posted.  Chazray’s loss inspired me to do something about the Dustoff.

I had seen Chazray’s Mom and wife on television while in the tent in Afghanistan.  It was the same tent Chazray had just moved into before the mission.  Chazray was gone now, and I watched on the computer his Mom and wife back in America.  Their courage was inspiring to Chazray’s buddies and to me.

And so it was a great honor when Chazray’s mom posted a couple of days ago, “Thank you for reporting the truth and not letting the military scare you into silence.”

Don’t worry Mam.  I’m not scared.  And a whole heap of Soldiers and Airmen are helping behind the scenes.  We are just getting warmed up.  Thank you for the note.  It is important to me.

I got traffic today from Afghanistan that 4-4 Cav had more serious injuries.  Next of kin was notified.  They are fighting hard.  Chazray also was in 4-4.

On Afghanistan, an invitation has come in to return to Afghanistan in about January.  This would mean more direct combat.  I have powerful opponents in the Army and so it is unclear if the embed would be approved.  My bets are that the Army will do everything possible to avert my coming.  In any case, I’ll return to combat work pending approval.  But I won’t stop on the Dustoff issue and so they surely don’t want me around.

Our withdrawal from Afghanistan has begun in earnest.  Key decisions have been made and the ball is in motion. There are areas of real progress in Afghanistan.  The surge of troops clearly has helped but the general trajectory is not good.  We are pulling out too soon, but by staying in we are at the mercy of Pakistan and others.  If we become engaged with Iran, Pakistan will leverage every ounce against us.  We are not allies.  We need our assets at home.  More attention to Mexico is crucial.

Soon our military departure from Iraq will be complete.  That was a bloody war that many people never will forget.  Our troops are not yet out of harm’s way, but nearly so.

Thousands were lost in combat and we are leaving one behind: Ahmed Altaie is Missing in Action.  All hope is not lost but we know the nature of the war in Iraq.  The pit of my stomach says we will never see Ahmed again.  I will not say Rest in Peace.  There remains a chance.

Meanwhile, Afghanistan combat continues but our trajectory is toward the door.  We can see the ball is dropping and today we are only guessing where it will first bounce.

For me, this means a transition to something more pressing and proximate to the United States: Mexico.  Just today there is a report of yet another tunnel found, and 32 tons of marijuana.  Mexico is has a war on.

I’ve been talking with key people about Mexico and have meetings arranged this month in California, Arizona, and Washington DC.  The schedule of exploratory meetings is jammed.

Insofar as potential for Mexico coverage, I am in with both feet provided reader support is sufficient.  At this time, I do not believe it will be sufficient.  Clearly there is heavy interest, but not enough people have shown enough interest to put down.

If the interest is not there for Mexico, I’ll step back from wars and write books.

And so the plan for the next few months: Continue to explore the possibility of Mexico work.  Return to Afghanistan if approved.  Transition to Mexico, or books, depending on funding.

Bottom line: The war in Mexico is growing.   We are going to have to face it, one way or another.

ComputerWorld recently interviewed me about smartphone security.  My work happens in dangerous places where a working knowledge of phone security is essential.

The reality is that if you have a cell phone, many people can track you.

Please read:

November 30, 2011 - 11:36 A.M.

Smartphone pocket spy tracking by drug cartels at Mexican border war zone?

Darlene Storm
Security Is Sexy

Michael Yon travels with U.S. combat troops overseas and has learned much about smartphones as pocket spies with actionable intelligence that is trackable and could mean life or death. While continuing to discuss smartphones as pocket spies with actionable intelligence that can be tracked, Yon pointed out that:

Smartphones are computers.  Software is hacked every day. The speaker and camera can be turned on without a warning.  This also is possible with normal landlines.  The phone speaker can remotely activated without the phone ringing.

Chinese hackers were said to be turning on webcams and secretly transmitting.  Information flows into and out of smartphones like water flows in rainforests.  Information practically evaporates.  Spyware can be installed. Wifi and Bluetooth are open doors.

Another layer can be achieved with special gear that intelligence agencies, various militaries, and others use.

During a mission in Iraq, a signal to a "hot" cell phone was picked up. The phone was in a mosque but there were loads of men in the mosque.  Many had phones that were not hot. Our people moved in closer, parked outside and started chatting with people. When the hot cell phone happened to pass by, our guys could see the target. They quietly took the one guy around the corner and loaded him up. It's possible that other Iraqis did not realize he had been snagged.

Yet sometimes unlocking the actionable intelligence, confidential info, off a target's smartphone is less tech-centered and more brute force. Yon gave this example:

Imagine a Mexican journalist with confidential informants. She gets picked up along with her smartphone, and the cartel (or whoever) beats the password out of her. Now they've got the keys to the kingdom without infiltrating a phone company. A common criminal can do this.

Yon may start to report from a new war zone at the Mexican border which he believes is a a greater threat to the USA than al Qaeda. If he does, drug cartels may consider him a threat and try to target him via smartphone pocket spy actionable intelligence.

You wrote, "The United States faces greater threats at home than we face in Afghanistan. The Mexican border, for instance, is being described as a war zone. People have been warning about it for years. Over time, I have seriously considered changing focus to the more proximate and bigger threats."

How/why do you regard it as a bigger threat?

Michael Yon: Afghanistan per se poses no threat to the United States. Zero. We attacked Afghanistan because al Qaeda was there, and as follow-on we went for the Taliban. Other threats exists in the region, but if we were to attack every place that has housed even al Qaeda, we would go for the UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Germany, Florida. . . long list. We are nation-building in Afghanistan. Yes, there are al Qaeda affiliates in some places but there are AQ and other terrorists in many countries. We saw OBL was living in Pakistan.

If our quest is only to hunt al Qaeda, Afghanistan is just one of many places they have kicked up. If we abandon Afghanistan, my guess is that it will devolve into civil war. The Taliban and others will inherit significant areas, but that is of little consequence to us directly. The bigger concern of course is Pakistan.

Mexico is far more important due to proximity. If Mexico were in Southeast Asia, it would be of no more concern than is Vietnam. There was a time when many Americans believed that a failure in Vietnam would domino to the demise of the United States. Vietnam is now a great place to vacation where Americans are welcome.

I am next door to Vietnam in communist Laos. I can see the Mekong River flowing by Vientiane. Communist flags are hanging everywhere. I am in the Sabai Dee coffee shop on the Rue Francious Ngin and they are playing American music. My iPhone picks up the WiFi. Vietnam became communist, so did Laos, and the world kept turning. I recommend Laos and Vietnam as travel destinations. The dominos fell and it hardly mattered.

Mexico is different. Due to proximity, our histories, cultures and futures are deeply entwined. We are in this together. We can walk away from Afghanistan as we did Vietnam and Laos, but not Mexico. If we walk away from Afghanistan, Afghanistan will suffer and no telling what will happen with Pakistan. The more we try to ignore the problems in Mexico, the more we all will suffer.

You are considering to move from covering our troops in Afghanistan to covering the Mexico border 'war zone.'

Do you agree with the comment posted that "If you start telling the truth about that situation, the Cartels will perceive you as a threat and move against you. The Mexican government will perceive you as a threat and move against you. The US government will perceive you as a threat and move against you."

Michael Yon: Billions of dollars are flowing about. Writing is dangerous business. Some have argued that in many places writing is far more dangerous than soldiering. This was almost certainly true for Iraqi journalists, and might be true for Afghans and Mexicans, or anyone else who enters the bloody fight armed with a pen.

In one comment it was implied that the cartels know who and where certain people are. Do you believe the cartel are using smartphones to track persons of interest/enemies? If so, do you have any verification of that?

Michael Yon: It's best to assume that rich and powerful cartel leaders will have taken pains to infiltrate phone companies. If I were a billionaire drug dealer, I might try to buy a phone company, but in any case would certainly invest in tracking gear for which a section would be devoted to tracking enemy phones.  I'm not saying this is occurring. I have no knowledge of this. I am only saying that it makes sense.  A powerful enemy would try to infiltrate or hack into all organizations wherein huge and useful data mines are available. Phone companies would be prime targets for human infiltration and computer hacking.

Do you believe any of the biometrics at the border, facial recognition, fingerprinting, has done anything helpful to stop the flood of trouble at our nation's border with Mexico?

Michael Yon: I do not know. Biometrics were helpful in Iraq and are increasingly working in Afghanistan. One day in Iraq, a bunch of men were applying to become police. One applicant was wanted and when he was entered into the system, it flagged within seconds. Our Soldiers quietly took him to a different room where he was peacefully detained.

Recently I published a small piece about smartphone security called Pocket Spies.  A security writer at ComputerWorld read Pocket Spies and contacted me for an interview.  

This is not my field, but that I have built awareness due to the dangers of my profession.  Anyone who uses a phone of any sort should be aware of the dangers.   Some of these pitfalls can cost you money, or worse.  

Please read:

November 29, 2011 - 10:14 A.M.

Pocket Spies: Smartphone actionable intelligence

Darlene Storm
Security Is Sexy

Photographer and writer Michael Yon, a former Green Beret, has been with our combat troops and reporting from Iraq and Afghanistan since 2004. Yon recently published an extremely interesting article titled Pocket Spies which deals with how our smartphones act like a pocket spy which we willingly carry, yet many people don't consider the hidden dangers. Yon has seen a perilous side of it that many of us never will, when carrying a phone can potentially cost the lives of U.S. troops.

Since GPS tracking is a huge issue that SCOTUS is deciding right now, I interviewed Yon about pocket spies and actionable intelligence. He's seen some U.S. combat units that are careful and aware of the hidden dangers from smartphone pocket spies and some that are not. Here's the first of a two part series:

You wrote that even "if location services/GPS-aware apps are turned off" yet "the battery is charged and in the phone, the phone is a homing beacon whether it's on or off." Are the units that are "good about reminding about smartphones" advising to turn off locational apps, geo-tracking, or about not carrying the phone at all?

Michael Yon: First, it is important to acknowledge that I am no expert on electronic tracking. I've learned some things from the company I keep and from my own research. I work in dangerous areas. Knowledge of electronic security is important.

Insofar as tracking phones, if you believe yourself or the person you are with is a target worth tracking, and that the opponent has the ability, best is to not carry any phone. Smartphone or not. The phone is constantly tracked by the company. Your travel habits can be mapped retroactively or in realtime. Think of the cell phone as a strobe light that's always blinking. We can't see them blinking, but the phone company can.

Insofar as smartphones, iPhones for instance have a battery that cannot be removed. With a BlackBerry you can pop off the back and take out the battery. When I was with certain units on the Iraq/Iran border, everyone with a phone was to take out the battery. An officer said that if you leave the battery in, you can practically watch it drain as the Iranians ping the phone. If they see thirty phones travelling together in a remote area on their border, they likely would take notice. But imagine ten people have phones. If one guy doesn't take out the battery, that's enough to track the unit and even hit you across the border with rockets, artillery or an airstrike.

At times when I fly over Iran, my phone picks up Iranian carriers. Their intelligence could easily use that information. If you fly over Iran, the phone pings the towers below and so your flight carrier and destination is known. Now imagine that you are an interesting person, and they already know your phone information. They could have someone pick up your trail when you land in Dubai or wherever.

A couple of months ago, I was on the Afghan/Iran border. My iPhone picked up Iranian towers. If I were a person of interest, they would have a good idea of my location and my direction. That area is riddled with Iranian agents who could have picked up my trail.

The family of a former billionaire Prime Minister of Thailand owned a huge stake in a cell phone company. Today he is in exile and his sister is Prime Minister. Imagine what a politician could do with that access.

An entity with sufficient resources could find lucrative incentives while investing in a section whose mission is to infiltrate phone companies in target areas. It would be crazy to think that the Chinese, Russians, United States and many others have not put significant efforts into these areas. The Israelis have been accused of infiltrating Lebanese cell phone operations and bribing employees.

Do you believe units that are not paying attention to "actionable intelligence" from smartphones realize that by simply carrying a smartphone, even turned off, the phone acts as a "homing beacon" if there is any juice to the battery at all?

Michael Yon: To my knowledge, we are not concerned in Afghanistan about the Taliban tactically tracking military units with smartphones. However, if someone posts a smartphone image (or whatever) in realtime, it might be easy to track.

It's important to note that in Afghanistan, after a period of time, users are required to register their phones and hand over a copy their passport. The companies already can track your phone but now others know who owns it. Last time I was in India, in order to get a cell phone you had to turn over a copy of your passport. Administratively, they track every hotel or guesthouse you stay in. Years ago, I was tracking someone in India and police allowed me to use those records.

India nearly banned BlackBerries due to encryption issues. The company faced similar pressures in countries such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Indonesia and the United States. Many countries want complete access. Presumably the bans have been avoided by allowing governments access to the information.

Some of our government people, such as the President, use special encryption devices on BlackBerries. India and numerous other countries also have issues with the strong encryption used by Skype. Gmail has faced obstacles.

When you land at a foreign airport, it's possible for the local government to secretly load software into your smartphone. When you email home, spyware can hit your home or office computer.

British journalists broke into voicemails of all sorts of people, including relatives of troops killed in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a murder victim. A large paper called News of the World was closed this July due to the scandal. The paper had been in print for 168 years.

The Taliban and other enemies in Afghanistan force cell towers to turn off at night. I've seen towers that they attacked. They threaten and kill cell phone company employees. I have been told that they threaten cell phone company executives in places like Kabul. The enemies in Afghanistan likely would do their best to infiltrate the cell phone carriers with agents, or at least compromise employees with coercions or incentives, to obtain registration data and also attempt to gather realtime or historical information.

If you are near the Afghan/Pakistan border, bets are on that in some areas the Pakistanis can track.

Do you believe this tracking via smartphone has cost the lives of any troops in Afghanistan?

Michael Yon: I do not know.  I do know that if I were a high-powered enemy commander, I would do my best to get agents inside those phone companies, or at least try to buy or coerce the information that is harvested. That information can be gold in the hands of an employee who wants to sell it. Indian, Pakistani and US intelligence all have vested interests in knowing what flows through Afghan phones.

Stay tuned for part two of our interview with Michael Yon.

Darlene Storm's original article can be found here.

These bodies still go for about $7,000 brand new.  Though this body has seen much combat, the camera is in perfect operating condition.  This fantastic machine is rugged.  It has photographed al Qaeda, Taliban and US and British forces in two wars, and come back ready for more.  It has photographed some of the thought-shapers of this generation, such as General Petraeus, and also Sherpas near Mt. Everest, and former guerrillas in the Philippines.

It is with heavy heart that I want to sell this camera to buy two more cameras.  In 2012, Canon will introduce a newer model with fewer megapixels, but it should work better in low light.  If I decide to cover the Mexico issue, low light shooting will be of great value.  The total price of the two new cameras, along with GPS and an IR modification to one, will be about $15,000.

I am in hopes that a buyer will see the potential historical value of this camera, and the great value in bringing two new workhorses in the stable.  And so with that in mind, I am starting the bidding at $10,000.

Thank you for your consideration.

Michael

Click here to see auction.

Soldiers react seconds after IED strike

28 November 2011

Every day in Afghanistan there are casualties requiring helicopter evacuation.  There is a high probability that as you read this, someone is bleeding and in the process of extraction from the battlefield.

US Army MEDEVAC helicopters fly unarmed into combat emblazoned with Red Crosses on white backgrounds.  This signals to the enemy that our people are unarmed.  The enemy tries to shoot them down.

The Air Force, Marines and British do not burden their helicopters with Red Crosses and they are armed with machine guns.  This facilitates faster, safer evacuations.  Army helicopters frequently must orbit landing zones because there is too much ground fire.  This happened again less than a week ago.  A trooper suffered a double amputation during an ambush.   The Army Dustoff had to orbit for about 45 minutes due to ground fire.

Pilots and crew from numerous Dustoff units have recounted to me many such events.   It is my belief that Dusftoff Soldiers will confirm to journalists that such long and unnecessary delays are common.  Meanwhile, Air Force rescue helicopters have large machine guns and will shoot their way in and get out faster.

The US Army burdens its Dustoff helicopters with Red Crosses due to internal political struggles about who controls the helicopters.  This leaves patients bleeding on battlefields.

Many people who are up to speed on the facts know that this tragic situation needs to change.  Many of those caring people have already contacted representatives across the country.

We have created a private forum for action-minded people to exchange information and ideas.  This forum is not a place to debate whether or not helicopters should go into combat unarmed and bearing Red Crosses.  This forum is for those who wish to change the situation.

Many people have contacted me offline.  Some are concerned that taking a public stand can damage their careers, or the careers of loved ones.  Some of these people are in key military positions.  If you share such concerns, please create a fictitious email and use a pseudonym.

To enter the RED AIR Private Forum, please register a username and password: Forum

If you are interested but not up to speed on the issues, please take time to visit these links before joining discussions:

RED AIR

Fool’s Gold & Troops Blood (Video of combat MEDEVAC failure)

Golden Seconds (More on MEDEVAC failures)

Pedros (Air Force Search and Rescue)

Marked for Destruction

CrusaderCopters

24 November 2011

Happy Thanksgiving weekend in America!  This is a good time to share something lighter than the constant war.

I’ve travelled to more than sixty countries, often spending years on end abroad.  Those journeys have revealed many fascinating sides of life.

Today I am in Laos, a small country thick with jungles in Southeast Asia.  Laos used to be called “The Land of a Million Elephants.”  There still are many elephants, but not like those older times.  One day in Italy, I was in Venice upstairs in a museum and saw a very old map of Laos.  It was a mysterious place illustrated by elephants and nestled between Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma and China.  Many names have changed since that old parchment was drawn.

This is my fifth trip to Laos.  The people are friendly and will eat just about anything.  I write these words just next to an open market where they sell bats, rats, wildcats and all sorts other creatures both dead and alive.  There were a couple of porcupines and many frogs.  Sometimes they will break the frogs’ legs so they will remain alive and fresh, but cannot escape.  Bugs, grubs and snake are on the menu.  One man said that a tiger yields about 12 kg of bones and the Vietnamese will pay $45,000 for 12 kg, but the police will lock you up for killing tigers or monkeys.  Some people keep dogs as pets or for security, but most of those dogs meandering about the villages are livestock no different than the chickens and pigs clucking and snorting about.  Some of the Hmong will not eat dogs, but they raise them to sell to Vietnamese who work here.

A couple of nights ago, I had dinner with a Hmong family.  They steamed flying squirrel with lemongrass, chili, garlic and onions.  It smelled delicious, and they also steamed some sort of wildcat, which I did not care for.  It was not a tiger but a small jungle creature that weighed maybe 5 kg unskinned.  I wondered if it was endangered or common.

In the villages, the simple things can be among the most interesting.   The traps can be ingenious in their simplicity.

The people here will eat just about any sort of bird and are experts at catching them.  The Hmong guide was taking me to a site with the ancient and mysterious Jars when we saw a birdhouse between two ponds.

Along the way, a friendly woman was digging crabs from the mud.

Laos is landlocked and these are freshwater creatures.

She had frogs in the bucket.

The birdhouse is actually two traps.  There are no trees around the pond, and so the bamboo arcing from the water provides a place for birds to rest.  It’s the first trap.

The hunter smears glue on the bamboo branches.  When the bird lands, its feet become stuck.  The man uses the line to pull down the flexible bamboo.  He unsticks the bird’s feet and uses the bird as bait for more.  I’ve seen similar traps down in the jungles of Borneo.

He ties a string around the leg of the bait bird, staking the other end to the ground, and then hides the bird under this cover.

And so now the bait bird is hidden under the cover and the man is concealed just close by in the birdhouse.  Looking closely, there is another line connected to the cover.  This line goes from the cover to the man.

When the hunter sees another bird flying near, he uses the line to jerk the cover off the bait bird.  The bait tries to fly.

When the bait tries to fly, it flutters while its leg tugs at the string.  The target bird swoops into fight.  While they fight, the hunter springs the net.  If he were hunting today, there would be a net spread on the ground, but there are not many birds now because this is dry season.

The hunter puts the catch into a cage and waits for the next.  He can snag dozens of birds in a single day, and then off to market that evening or next morning to sell the catch.

Through the years, villagers have probably shown me a thousand ways to catch critters.  Nearly every way is elegant and simple, though there are more complicated traps.

And there was another trap nearby.  An electric line was strung low over the water, staked up by bamboo.  At the bamboo was a light bulb just near the water.  During night, the light is switched on.  Bugs bounce off the light, fall onto the water, where the fish will gather and be dragged in by the net.

Afghanistan: Army Medic helps to bag up an Afghan Soldier who was just blown up. Our medics do not wear Red Crosses. They carry rifles.

23 November 2011

Army Dustoff MEDEVAC helicopter crews have been performing stellar work in Afghanistan. When troops are wounded, the Dustoffs go into hostile territory often while taking ground fire. Most interesting: they go in unarmed.

The helicopters are emblazoned with the Red Cross, and so according to the Geneva Conventions they are not allowed to carry offensive weapons. Just what constitutes an offensive weapon is another line of discussion, but the bottom line is that Dustoffs do not carry machine guns.

More interesting is that the Red Cross is one of the symbols used in the Crusades.  After years of throwing around the COIN acronym while pretending we have learned something about Counterinsurgency, we still fly around Afghanistan in CrusaderCopters.

The Air Force Pedro rescue helicopters are not burdened with the Red Cross, and so they carry two .50 caliber machine guns. The U.S. Marines and British Army also don’t burden themselves with the Red Cross, nor are there the World War II-type scenes with medics wearing crosses on their sleeves. The medics are armed. In fact, some medical crews working in Kabul are armed even while in the operating room.

The Taliban and other enemies in Afghanistan do not subscribe to the Geneva Conventions. They try to shoot down any and all helicopters, and sometimes they succeed. If you ask an Afghan what the Red Cross means, he’ll likely say it’s a symbol of Christianity — and in that regard, it might actually draw fire.  This poster describing evil symbols was found hanging on a wall in an Afghan village.  Most of the symbols are crosses.

There are numerous reasons why the Dustoffs should remove the Red Cross. We’ve been plagued with helicopter shortages in Afghanistan since the beginning of the war. When Dustoffs perform rescue missions, they must have armed top cover, often in the form of an Apache helicopter. By comparison, the Air Force Pedro rescue helicopters do not need top cover because they carry machine guns. And so in addition to adding more stresses to our helicopter fleet, the necessity to have top cover can lead to delays in MEDEVAC.

In September, I videotaped such a delay after an IED strike. The most wounded soldier was a triple amputee.  Another soldier was deaf from the blast. A Dustoff crew was stationed probably two to three minutes away at Forward Operating Base Pasab. You can sometimes see the crews at Pasab running to start up a Dustoff helicopter.  The Dustoff was parked about 200 meters from my tent.  If it takes the Dustoff seven minutes to launch and three minutes to get to the LZ, they could have picked up the patients in about 10 minutes.

The hospital at Kandahar Airfield was about 13 minutes away, and so this means the patients could have been at the hospital in about 25 minutes. Instead, it took 65 minutes.

The Army claims it took 59 minutes, but they don’t start the clock until after a “9-line” casualty report has been called up. The Golden Hour doesn’t start when the 9-line goes up; it starts when the bomb explodes. In any case, 59 minutes is a lot longer than 25, and this delay was caused because the Dustoff needed Apache top cover.

The triple amputee was very much alive and talking, but you could hear him fading as the minutes ticked by. His buddies were saying he was going to live. The commander said to me that he was going to live, but as the minutes dragged by the soldiers became frustrated with the delay. We were sitting on a landing zone vulnerable to enemy fire, and there was little doubt the enemy knew where we were. In addition to endangering the wounded with delays, the delay also provided the enemy time to prepare to shoot down a rescue helicopter, or to attack troops who would be in the open on the LZ.

An Air Force Pedro pilot with 420 combat missions worth of experience read this article for accuracy and he responded:

“Pedros fly in a two ship formation for several reasons, mutual support, both with fires and mission management, and added capacity. In a dynamic and inaccurate threat environment we may launch on one Cat A, and arrive to discover additional survivors (or, God forbid, Heroes). This happened often, but as an example one of my missions in the “Cat Triangle” SE of Bastion, I was launched to rescue a Brit double amputee. 30 sec from the zone a second IED detonated and rendered a second Brit as a double amputee. Both Pedro’s effectively split and worked individual rescues while maintaining each others “back” — we minimized the time in the zone and got the survivors back as rapidly as possible. In my opinion two armed Dustoffs are better for the fight than one unarmed Dustoff and an Apache.”

If the Dustoffs were armed, there would have been no delay. So why does the Army hide behind Geneva Conventions when the Air Force, Marines, and British do not?  It’s not about Geneva, but about who controls the Dustoff helicopters. It’s not about the “moral high ground.” The crosses have been used as a crucifix to ward off change within the military.

Some Army officers will attempt to confuse laymen by slapping the “Geneva Conventions” card on the table.  There are two categories of people who will say we are legally or morally obligated to sport Red Crosses on our helicopters.  The first category is the uninformed.  This dispatch is written for the uninformed yet smart-minded people who, when presented with the evidence, will make a good decision.  The second category consists mostly of a small number of Army officers who are lying.  They have a political dog in this fight and they are willing to sacrifice combat readiness and troops’ lives to maintain the status quo.  These people are disgraceful and I make no effort not to offend them.  They should be discharged from the Army.

To be sure, it will be difficult to find senior NCOs or officers from the combat arms who will say that it’s a good idea to send unarmed troops into combat while marking them as defenseless.

Let’s number the problems, any one of which is enough to take off the crosses:

1)    Sending unarmed troops into combat is unwise
2)    Marking them as unarmed is tantamount criminal
3)    Delays in MEDEVAC leave wounded troops bleeding on battlefields
4)    Creates additional stresses on overstretched helicopters
5)    CrusaderCopters create a “COIN fail”

If the Army insists on sending defenseless CrusaderCopters into combat, it should use common sense by not alerting the enemy that the helicopter is unarmed.

Further Reading:

RED AIR: America’s MEDEVAC Failure (circumstances behind a MEDEVAC failure)

Fool’s Gold & Troops Blood (Video of combat MEDEVAC failure)

Golden Seconds (More on MEDEVAC failures)

Pedros (Air Force Search and Rescue)

22 November 2011

US Army MEDEVAC helicopters in Afghanistan are marked with Red Crosses. Helicopters sporting a Red Cross are not allowed to be armed. The enemy knows this. The enemy tries to shoot down these unarmed helicopters with the added advantage that our people cannot shoot back.  And so, we push people into combat while advertising to the enemy that our people are unarmed.  The best that can be said for this policy is that it’s wrong. The worst that can be said might be that it borders on criminal.

We like to think that after a decade of counterinsurgency, we have learned something. Have we? What does a cross on a helicopter mean? For some Afghans, it’s a mark of the beast. The poster above was hanging on a wall in eastern Afghanistan.

Of the approximate fifty evil symbols, most are crosses. Even the shape of an anchor is seen as unholy.

An Afghan friend translates:

*Destroying the cross is an Islamic obligation*

1. Christians want to publish and spread their unholy and cursed religious logos and signs in different shapes and appearances in clean and holy Muslim society.

2. These Christianity signs (Crosses) have affected our Islamic society too

– even our mosques and our Menbers are not safe from those Christianity signs (Crosses).

(Further note from my Afghan friend explaining “menber”: When you enter a mosque, the menber is a chair in the most forward point. After the prayer is done, a mullah sits on that chair and enlightens people. Talking rubbish about how to be a good muslim or other nonsense. That chair is higher than the regular ones in terms of height. It’s higher in order to enable the mullah to see all the folks and the folks seeing mullah – even the ones sitting far away. Menber is the written name of it.)

3. The respected Ulemas agree over the fact that destroying these crosses is an Islamic obligation and on whatever object or surface where there is a cross, praying is a sin.

4. —– had a gold cross in his neck and prophet Mohammad told him to remove that ‘idol’ from himself and is narrated from Aisha that prophet Mohammad never allowed anything in his house with a cross on it and used to destroy or throw it away.

6. For further explanations, refer to …. / …. / …. (Names of references given)

*Some of the names on the crosses:*

1. Cross of George

2. Cross of Andrew

3. Cross of Lauren

4. Cross of Jerusalem

5. Cross of Anthony

6. Cross in shape of the Nazi logo

7. Catholic Cross

===End of Translation===

The US Army will defend the Red Crosses on the helicopters by falsely bringing the Geneva Conventions into the conversation. They will say, “According to the Geneva Conventions…”

Nothing in the Geneva Conventions forces us to put Red Crosses on medics or helicopters. I’ve never seen a medic in Iraq, Afghanistan, or the Philippines who was wearing a Red Cross. I don’t recall ever having seen an American service member wearing a Red Cross. Importantly, the US Air Force, Marines, and the British do not put Red Crosses on their helicopters.

This puts the Army’s argument about Geneva Conventions into an interesting light. By bringing the Geneva Conventions into the discussion, the US Army implies that the Marines, Air Force and the British all are violating the Geneva Conventions. They are not violating the Geneva Conventions. Meanwhile, the Army is shamelessly hiding behind those conventions to forward an internal political fight about who controls those helicopters.

The Army has not a single valid reason for sporting the Red Crosses. Army leadership should hang its head in shame for willfully endangering troops and the mission by sending unarmed troops into combat, signaling to the enemy that they are unarmed, all while elegantly marking our helicopter with what to many Afghans is a mark of the beast.

If the Army insists on sending unarmed troops into combat, it should at least remove the crosses that alert the enemy that the helicopter is unarmed, all while inflaming local passion to shoot it down.

Related links:

RED AIR

Golden Seconds

Pedros

Helicopter evacuation

Image created with iPhone4s

17 November 2011

We know the Internet has dangers.  Everything we put onto the information superhighway should be considered chiseled into marble.  Meanwhile, those smartphones that so many of us carry are tantamount to carrying hostile spies in our pockets.  If the battery is charged and in the phone, the phone is a homing beacon whether it’s on or off.  Now add services such as Facebook, and those excellent phone cameras with geotagging, and there is a combination for disaster.

This has relevancy for our troops in Afghanistan.  During certain missions, I would not even take my smartphones.  On or off, I did not want to take the chance.  Probably made no difference, but it’s better safe than to get our people hurt.  It is important that troops make sure that journalists and Interpreters do not take smartphones during certain sorts of missions.  Also, if you get blown up, that smartphone might go sailing through the air and be found by the enemy.  If they crack into it, they might have a treasure chest.  The last unit that I had the honor to cover was 4-4 Cav.  They were good about reminding about the smartphones but some other units don’t pay attention.

My Facebook has more than 48,000 readers. They come from just about any country imaginable, and many walks of life.  A few days ago, I was browsing through the menus trying to learn more about Facebook, which amounts to a passive intelligence agency of sorts.  This is especially true if you have Facebook (or other similar services) on your smartphone.

And so, with my iPhone4s using a Facebook app, I touched the tab called “Nearby.”  An incredible amount of “actionable intelligence” scrolled on.  One friend was at the Sheraton at the Pentagon.  Another was at the Pentagon.  I emailed to her and she confirmed.  Another was at the VA Hospital in Long Beach.  Ruby Tuesday.  iHop.  Starbucks Fort Polk.  Times Square.  Pacific Grill.  Home sweet home.  Octapharma Plasma.  China Café.  FBI Academy.    Tahlequah Dialysis Unit.  Columbus State University.  AJ’s Pizza.  Farelli’s Pizza.  Palladium Theatre.  Home.  Crossroads Christian Church.  24 Hour Fitness – Mission Valley California.  The Exchange Hotel.

And on and on.  With my iPhone, I could track their smartphones in real time.

Some people were also typing entries (just got on the train) and they were being tracked.  One young Thai woman was typing entries and finally posted she was home at her condo in Bangkok.  At the same time, another was 12 time zones away at X-treme Rockclimbing Gym in Miami, Florida.

Touch one button and GoogleMaps instantly appears showing the precise location.  Touch one more button and there is a choice: “Open in Maps,” “Get Directions,” “Cancel.”

I scrolled down the list.  Numerous people said they were home.  Their locators pinpointed their locations.  I touched the buttons and saw their locations on Google Earth.  And there was one Afghan friend.  I could see exactly where he was in Kabul.  He is an avowed enemy of the Taliban.  They have threatened to kill him.  I emailed at once saying to turn that thing off.  I know where you are.  If he did not email back very quickly, I was going to call.  He emailed back, confirmed his location and turned it off.

It’s not enough that we are careful ourselves.  If we are tooling around Afghanistan together, and only one of us has not turned off the location service, we are both trackable by anyone.  No special gear or warrant is needed.  If someone’s child has this option switched on, the whole family is trackable, not to mention that the child is easily trackable in real time everywhere he or she goes.

Enough said.

Finally, onto a different topic.  I published this yesterday:

What is Your Vote?

The United States faces greater threats at home than we face in Afghanistan.  The Mexican border, for instance, is being described as a war zone.  People have been warning about it for years.  Over time, I have seriously considered changing focus to the more proximate and bigger threats.

I am ready and willing to change primary focus to the home front.  This will require setting up shop and living in a place like Texas or Arizona.  Probably Texas.

I am testing the winds.  If the funding is there, it will happen.  I will move home to America and get to work.  If you are willing to support coverage on the home front, this is a situation where money talks.  If you vote “Yes, I will support it,” please annotate your vote with a note.

The bottom line question: Will you financially support this coverage?  The quality will be high.  So will the price.

Michael

The United States faces greater threats at home than we face in Afghanistan.  The Mexican border, for instance, is being described as a war zone.  People have been warning about it for years.  Over time, I have seriously considered changing focus to the more proximate and bigger threats.

I am ready and willing to change primary focus to the home front.  This will require setting up shop and living in a place like Texas or Arizona.  Probably Texas.

I am testing the winds.  If the funding is there, it will happen.  I will move home to America and get to work.  If you are willing to support coverage on the home front, this is a situation where money talks.  If you vote “Yes, I will support it,” please annotate your vote with a note.

The bottom line question: Will you financially support this coverage?  The quality will be high.  So will the price.

Michael

14 November 2011

Camouflage is a combat imperative.  Instruction in the use of camouflage begins in basic training.  The Red Cross on the bright white background is meant to break up camouflage and to be seen.

While there might seem little chance in hiding a roaring helicopter, the contrasting colors and sharp shapes of the Red Cross create a significant difference when aiming shots.  Many or most of the enemies in Afghanistan are bad shots.  Others are good.  They make successful long shots onto FOB Pasab, for instance, with explosive weapons, such as recoilless rifles and rockets.  They have no problems hitting moving armored vehicles with recoilless rifles.  One shot can easily destroy a helicopter.

Combat Medic in 4-4 Cav: Not Wearing Red Cross

The Red Cross specifically means that the wearer is unarmed.  Only non-combatants are to display the symbol.  There is no security violation in saying that our helicopters sporting Red Crosses all are unarmed.  That is exactly what we are trying to advertise.

The enemies in Afghanistan will shoot down any helicopter.  And so, if the Army insists on using unarmed helicopters for MEDEVAC missions, it makes doubly no sense to advertise that the helicopter is defenseless, all while literally helping the enemy to aim.

4-4 Cav Soldiers firing mortar during minor firefight

It must border on criminal negligence to order our people to advertise that they are unarmed while knowing that the enemy will fire upon them.  At minimum, the US Army is displaying incompetence and a lack of sense.  The Marines, Air Force, and British do not so encumber their helicopters.  After ten years of war we know that the enemy shoots at all helicopters.  We know that forcing our warriors to advertise themselves as unarmed welcomes attack.  We know that the Red Cross literally makes an easier target for aiming.  After ten years of war, the Army has not adapted to this obvious reality.  

If the Army insists on pushing unarmed Soldiers into combat, it should at minimum remove the advertisement that notifies the enemy of an easy target.  With the Red Cross, our people cannot even bluff that they might have weapons.  Pushing unarmed Soldiers into combat while forcing them to advertise they are defenseless is wrong. 

11 November 2011

It has been an honor these seven years to cover American and British troops in Iraq, Afghanistan, Philippines and elsewhere.  It is said that only about 1% of Americans serve in the armed forces.  Many of our troops are not even American citizens.  I see them in combat regularly.  Many veterans are in hospitals or have fresh scars and are recovering from recent wounds.  A message just arrived from the military in Kabul that we just lost another service member in Southern Afghanistan.

Many of our finest will be in combat as you read these words.  They will cope with their losses and continue to fight.  Mostly they are very young.  It is common to meet a young combat trooper who has fought for several years overseas.  He doesn’t make much money.  A heartfelt “thank you” goes a long way.

They have lost friends.  Many of our young veterans have been wounded more than once, and yet they are out there right now.  Some have more Purple Hearts than stripes.  Their strength and dedication is inspirational.  Their courage seems bottomless.

Tonight, many will sleep on the ground, their ears ringing from the nearby bullets and blasts that they have experienced so many times.  They have killed the enemy, and watched their buddies die in their arms.  They have seen and smelled and heard things that most of us rather would not.  They will carry these things forever as Veterans.  Tonight they will fight. We’ve already lost at least one today, yet most Americans seem to have forgotten that many of our men and women are still out there.

This is the longest war in the history of the United States.  It’s far from over.  I have not forgotten.  I never will forget.

Thank you, Veterans.