That being said, they most certainly do need more support and the need for more ANA and ANP on the ground is very obvious to everyone familiar with Afghanistan.
Keep up the good work, Michael. Your truth is recognized by those people who are there.
12 March 2009
There is dispute whether the testimony to the British House of Commons regarding the Afghan National Army is correct.
Part of that testimony was published on my site yesterday.
Colonel Bill Hix emailed to me from Afghanistan with an on-the-ground view. It is important to note that Colonel Hix is a veteran of Iraq, with much experience in the tough parts of Afghanistan. I was out with his soldiers in late 2008. Colonel Hix is highly respected among combat soldiers who don't hand out respect easily. His views on Afghanistan are highly-informed, cautious and realistic, but definitely more optimistic than are mine. I greatly respect his highly informed opinion and so it's important to make sure Colonel Hix's counterpoints get wide distribution. Please link to this dispatch. (Note to journalists seeking truth on Afghanistan: Colonel Hix is at KAF and is an important source regarding conditions in southern Afghanistan.)This from Colonel Bill Hix regarding the testimony:
The assertions on ANA unit independence are incorrect. As well, the ANA is larger than stated in the article, but was only recently authorized by the Bonn Accord constituted Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board to grow beyond 80,000 to 122,000 in structure and 134,000 in end strength. Even with that increase, neither the ANA nor the ANP are adequate in size, fully equipped, or have enough advisor teams. However, while far from perfect, they fight, are capable and can operate effectively.
Some examples from those ANA and ANP forces in the south of Afghanistan:
-75% of the brigade headquarters and 50% of the infantry battalions in the south of Afghanistan are capable of independent action within their organic capabilities. The combat support and service support battalions are lagging for a variety of reasons, including an absence of branch schools [much of their training comes from the advisor teams embedded with them, on the job training, and mobile training and regional training teams] and the propensity of commanders to use them as infantry due in part to over tasking and inadequate numbers mentioned above.
-In November 2008, the brigade in Zabul province mounted an independent, multi-battalion operation into an enemy sanctuary with almost no Coalition support. What little support they did receive was limited to one day of ISR support, occasional attack helicopter support, and an EOD team to reduce IEDs found by Afghan engineers [ANA EOD capabilities are still in development] who successfully cleared a two day route of march of without injury or loss of equipment.
-In October 2008, the Afghans planned and executed the relief of Lashkar Gah [capital of Helmand province -- under the UK Task Force], deploying over 2300 Army and Police into the city and surrounding area from as far as Kabul in less than 2 days, launching operations within 2 days of those forces closing, and sustaining those operations for nearly two weeks. The operation was planned by the ANA brigade commander and jointly executed by the ANA and ANP under the direction of the ANA brigade commander and in partnership with the ANP provincial Chief of Police. Except for advisor teams, coalition support and participation was generally limited to ISR and fire support. This operation was undertaken in response to a threat Afghans government, Army and Police leaders had been highlighting to the Coalition, to little avail, over the preceding two months. Afghan concerns at one point were dismissed as ‘chasing ghosts.’ To their credit, 3 Commando Brigade, having only recently assumed the TF Helmand mission, focused on enabling this operation which contributed to its success.
-With the exception of one very tough district, every district where the Police have undergone the Focused District Development reform program has seen dramatic drops in civilian casualties and significant drops in police casualties. Moreover, despite our constant recriminations and obvious shortcomings, including continued corruption, the police poll very highly with the Afghan people and they do fight to protect their people, suffering 3 times the casualties seen by either the ANA or ISAF.
-ANA and ANP units routinely conduct joint cordon and search operations around Kandahar City independent of support from the Coalition.
-Similarly, ANA companies in remote district outposts with their advisers do conduct operations daily. For example, a series of night ambush operations killed a number of Taliban leaders who threatened locals with death if they came to the local market, and broke the intimidation of the population and restored security and local commerce in the area.
None of this to suggest they are perfect, but they are far better and capable than most of our Coalition partners will admit or allow.
Not sure what you meant by AOG, but if you mean Afghan Opposition Groups, the AOGs suffer significant casualties when fighting the Coalition and, absent IED attacks, most often when fighting the ANSF, especially the ANA.