Michael's Dispatches

03 February 2012

Nobody crucifies common sense like the US Army.  During my morning search for anything MEDEVAC related, several new stories emerged, including one with these illustrative quotes from a Soldier returning from Iraq:

“You have to land where you never had to land before,   surrounded by the enemy.”

In conventional warfare a vehicle or aircraft bearing a red cross is considered almost sacrosanct. Not so during the open, no holds barred atmosphere that permeated Iraq.

“There are no rules. They see a red cross, they see a target,” Nicoletti said of rebels. “They don’t abide by the Geneva Convention.  You know they’re there,” he added. “You try to avoid them.”

“Technically a medivac is unarmed, though Nicoletti did have a rifle and handgun. In extreme cases, an Apache gunship would be called to provide cover when a medivac landed.
That was Iraq in a story this Thursday morning in the Palm Beach Daily News.

Now this comment, also on Thursday, but from a Dustoff MEDEVAC pilot currently in Afghanistan:

“A German friend pointed at the red cross on my helicopter the other day and told me how he'd heard that the Taliban will pay anyone who can prove they shot one. Peachy. How much of a laughingstock must we be to our allies here.”

What more is there to say?

02 February 2012

An Army officer writes:

The Army is not resisting Dustoff policy change because our leadership honestly believes the current policy is superior, but rather because of AMEDD's [Army Medical Department] protectionist attitude toward "their" Dustoff MEDEVAC helicopters. I'm an active duty infantry officer, and I've been following the Dustoff issue since you first brought attention to it.  More importantly, I have a lot of contacts within the Medical Service branch.  While we have discussed this issue "around the watercooler" at work, Medical Service officers have been receiving briefings from senior members of their branch about a selectively edited account of SPC Clark's MEDEVAC mission, and what their message should be if anyone asks about it.

My contacts have highlighted that AMEDD's number one priority is protecting their "ownership" of the helicopters in question. They are concerned that removing the Red Cross from AMEDD's birds will result in those helicopters being assigned general purpose tasks, outside of the Medical Service Corp's control. In other words, their top priority is NOT providing the best possible care for our Soldiers and partners, but rather protecting their own fiefdoms. AMEDD is choosing to put Soldiers' lives in danger rather than chance losing "their" birds. Never mind that our sister services, special operations forces and allies are all able to field armed, dedicated CASEVAC/MEDEVAC helicopters! Somehow, despite all the evidence to the contrary, this is still the irrational argument AMEDD is sticking to, and directing its officers to spread. I'm concerned that in the dust-up over policy recommendations, comparisons with Pedro, and rebutting the JCS letter that we may be losing sight of the real obstacle in our path to reform. Sincere thanks for all you do, and keep up the fire!

31 January 2012

A Gold Star Mother is one who lost a child in service of the United States.  Ms. Keyko Clark-Davis is a recent Gold Star Mother.  I was present when her son Chazray was mortally wounded.  We have communicated many times.  Chazray’s mother is strong and inspirational.  She sends this letter in hopes that other Americans will take a few minutes to absorb her message.

The letter from Chazray’s Mother:

U.S. Army Evacuation Policy Change Request Letter from the Mother of a fallen soldier:

Hello to all American Citizens at home and abroad. My name is Keyko Clark-Davis and I am a military parent whose first-born son, Army SPC Chazray Clark was killed in Kandahar, Afghanistan on 18 Sept 2011.

The fact that my son decided to risk his own life to protect the basic freedoms so many of us take for granted makes me extremely proud in spite of the devastation and sadness that his untimely death has caused us as a family. Chazray was only 24 years old. He and I had a long discussion prior to his decision to enlist; and like the majority of mothers I reluctantly agreed and reassured him that I supported his decision 100%. I even went with him to be sworn in after signing up.

I am having a very difficult time dealing with his death and as are his four siblings. Although this is not the sole content of our conversations, my maternal instincts causes me to feel their pain; just as they can feel mine even in the absence of words. My difficulty in coping is compounded by the fact that the US Army has failed to provide me with honest, full disclosure of ALL the facts that caused the death of my son. Although not the official next –of-kin on behalf of my daughter—in law I have requested a complete copy of the Army investigation, autopsy reports, photos, etc., which at the time of this letter I have not yet received.

Thus, after several failed attempts to obtain honest official answers to my many questions from the US Army, I began conducting my own research into the circumstances surrounding my son's death. My grief began to give way to anger when I viewed video footage shot by a reporter named Mr. Michael Yon, who was there at the time my son was injured. Casualty Assistance Officers advised us initially to not believe possible rumors or media propaganda which we might be exposed to prior to us having any knowledge of Mr. Yon. When I thought about that, it actually raised even more unresolved questions with regard to the US Army's "Golden Hour" and "9-line" evacuation policies involving rescue missions. Mr. Yon's footage makes him an eyewitness to what happened to my son, and not just a media person spreading rumors.

It has come to my attention that there was a PEDRO that was operational and could have responded to the 9-line call the day my son was injured; thereby alleviating the 59minutes that my son had to wait for a MEDEVAC. However, due to policies and/or politics within the US Army with respect to other branches operating under CENTCOM the MEDEVAC was delayed.

The loss of my son has become the most life-altering event that my entire family has ever experienced. I feel that the United States Army, has an obligation to every soldier, every family and every US citizen to re-evaluate current protocol and implement WHATEVER CHANGES are needed to save the lives of wounded soldiers by whatever means necessary.

The Army’s contention that they are following protocol of the Geneva Convention is fallacious and without substance. Not only are the Taliban not signatories to the Geneva Convention but the Geneva Convention does not mandate that a MEDEVAC transport identify itself with a Red Cross.

I do not want another family to feel excruciating pain and suffering from the devastating loss of a loved one while policy makers and high ranking officers continue to turn a blind eye to the inherent failures in existing policies. With vivid images of my son's final moments of life FOREVER BURNED into my mind, closure can only be made possible by doing everything in my power to bring about these much needed changes in current policy.

In the name of my fallen hero, SPC Chazray Clark,  I am making a personal appeal to ALL United States Citizens who enjoy the freedoms for which he unselfishly gave his life, to join me in this crusade to bring about an immediate change to an Army Policy that requires alerting the enemy the MEDEVACs are unarmed.

God bless you all and thanks in advance for your prayers and support.

Respectfully,

Keyko Clark-Davis

An overview of harmful Army medical evacuation practices not endorsed by other service branches, and a response to official arguments defending this policy provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to the House Armed Services Committee (HASC).

30 January 2012

Introduction

Michael Yon is a combat writer, and a former member of the US Army Special Forces.  The New York Times noted in 2008 that he’d spent more time embedded with combat units than any other journalist in Iraq, and the reporting on his blog won the Weblog Award in 2005, 2007, and 2008.  It is probable that he has also spent more time with combat troops in Afghanistan than any writer, photographer, or journalist of any sort.  He is widely respected inside the military and beyond for the quality of his journalism, and his pursuit of the truth alongside US and allied combat personnel in the most dangerous theaters of operation.

On 18 September 2011, Mr. Yon accompanied an element of the US Army’s 1st Infantry Division, the 4-4 Cav, on a nighttime combat operation in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan.  During this mission the unit was attacked with an Improvised Explosive Device, deafening one soldier, and amputating both legs and one arm of a second—Specialist Chazray Clark.  Specialist Clark was conscious and communicating up until the time he was evacuated.

US and allied forces have two primary helicopter medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) assets in Kandahar: US Army “Dustoff” flights, and US Air Force “Pedro” flights.  Unlike Army Dustoff flights, the Pedro flights—as well as British, Dutch, US Marines, Navy, and US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) medical flights—do not bear the Red Cross.  The core reasons for this difference involve rapid reaction and maximum flexibility with limited air assets.

Read more: 13 Military Pilots Rebuke the Joint Chiefs of Staff

28 January 2012

While reading traffic in a closed forum between current and former military officers, I stumbled across this message from a British officer.  I’ve known him since the Iraq days, and he’s also served in Afghanistan.  He’s an honest and very smart officer, and so I pay close attention to him.  With his permission, I reprint:

Message from British officer

I've been following Michael's work for years and I watched that painful video some while ago.

Michael makes a perfectly valid, arguably indisputable point that, in some circumstances, US Army MEDEVAC policy can delay the movement of casualties to hospital. The fact that the Golden Hour can still be met in most cases is immaterial. If we could make it work, we'd want a Platinum 30 Minutes as we all know that a few minutes can make the difference between life and death. Accordingly, there should be a continuous effort to shave extra minutes off of the time it takes to reach the wounded and what is proposed by Michael will often do just that.

The arguments presented by the US Army for why a change is not necessary are unconvincing, in fact in parts they seem somewhat fictive. I just hope there aren't people out there telling their boss what they think he wants to hear when they know differently in their hearts.

Therefore - and as a British Army officer I do think carefully about criticizing an organization I admire in many ways - my opinion is that there should be a quick meal of humble pie at the upper levels of the US Army and a change to match the USAF and RAF methods which do not mark MEDEVAC aircraft and do arm them. Saying "We were wrong" need bring no shame, it would be a fine example of leadership that would be respected within the Army itself and wider - and it'll likely save a few lives.

(The following letter appeared on the Army Times website.)

DEADLY DELAYS

“What the hell happened to Medevac, sir?”

That was a question an angry sergeant asked me as I was eating chow last February at Forward Operating Base Kalsu, Iraq. I didn’t understand the question or the anger in his voice at the time, but I do now and would like to try to offer an explanation.

In the past, medical evacuation units reported to a medical command. These Medevac units had aviation assets, namely Black Hawk helicopters, but at the end of the day, Medical Service Corps officers were in charge. Recently, the Medevac units were realigned to fall under an aviation command as a part of the new General Support Aviation Battalion (GSAB).

My unit, the 571st Medical Company (AA) became C Company, 2nd Battalion, 227th Aviation Regiment, and our new command decided to implement new Medevac procedures. Ultimately, it was decided that Medevac aircraft would require gunship support for all off-FOB missions even if the landing zone was reported secure.

Read more: Another Dustoff Pilot says Delays Costing Lives

27 January 2012

The MEDEVAC issue continues to grow.  There have been many articles and it's becoming difficult to keep up.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff is preparing something for Congress.  My guess based on conversations is that JCS will try deflection and will not solve the issue.  SecDef has done nothing, to my knowledge.  And so this is set to become an election issue.

This list below is not comprehensive but can be a helpful resource.

Please listen to my interview with Dennis Miller.

LINKS
Op-eds by James Simpson

American Thinker
http://www.americanthinker.com/2012/01/incomprehensibly_stupid_army_regulation_killing_americans_in_afghanistan.html

Breitbart Big Peace
http://bigpeace.com/jmsimpson/2012/01/09/incomprehensibly-stupid-army-regulation-killing-americans-in-afghanistan/

Examiner.com—D.C. Examiner
http://www.examiner.com/independent-in-washington-dc/incomprehensibly-stupid-army-regulation-killing-americans-afghanistan?cid=PROD-redesign-right-next

Washington Times
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jan/16/bureaucracy-killing-us-troops-in-afghanistan/

Read more: MEDEVAC Links

26 January 2012

I am a Dustoff pilot (Instructor pilot) with over 1000 hours of combat time, and over 300+ combat medevac missions under my belt.  In 2004 (Iraq) we flew single ship, responding to thousands of medevac 9-line calls.  Not one helo shot down, but we sure got shot at a lot.  On a few occasions, we had to ask armed helos, who were out on missions, to divert and escort us into some hot areas.  On a few other occasions, we had the Air Force Pedros request to go along with us on missions. We responded quickly and efficiently.  When we got the call, we went.

When there were multiple casualties, we as crews made the call to launch more than one medevac bird to accommodate the number of patients.  No bureaucracy on launch authority or escorts.

Now, all medevac calls must go through channels, must be approved by commanders at battalion level or higher, must be escorted etc etc. This is what slows us down.

Some facts as I see it:

Read more: Thoughts from a Dustoff Pilot

25 January 2012

A young Iranian woman has written to me off and on for a couple of years.  Yesterday she sent a note.

I responded in part with a few questions:

What do young Iranians think about our government and about the Iranian government?  Also, do you think there will be war?

Read more: A Young Iranian Woman Writes

23 January 2012

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) provided a document to the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) about MEDEVAC issues in Afghanistan.  The document was provided with no cover or signature page.  Congressman Todd Akin (MO-2), a senior HASC member, received that document.  A staffer for Mr. Akin passed the letter to me asking questions.

I publicly acknowledged receipt of the JCS letter before publishing it.  My acknowledgement prompted an email to me from the Public Affairs Officer for the Vice Chairman of the JCS.

Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Seiber (Public Affairs Officer to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) wrote to me, “Your citing of a JCS letter is inaccurate.  Please correct/update your website accordingly.  Background information is below:"  I immediately contacted Congressman Akin’s office.  A staffer again confirmed that this document came from JCS to HASC.  The denial by JCS itched for explanation.  JCS then backtracked, saying it had provided the letter to HASC, and “We don't necessarily refute what is in the document itself, it's just a matter that it isn't a Joint Staff document.”

Read more: Messages from Joint Chiefs of Staff

21 January 2012

This war is going to turn out badly. We are wasting lives and resources while the United States decays and other threats emerge.  We led the horse to water.

Importantly, there is no value in pretending that Pakistan is an ally. We should wish the best of luck to the Afghans, and the many peaceful Pakistanis, and accelerate our withdrawal of our main battle force. The US never has been serious about Afghanistan. Under General Petraeus we were starting to gain ground, but the current trajectory will land us in the mud.

The enemies will never beat us in Afghanistan.  Force on force, the Taliban are weak by comparison.  Yet this is their home.  There is only so much we can do at this extreme cost for the many good Afghan people.  We must reduce our main effort and concentrate on other matters.  Time to come home.

Sincerely,

Michael Yon

20 January 2012

What do you think of Lieutenant General John F. Campbell's remarks in this video?

Please click to view.

19 January 2012

I published a letter that I received from Congressman Todd Akin's office.  Mr. Akin is on the House Armed Services Committee.  According to Mr. Akin's office, HASC received the letter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  After I published the letter, I read an email to me from a Public Affairs Officer at JCS saying JCS didn't author the letter.

Curiouser and Curiouser.

And so just now I contacted a staffer at Congressman Akin's office who responds:

Read more: JCS: Curiouser and Curiouser

19 January 2012

The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a bogus letter on MEDEVAC to the House Armed Services Committee.  The JCS letter is so filled with errors and deceptions that it has taken more than a week for me to respond.  The JCS directly refutes my work on MEDEVAC.

Thirteen pilots have read my draft response.  Ten of those pilots are Pedro or Dustoff.  (Five each.)  The remaining three have or do fly MEDEVAC escort in Afghanistan.  Twelve are active duty and one is retired.  All have served in Afghanistan or are there.  Some also served in Iraq.  Together they have done about 25 combat tours.

Details are crucial.   Other veterans, and civilians, are providing feedback to keep my response to the JCS accurate.  My response should be ready by Monday.

Meanwhile, the Secretary of Defense, Senators, and Representatives are cautioned to avoid embarrassment by not taking the JCS letter at face value.

Representative Todd Akin (MO-2) has rejected the JCS letter and directly contacted Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta.

The JCS letter to the HASC:

Read more: Joint Chiefs of Staff: Bogus Report to Congress

You can download a pdf version here.

18 January 2012

The bad judgment exercised by a handful of Marines should be treated like an ND: a Negligent Discharge.  In the US military, if you “accidentally” pull the trigger and launch an unplanned bullet downrange, you should not even bother trying to explain away the “accident.”  If that bullet kills someone, it’s called Negligent Homicide.  The bullet did not fire accidentally; it was fired negligently.  Bottom line.

This should be treated like a negligent discharge of the penis, and of the video camera, and then of common sense.  What a dumb thing to do.   And super dumb to video tape it.  And ultra-dumb to then let the video make it to the Internet.

Read more: Marine Urination Video: Some Thoughts

Army Deceptions May Cause Embarrassment

17 January 2012

The Army has been deceiving members of Congress about MEDEVAC issues in Afghanistan.  This poses a danger for civilian leadership who may run with the Army information, expecting accuracy in detail and in spirit, only to be ridiculed later.

In Afghanistan, I first brought up the MEDEVAC issue at Task Force Spartan in Zhari District, but this was above their level.  There was excellent leadership at TF Spartan, yet nothing to push because there was little they could do.

Next, Regional Command South in Kandahar addressed the issue but did nothing.

Next, the IJC (combatant command in Kabul) did nothing.  The issue was taken up by ISAF HQ in Kabul, who did nothing. (When I write, “nothing,” it means they wrote false accounts of the events and demanded that I publish them.  I refused.)

Read more: Danger For Senators and Representatives

16 January 2012

Caring people are becoming involved from Hawaii to Texas to Washington.  There has even been help from the United Kingdom.  Thank you in the UK!

Please see this OpEd from Larry Wood in Alaska:

Read more: Progress on Removing Dustoff Red Crosses

12 January 2012

First came the rumors.  Innumerable US Soldiers claimed to have seen large cats in Kandahar Province.  More than once I saw Afghan Soldiers laugh it off, saying our folks were seeing apparitions.  The Afghans would say, yes, there can be big cats in the mountains, but not here.

But time after time, men said they saw the cats with night vision gear, thermals, or in broad daylight.  Some who made these claims were country boys who grew up hunting, and so their words carried particular weight.  They said the cats did not just come and vanish quickly, but our men often watched the cats for minutes at a time.  They said the cats could even jump over the large Afghan walls.

Read more: AfCats - Wild Cats of Afghanistan

11 January 2012

Many folks have asked me about selling camera gear.  I’m starting to offload some glass.  These four Canon lenses have all been used downrange either in Iraq, Afghanistan, or both, and probably in many other countries.  This gear is in great condition.  Many of my published photos were made through this glass.

The four lenses are on eBay and bidding starts at 50% off new price.

Read more: Experienced Camera Gear for Sale