26 January 2012

I am a Dustoff pilot (Instructor pilot) with over 1000 hours of combat time, and over 300+ combat medevac missions under my belt.  In 2004 (Iraq) we flew single ship, responding to thousands of medevac 9-line calls.  Not one helo shot down, but we sure got shot at a lot.  On a few occasions, we had to ask armed helos, who were out on missions, to divert and escort us into some hot areas.  On a few other occasions, we had the Air Force Pedros request to go along with us on missions. We responded quickly and efficiently.  When we got the call, we went.

When there were multiple casualties, we as crews made the call to launch more than one medevac bird to accommodate the number of patients.  No bureaucracy on launch authority or escorts.

Now, all medevac calls must go through channels, must be approved by commanders at battalion level or higher, must be escorted etc etc. This is what slows us down.

Some facts as I see it:

Read more: Thoughts from a Dustoff Pilot

21 January 2012

This war is going to turn out badly. We are wasting lives and resources while the United States decays and other threats emerge.  We led the horse to water.

Importantly, there is no value in pretending that Pakistan is an ally. We should wish the best of luck to the Afghans, and the many peaceful Pakistanis, and accelerate our withdrawal of our main battle force. The US never has been serious about Afghanistan. Under General Petraeus we were starting to gain ground, but the current trajectory will land us in the mud.

The enemies will never beat us in Afghanistan.  Force on force, the Taliban are weak by comparison.  Yet this is their home.  There is only so much we can do at this extreme cost for the many good Afghan people.  We must reduce our main effort and concentrate on other matters.  Time to come home.

Sincerely,

Michael Yon

28 January 2012

While reading traffic in a closed forum between current and former military officers, I stumbled across this message from a British officer.  I’ve known him since the Iraq days, and he’s also served in Afghanistan.  He’s an honest and very smart officer, and so I pay close attention to him.  With his permission, I reprint:

Message from British officer

I've been following Michael's work for years and I watched that painful video some while ago.

Michael makes a perfectly valid, arguably indisputable point that, in some circumstances, US Army MEDEVAC policy can delay the movement of casualties to hospital. The fact that the Golden Hour can still be met in most cases is immaterial. If we could make it work, we'd want a Platinum 30 Minutes as we all know that a few minutes can make the difference between life and death. Accordingly, there should be a continuous effort to shave extra minutes off of the time it takes to reach the wounded and what is proposed by Michael will often do just that.

The arguments presented by the US Army for why a change is not necessary are unconvincing, in fact in parts they seem somewhat fictive. I just hope there aren't people out there telling their boss what they think he wants to hear when they know differently in their hearts.

Therefore - and as a British Army officer I do think carefully about criticizing an organization I admire in many ways - my opinion is that there should be a quick meal of humble pie at the upper levels of the US Army and a change to match the USAF and RAF methods which do not mark MEDEVAC aircraft and do arm them. Saying "We were wrong" need bring no shame, it would be a fine example of leadership that would be respected within the Army itself and wider - and it'll likely save a few lives.

20 January 2012

What do you think of Lieutenant General John F. Campbell's remarks in this video?

Please click to view.

You can download a pdf version here.

America's Medevac Failure

06 November 2011

This combat video was made in September 2011 in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan.  A bomb was planted in our path.  A young, highly-liked Soldier named Chazray Clark triggered the blast.  Chazray lost an arm and both legs.  Despite great pain, Chazray was awake and lucid the entire time.

A tragedy was unfolding.  The US military, at the direction of former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, strives to get our wounded to hospitals within the “Golden Hour.”  The military mostly accomplishes this with incredible speed, often under direct enemy fire.   They could do much better.

After casualties are sustained, the medical evacuation helicopters typically will not launch until a “9-line” report is transmitted from the field.  During this mission, due to the calm discipline of the Soldiers of 4-4 Cav, the 9-line was transmitted in only six minutes.  That’s fast.

Bold accounting magic has been used to redefine the Golden Hour.  The true starting gun for the biological Golden Hour begins at the moment of injury.  The military Golden Hour begins after the 9-line is received.  If combat or other circumstance delays the 9-line by 20 minutes, the military Golden Hour becomes 80 minutes.  But when we hear a military spokesmen saying that average MEDEVAC times are 50 minutes, what they are really saying is 50 minutes plus the 9-line time, and they won’t mention that 9-line buffer.  This audacious deception angers many military people who know about it.

I reported that 65 minutes were used to get Chazray Clark to the hospital.  The military rebuked my initial report, saying it took only 59.  They took the Golden Hour tax deduction, deceived the public, and did so in writing.

It took 65 minutes.  It should have taken 25.   There are several reasons why Chazray suffered the additional 40 minutes.

The first reason is the 9-line.  Pilots in Afghanistan say there is no need to wait.  They should launch immediately upon notification of serious wounds.  They can pick up the 9-line in flight.

The bigger reason is a longstanding Army policy to wear Red Crosses on their helicopters.  The Army will say that in accordance with the Geneva Conventions they must wear the Red Crosses, and therefore cannot carry machine guns on the helicopters.  This is false: neither the Air Force, nor the Marines, nor British wear the Red Crosses, and they go armed.  The enemies in Afghanistan do not adhere to the Geneva Conventions.  Is the Army saying that the Air Force, Marines and British are in violation of Geneva Conventions by not wearing the Red Crosses?  Of course not.  But the Army wears the Red Crosses as crucifixes to avoid uncomfortable change.

The helicopters are clearly visible on most nights while the Red Crosses are not.  An Afghan said that Taliban would likely consider the Red Cross a sign of Christianity, not MEDEVAC.   The enemy constantly tries to shoot down Army Dustoffs, Red Cross and all.  By contrast, the Air Force and Marines play smarter games and will come in guns blazing and help kill enemy around the landing zones.

While Chazray lay dying, an unarmed Dustoff helicopter was parked about 2 – 3 minutes away at Forward Operating Base Pasab.  After a call, it can take about 7 minutes to launch a Dustoff.  And so, 7 minutes plus 3 minutes’ flight could have had Chazray on the bird in just over 10 minutes.  The hospital was at Kandahar Airfield (KAF) about 13 minutes away.  So 10 minutes to arrive to the LZ, 2 minutes to load Chazray and take off, then 13 minutes to the hospital.  This would have put Chazray at the hospital in 25 minutes.  Alternatively, armed Air Force Pedro rescue birds were parked farther away at KAF and could have flown the longer distance, picked up Chazray, and had him back in about 35 minutes.  Had Pedros or armed Dustoffs been at FOB Pasab, they could have done the job in 25 minutes.

Instead, since the Dustoffs do not have machine guns, the Dustoff waited for the Apache helicopter top cover.  Forty minutes were lost due to 9-line procedures and waiting for the Apache.   This delay allowed the life to drain out of Chazray.  It also allowed the enemy a great amount of time to prepare to attack the unarmed Dustoff helicopter on the open landing zone, along with the Soldiers who were there in the open working hard to save Chazray.  (In this case, no attack occurred during LZ operations.)

The military spent much energy refuting my claims in RED AIR and GOLDEN SECONDS.   They apparently did not realize I made video.  For instance, they tried to undercut the credibility of my reports by saying the Dustoff did not come from Kandahar Airfield, but from FOB Pasab.  The video clearly shows on numerous occasions that the Dustoff was coming from KAF.  Nevertheless, allowing for battlefield errors, if the Dustoff actually came from Pasab, this does not help their case, but damages it outright.  KAF is about 13 minutes away; Pasab only about 3, and so what they accidentally said by trying to undermine my reports was that Chazray could have been to the hospital 10 minutes faster.  That is, if the Dustoffs were armed and could depart without gunship cover.

The 9-line procedure must be changed, and Dustoffs must be armed.  The “Military Golden Hour” must become a thing of the past.  There is only one Golden Hour.  All else is Fool’s Gold.  This Fool’s Gold is expensive; it’s costing lives of our service members in Afghanistan.

Please watch this important video of the attack and MEDEVAC of Chazray Clark.

Further Reading:

1) RED AIR
2) GOLDEN SECONDS
3) PEDROS

Golden Seconds

Open Letter to Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta
and President Barack Obama

US Air Force "Pedro" helicopter

24 October 2011

Gentlemen,

For the last seven years I have written about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  I have covered the US Army, Marines, Air Force and Navy.  I’ve also covered the British, Lithuanian, Afghan and Iraqi forces, among others, in places ranging from Iraq to the Philippines and beyond.  My most recent embed in Afghanistan was at personal invitation from then-General David Petraeus.  It is said that I have spent more time with American combat forces than any writer in US history.  I do not know if this is true, but it’s got to be close.  I’ve written three books and probably a thousand articles.  My work is known worldwide.

On 12 October, I published a dispatch called “Red Air,” detailing policy shortcomings with US Army Dustoff MEDEVAC procedures.  The kernel of the matter is that under the Geneva Conventions, when our Army “Dustoff” MEDEVAC helicopters wear red crosses, they are forbidden to be armed.  If they do not wear red crosses, they can be armed.

Read more: Golden Seconds

22 November 2011

US Army MEDEVAC helicopters in Afghanistan are marked with Red Crosses. Helicopters sporting a Red Cross are not allowed to be armed. The enemy knows this. The enemy tries to shoot down these unarmed helicopters with the added advantage that our people cannot shoot back.  And so, we push people into combat while advertising to the enemy that our people are unarmed.  The best that can be said for this policy is that it’s wrong. The worst that can be said might be that it borders on criminal.

We like to think that after a decade of counterinsurgency, we have learned something. Have we? What does a cross on a helicopter mean? For some Afghans, it’s a mark of the beast. The poster above was hanging on a wall in eastern Afghanistan.

Read more: Mark of the Beast: Evil Symbols in Afghanistan